Opinion
Appellate Case No. 2017-001229 Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-074
03-10-2021
The State, Respondent, v. David Harold Campbell, Appellant.
Tara Dawn Shurling, of Law Office Of Tara Dawn Shurling, PA, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior Assistant Attorney General David A. Spencer, both of Columbia, for Respondent.
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. Appeal From Horry County
Thomas A. Russo, Circuit Court Judge
AFFIRMED
Tara Dawn Shurling, of Law Office Of Tara Dawn Shurling, PA, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior Assistant Attorney General David A. Spencer, both of Columbia, for Respondent. PER CURIAM: David Harold Campbell appeals his convictions and sentences for trafficking in cocaine, third offense, and failure to stop for a blue light. The trial court sentenced Campbell to thirty years' imprisonment for trafficking cocaine and a concurrent sentence of five years' imprisonment for failure to stop for a blue 2 light. On appeal, Campbell asserts the trial court erred in (1) admitting irrelevant evidence and (2) denying his motion for a mistrial. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: 1. First, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Detective Jeremy Neely's testimony that he and another officer were investigating a narcotics complaint in the area prior to initiating a traffic stop. See State v. Gaster, 349 S.C. 545, 557, 564 S.E.2d 87, 93 (2002) ("The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion."); Rule 402, SCRE (explaining that relevant evidence is generally admissible, whereas irrelevant evidence is generally inadmissible); Rule 403, SCRE (instructing relevant evidence may be excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence"). Detective Neely's testimony was relevant to present a full presentation of the offense because it explained why plainclothes police officers were in the area and provided context for the initial traffic stop. See State v. Preslar, 364 S.C. 466, 474, 613 S.E.2d 381, 385 (Ct. App. 2005) ("When evidence is admissible to provide this 'full presentation' of the offense, there is 'no reason to fragmentize the event under inquiry by suppressing parts of the res gestae.'" (quoting State v. Sweat, 362 S.C. 117, 133, 606 S.E.2d 508, 517 (Ct. App. 2004))). Moreover, Detective Neely's testimony did not pose a risk of unfair prejudice because it did not reference Campbell and did not suggest a decision on an improper basis. See State v. Wiles, 383 S.C. 151, 158, 679 S.E.2d 172, 176 (2009) ("Unfair prejudice means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis."). 2. Second, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Campbell's motion for a mistrial. See State v. Stanley, 365 S.C. 24, 33, 615 S.E.2d 3 455, 460 (Ct. App. 2005) ("The decision to grant or deny a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial [court]."); State v. Simmons, 352 S.C. 342, 354, 573 S.E.2d 856, 862 (Ct. App. 2002) ("'The power of a court to declare a mistrial ought to be used with the greatest caution under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes' stated into the record by the trial [court]." (quoting State v. Kirby, 269 S.C. 25, 28, 236 S.E.2d 33, 34 (1977))); Stanley, 365 S.C. at 34, 615 S.E.2d at 460 ("The granting of a motion for a mistrial is an extreme measure which should be taken only where an incident is so grievous that prejudicial effect can be removed in no other way."). AFFIRMED. LOCKEMY, C.J., and KONDUROS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.