Opinion
ID# 9912011058.
Date Submitted: February 11, 2003.
Date Decided: May 30, 2003.
UPON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF
DENIED
ORDER
On this 30th day of May 2003, upon consideration of the Motion for Post Conviction Relief filed by the Defendant and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that:
(1) On March 29, 2001 a jury trial was held and Defendant was found guilty of one count of Possession With Intent To Deliver Cocaine and to one count of Possession of a Controlled Substance Within 300 Feet Of A Park. Defendant was sentenced on August 10, 2001, to a total period of eighteen years incarceration to be suspended after serving fifteen years for decreasing levels of supervision. Defendant appealed the jury verdict to the Supreme Court of Delaware, and the judgment was affirmed on June 27, 2002. Defendant first filed his Motion for Postconviction Relief on July 19, 2002. However, on May 28, 2002, Defendant filed a Motion for a New Trial, which was denied by the Superior Court on August 13, 2002. Defend ant appealed this denial, thus his Motion for Postconviction Relief filed on July 19, 2002, was dismissed by Superior Court. On December 19, 2002, the Superior Court's decision denying Campbell's Motion for a New Trial was affirmed. On December 26, 2002, Defendant filed the present Motion for Postconviction Relief. Defendant proceeded to file five Amendments to his Motion for Postconviction Relief on the following dates: January 3, 7, 23 and 27, 2003, and February 6, 2003.
Campbell v. State, 801 A.2d 10 (Del.Supr. 2002).
Defendant asserts four grounds in his initial request for postconviction relief:
(i) ineffective assistance of counsel;
(ii) structural defect in trial proceedings;
(iii) evidence insufficient to establish intent to deliver drugs and
(iv) substantial prejudice to defendant due to remarks concerning prior convictions. In the Amendments, Defendant elaborates on grounds (i)-(iv) above and further alleges the following:
(v) lack of proof of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt;
(vi) arrest warrants invalid; and
(vii) various erroneous instructions to the jury.
(2) In evaluating a postconviction relief motion, the Court must first ascertain if any procedural bars of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i) apply to the case. If a procedural bar is found to exist, the Court should refrain from considering the merits of the individual claims.
See Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del.Supr. 1990); Super.Ct.Civ.R. 61(i).
See Id.
(3) Defendant's contentions are procedurally barred as they have been previously considered by the Delaware Supreme Court in Defendant's direct appeal. Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(4):
Former Adjudication. Any ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated, whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is thereafter barred, unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice.
(4) A Rule 61(i)(4) procedural bar can be overcome if reconsideration of the claim is warranted "in the interest of justice." Exceptions to the former adjudication bar are necessarily narrow in scope. Otherwise, the bar would not achieve its purpose of finality and would become meaningless. Hence, legal arguments which have previously been adjudicated may not be reasserted in later proceedings, except under exceptional circumstances. Defendant's contentions do not fall under the category of exceptional circumstances.
State v. Deputy, 1989 WL 158454 at 7 (Del.Super.Ct.) (citing Fenton v. State, Del.Supr., No. 462, 1988, Christie, J. (Oct. 6, 1989).
Id.
Id.
(5) Although Defendant was unable to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal because this type of claim cannot be raised to the Delaware Supreme Court for the first time on appeal, the Court may consider them now. To prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Defendant must allege by clear facts the requirements of the Strickland test. Under Strickland, Defendant must show that alleged counsel's course of conduct "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and that such actions were prejudicial. It is settled Delaware law that allegations that are entirely conclusory are legally insufficient to prove ineffective assistance of counsel. Thus, Defendant must be able to show that defense counsel's error was objectively unreasonable and caused prejudice to Defendant's trial.
Campbell v. State, 801 A.2d 10 (Del.Supr. 2002). See Wright v. State, 513 A.2d 1310, 1315 (Del.Supr. 1986); State v. Brittingham, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. IN91-01-1009-R1, Barron, J. (Dec. 29, 1994) (Order) at 3.
Mapp v. State, Del. Supr., No. 003, 1994, Holland, J. (Mar. 17, 1994) (ORDER).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).
State v. Brittingham, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. IN91-01-1009-R1, Barron, J. (Dec. 29, 1994).
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
(6) In this case, Defendant has failed to satisfy the Strickland requirement of actual prejudice as he does not substantiate his claims. Defendant does not allege actual prejudice nor do his conclusory contentions allege that but for the errors he would not have been found guilty. Defendant bears the burden of proving that his trial counsel's inadequacies affected the outcome of the trial. Here, Defendant outlines the mistakes he believes his trial counsel committed. Defendant makes no attempt to show how the trial without these alleged mistakes would have resulted in a verdict of not-guilty. Thus, Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims must be denied.
Mapp v. State, Del. Supr., No. 003, 1994, Holland, J. (Mar. 17, 1994) (ORDER).
Stevenson v. State, Del. Supr., 469 A.2d 797, 799 (1983).
For the foregoing reasons Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED. ALFORD, J.