Opinion
ID Nos. 9807006121, 9807006069. Cr.A. Nos. IK98-07-0450-0549.
Submitted: December 27, 1999.
Decided: January 4, 2000.
Upon Defendant's Motion for a New Trial DENIED
Stephen R. Welch, Jr., Esquire, Department of Justice, for State of Delaware.
Charles E. Whitehurst, Esquire, Young, Malmberg, Whitehurst Curley, P.A., for the defendant.
ORDER
1. Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for a New Trial pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 33. The basis for Defendant's motion is the relationship that existed between Juror Number 7 and the wife of a Deputy Attorney General ("DAG") within the same office as the prosecutor in this case, Stephen R. Welch, Jr. After the State rested its case, Mr. Welch advised the Court that Juror Number 7 had a conversation with the wife of a Deputy Attorney General from Mr. Welch's office after the case had begun. According to the Defendant, Juror Number 7 deliberately did not disclose this relationship to the Court. Consequently, Defendant asserts that he endured undue prejudice as a result of this non-disclosure by a prospective juror who was eventually empaneled.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 33. New Trial.
The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to that defendant if required in the interest of justice.
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2. The importance of a fair trial by a panel of impartial jurors is reviewed in detail by the Defendant. It is a correct assertion that it is a fundamental right in our society. Juror bias, of course, will not be tolerated in our judicial system. Indeed, if only one juror is improperly influenced, a defendant in a criminal case is denied his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. Defendant further claims that his right to utilize his peremptory challenges to prospective jurors was impeded in this case because of Juror Number 7's non-disclosure. However, the Defendant's position ignores the facts as they were elicited at trial.
Styler v. State, Del. Supr. 417 A.2d 948 (1980); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Jackson v. State, Del. Supr., 374 A.2d 1 (1977).
Styler at 950-951; United States v. Hendrix, 9th Cir., 549 F.2d 1225 (1977).
3. Immediately upon being made aware of Juror Number 7's comments, the Court brought the juror into open court and questioned her on the record about her relationship with anyone within the Department of Justice. Juror Number 7 responded that the wife of a Deputy Attorney General is her best friend. She also stated that she told this DAG's wife that she was sitting on a criminal jury trial in Superior Court in Dover, Delaware. Although the date this conversation took place was not made clear by Juror Number 7, upon further questioning she stated that any relationship she has with the wife of a DAG would not affect her impartiality to the case upon which she was sitting as a juror. The Court was satisfied that this juror could serve the remainder of the trial as an impartial judge of the facts. This colloquy was documented on the record.
4. The Defendant avers that this juror did not disclose her relationship with the wife of a DAG intentionally. However, looking at the voir dire question posed to the jury panel, her answer was not an intentional misrepresentation to the Court. In the case at bar, the Court chose to accept the proposed voir dire question of Defendant's attorney, Mr. Whitehurst. The question read:
Do any of you know any of the attorneys in this case or have any of you been represented by the attorneys in this case or for the law firms for which they work, either now or in the past? They are as follows: a. Charles E. Whitehurst, Esquire of Young, Malmberg, Whitehurst Curley, or any other member of that law firm, for the defendant; b. Stephen E. Welch, Esquire, for the Department of Justice, as prosecutor.
The question asked by the Court does not mention the DAG whose wife is an acquaintance of Juror Number 7, nor does it ask if any potential jurors know anyone else within the Department of Justice outside of the current prosecutor. The wording of the question is also ambiguous as to whether the Department of Justice can actually represent someone in a past action.
The voir dire question that the Court typically asks would have asked the jury panel whether they knew anyone in the Department of Justice or the Defendant's attorney's law firm. However, it was the Defendant's attorney who propounded this proposed voir dire question to the Court. The question was asked without objection by either party. Therefore, since there was no prejudice as a result of the question, it would not be proper for the Defendant to now to attack his own question.
5. This Court agrees with its finding on the record during trial that this question was ambiguous and Juror Number 7 was not deliberately misleading the Court and was answering the voir dire questions to the best of her knowledge. The comments of Juror Number 7 are similar to the comments made in Styler v. State. In Styler, the Judge found comments from a juror to a spectator about the nature of the case to be "loose talk." Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that since the trial judge found the comments to be "loose talk" rather than a reflection of an improper bias against the defendant, that a new trial was not warranted. The Supreme Court has also previously held that complete ignorance of the facts by a prospective juror is not needed, "[i]t is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court." In the case sub judice, after questioning Juror Number 7 about her relationship with the wife of a DAG, the Court was satisfied with the juror's assertion that any such relationship would not affect her ability to sit as an impartial judge of the facts as elicited at trial. Thus, the Defendant has not demonstrated to the Court that he must be granted a new trial in the interests of justice.
Styler at 953.
Hughes v. State, Del. Supr., 490 A.2d 1034, 1040 (1985) citing Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961).
Therefore, Defendant's Motion for a New Trial is denied. IT IS SO ORDERED.