Opinion
ID. No. 1803005754
10-30-2020
STATE OF DELAWARE v. WILLIAM E. CALDWELL Defendant.
Lindsay A. Taylor, Esq., Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, for the State of Delaware. William E. Caldwell, Pro se.
RK18-03-0323-01 PFDCF (F)
COMMISSIONER'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Upon Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61
Lindsay A. Taylor, Esq., Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, for the State of Delaware. William E. Caldwell, Pro se. FREUD, Commissioner
The defendant, William E. Caldwell ("Caldwell") pled guilty on the day of his trial on November 19, 2018 to one count of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony ("PFDCF"), 11 Del. C. § 1447A. He was also charged with one additional count of PFDCF, two counts of Aggravated Menacing, four counts of Possession of a Firearm or Ammunition by a Person Prohibited, two counts of Possession of a Weapon Without a License, one count of Criminal Trespass in the Second Degree, two counts of Disorderly Conduct, two counts of Burglary in the First Degree, two counts of Endangering the Welfare of a Child and one count of Reckless Endangering in the First Degree. As part of the plea deal the State agreed to enter nolle prosequis on the remaining charges and along with the defense recommended a sentence of five years incarceration, with immediate sentencing. Had Caldwell gone to trial and been found guilty as charged he faced many years in jail and the potential for essentially life in prison. Caldwell's trial was originally scheduled for October 2, 2018 but the victim failed to appear so a material witness warrant was issued by the Court at the request of the State. The warrant was returned and the trial was then set for November 19, 2018. On the morning of trial after the victim appeared, Caldwell, his mother and counsel discussed the State's plea offer. Following the discussion Caldwell accepted the plea offer. The Court agreed with the recommendation of the parties and sentenced Caldwell accordingly.
Caldwell did not appeal his conviction or sentence to the State Supreme Court. Next, Caldwell filed the pending motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 on November 18, 2019 in which he alleges, in part, ineffective assistance of counsel.
FACTS
According to the Affidavit of Probable Cause and the transcript of the Preliminary hearing, on March 10, 2018 at approximately 12:47 a.m., Master Corporal Kevin Streadwick was patrolling in the area of South New Street and West Reed Street in Dover, Delaware and heard gunfire. Shortly thereafter the victim, Shirmera S. Brinson ("Brinson") filed a complaint at the Dover Police Department. Brinson stated that shortly before, her cousin, Morgan Brown ("Brown"), had come to her residence and told her that Caldwell, who was Brinson's ex-boyfriend was out front in a vehicle. As Brown was leaving Brinson's residence, Caldwell entered the residence uninvited and unannounced. Brinson then confronted Caldwell and told him to leave her residence at which time Caldwell pointed a black handgun at her. Next, Brinson and Brown attempted to push Caldwell out of the residence. Brinson's and Caldwell's 13 year old daughter was present during these events. Once out of the residence Caldwell shot the gun twice up into the air and then again pointed it at Brinson once again placing her in fear of her life. Caldwell then fled in a silver Mitsubishi Galant owned by another girlfriend of his, Kierra Mohr. Following this Brinson went directly to the Dover Police station. She was interviewed by Patrolman First Class Craig E. Mitchell. The police were able to view security video and saw the silver Mitsubishi leaving the front of Brinson's residence at 12:48 a.m. just one minute after Master Corporal Streadwick had heard the gun fire. Additionally two 9 mm bullet casings were located on the sidewalk in the front of Brinson's residence by the Dover Police during the investigation that morning.
State v. Caldwell, Del. Super., ID No. 1803005754, Affidavit of Probable Cause (D.I. 1) and Transcript of Preliminary Hearing (March 16, 2018), pp. 4 - 13 (D.I. 9).
CALDWELL'S CONTENTIONS
In his Motion for Postconviction Relief Caldwell raises the following grounds for relief:
Ground one: Effective Assistance of Counsel.
Assistance of counsel prejudice defendant by his ineffective performance under the Sixth Amendment, by failing to conduct any pre-trial investigation.
Ground two: Suppression of favorable evidence.
Defense counsel Mr. Zachary George failed to file a pre-trial motion to suppress the
materials of a June 25, 2018 discovery. Mr. George was informed I wanted to suppress the material I was informed we need the police report to do so which goes back to Ground one.
Ground three: Coerced guilty plea.
I rejected the State plea on November 19, 2018, which I was changed out of my D.O.C.'s into the clothes provided for trial. Instead of going up to the courtroom I was returned to the interview room where my mother set in place of Mr. George crying telling me to take the plea, because Mr. George informed her the State was going to find me guilty if I went upstairs to address the charges. Mr. George had then step into the room after I told my mother I didn't want to pain her anymore, she stated she didn't want to witness my life being taking from me. Counsel tactic was very stressful and emotional.
The grounds stated above represent all of Caldwell's arguments. He did not file a memorandum of law or Reply brief.
DISCUSSION
Under Delaware law, the Court must first determine whether Caldwell has met the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(I) before it may consider the merits of the postconviction relief claims. Under Rule 61, postconviction claims for relief must be brought within one year of the conviction becoming final. Caldwell's motion was filed in a timely fashion, thus the bar of Rule 61(i)(1) does not apply to the motion. As this is Caldwell's initial motion for postconviction relief, the bar of Rule 61(i)(2), which prevents consideration of any claim not previously asserted in a postconviction motion, does not apply either.
Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
None of Caldwell's claims were raised previously at his plea, sentencing or on direct appeal. Consequently they are barred under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(3) unless he demonstrates: (1) cause for relief from the procedural default; and (2) prejudice from a violation of the movant's rights. The bars to relief are inapplicable to a jurisdictional challenge or "to a claim that satisfies the pleading requirements of subparagraph (2)(i) or (2)(ii) of subdivision (d) of Rule 61. To meet the requirements of Rule 61(d)(2) a defendant must plead with particularity that new evidence exists that creates a strong inference that the movant is actually innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges of which he was convicted or that he pleads with particularity a claim that a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the United State or Delaware Supreme courts, applies to the defendant's case rendering the conviction invalid. Caldwell's motion pleads neither requirement of Rule 61(d)(2).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(ii).
To some extent each of Caldwell's grounds for relief are premised on allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore Caldwell has alleged sufficient cause for not having asserted these grounds for relief at trial and on direct appeal. Caldwell's ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not subject to the procedural default rule, in part because the Delaware Supreme Court will not generally hear such claims for the first time on direct appeal. For this reason, many defendants, including Caldwell, allege ineffective assistance of counsel in order to overcome the procedural default. "However, this path creates confusion if the defendant does not understand that the test for ineffective assistance of counsel and the test for cause and prejudice are distinct, albeit similar, standards." The United States Supreme Court has held that:
State v. Gattis, 1995 WL 790961 (Del. Super.).
[i]f the procedural default is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment itself requires that the responsibility for the default be imputed to the State, which may not 'conduc[t] trials at which persons who face incarceration must defend themselves without adequate legal assistance;' [i]neffective assistance of counsel then is cause for a procedural default.A movant who interprets the final sentence of the quoted passage to mean that he can simply assert ineffectiveness and thereby meet the cause requirement will miss the mark. Rather, to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must engage in the two part analysis enunciated in Strickland v. Washington and adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court in Albury v. State.
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
551 A.2d 53, 58 (Del. 1988).
In the context of a guilty plea challenge, Strickland requires a defendant show: (1) that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that counsel's actions were prejudicial to him in that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial and that the result of a trial would have been his acquittal. The failure to establish that a defendant would not have pled guilty and would have proceeded to trial is sufficient cause for denial of relief. In addition, Delaware courts have consistently held that in setting forth a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal. When examining the representation of counsel pursuant to the first prong of the Strickland test, there is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct was professionally reasonable. This standard is highly demanding. Strickland mandates that, when viewing counsel's representation, this Court must endeavor to "eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight."
Id. at 687.
Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997)(citing Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 60 (Del. 1988))(citations omitted).
See e.g., Outten v. State, 720 A.2d 547, 557 (Del. 1998) (citing Boughner v. State, 1995 WL 466465 at *1 (Del. Supr.)).
Albury, 551 A.2d at 59 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 754 (Del. 1990)(quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 383 (1986)).
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
Following a complete review of the record in this matter, it is abundantly clear that Caldwell has failed to allege any facts sufficient to substantiate his claim that his attorney was ineffective. I find trial counsel's affidavit, in conjunction with the record, more credible than Caldwell's self-serving claims that his counsel's representation was ineffective. Caldwell's counsel clearly denies the allegations.
Caldwell was facing the possibility of many years in jail, which would have essentially amounted to life in prison had he been convicted on all counts. The sentence and plea were very reasonable under all the circumstances, especially in light of the eyewitness, physical and video evidence against him. Prior to the entry of the plea, Caldwell and his attorney discussed the case and the plea. The plea bargain was clearly advantageous to Caldwell. Counsel was successful in negotiating an extremely beneficial plea bargain with the State. Counsel's representation was certainly well within the range required by Strickland. Additionally, when Caldwell entered his plea, he stated he was satisfied with defense counsel's performance. He is bound by his statement unless he presents clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Consequently, Caldwell has failed to establish that his counsel's representation was ineffective under the Strickland test.
Mapp v. State, 1994 WL 91264, at *2 (Del.Supr.)(citing Sullivan v. State, 636 A.2d 931, 937-938 (Del. 1994)).
Even assuming, arguendo, that counsel's representation of Caldwell was somehow deficient, Caldwell must satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, prejudice. In setting forth a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk dismissal. In an attempt to show prejudice, Caldwell simply asserts that his counsel was ineffective by failing to adequately investigate the case and for not filing a motion to suppress. Both of these claims are denied by counsel who outlined his efforts on behalf of Caldwell and his concern that a suppression motion would have been futile. My review of the facts of the case lead me to conclude that counsel's representation of Caldwell was well within the requirements of the Sixth Amendment and no prejudice has been demonstrated. His statements are insufficient to establish prejudice, particularly in light of the evidence against him. Therefore, I find Caldwell's grounds for relief are meritless.
Larson v. State, 1995 WL 389718, at *2 (Del. Supr.)(citing Younger, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990)).
To the extent that Caldwell alleges his plea was involuntary, the record contradicts such an allegation. When addressing the question of whether a plea was constitutionally knowing and voluntary, the Court looks to a plea colloquy to determine if the waiver of constitutional rights was knowing and voluntary. At the guilty-plea hearing, the Court asked Caldwell whether he understood the nature of the charges, the consequences of his pleading , and whether he was voluntarily entering the plea. The Court asked Caldwell if he understood he would waive his constitutional rights if he entered the plea including the right to suppress evidence; if he understood each of the constitutional rights listed on the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form ("Guilty Plea Form"); and whether he gave truthful answers to all the questions on the form. The Court asked Caldwell if he had discussed the his plea and its consequences fully with his attorney. The Court also asked Caldwell if he was satisfied with this counsel's representation. Caldwell answered each of these questions affirmatively. I find counsel's representations far more credible than Caldwell's self-serving, vague allegations.
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993).
State v. Caldwell, Del. Super., ID No. 1803005754 (Nov. 19, 2018) Tr. at 3-11.
Furthermore, prior to entering his plea, Caldwell signed a Guilty Plea Form and Plea Agreement in his own handwriting. Caldwell's signatures on the forms indicate that he understood the constitutional rights he was relinquishing by pleading guilty and that he freely and voluntarily decided to plead guilty to the charges listed in the Plea Agreement. Caldwell is bound by the statements he made on the signed Guilty Plea Form, unless he proves otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. I confidently find that Caldwell entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily and that Caldwell's grounds for relief are completely meritless.
Sommerville, 703 A.2d at 632. --------
CONCLUSION
I find that Caldwell's counsel represented him in a competent and effective manner as required by the standards set in Strickland and that Caldwell has failed to demonstrate any prejudice stemming from the representation. I also find that Caldwell's guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. I recommend that the Court deny Caldwell's motion for postconviction relief as procedurally barred and meritless.
/s/ Andrea M. Freud
Commissioner AMF/dsc
oc: Prothonotary