Opinion
2012 KA 0710
02-15-2013
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. PERCY CAGE
Hon. Hillar Moore, III District Attorney BY: Darwin Miller Jaclyn C. Chapman Assistant District Attorneys Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Appellee State of Louisiana Lieu T. Vo Clark Mandeville, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Percy Cage
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
On Appeal from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge
State of Louisiana
No. 10-09-0994
Honorable Anthony Marabella, Judge Presiding
Hon. Hillar Moore, III
District Attorney
BY: Darwin Miller
Jaclyn C. Chapman
Assistant District Attorneys
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Counsel for Appellee
State of Louisiana
Lieu T. Vo Clark
Mandeville, Louisiana
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
Percy Cage
BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., McCLENDON AND HIGGINBOTHAM, JJ.
McCLENDON , J.
The defendant, Percy Cage, was charged by grand jury indictment with felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile, in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:80. After a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty as charged. The State filed a habitual offender bill of information, the trial court adjudicated the defendant a fourth felony offender, and the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The defendant now appeals, raising the constitutionality of the sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction, habitual offender adjudication, and sentence.
While the indictment included several other charges, the trial and this appeal pertain only to the offense stated herein.
The habitual offender adjudication was based on a 1990 guilty plea to simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling, a 1995 conviction of first degree robbery, and a 2000 guilty plea to illegal possession of stolen things (in excess of $500.00).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 2002, the defendant began a relationship with J.M. (the victim), who was thirteen years old at the time. The defendant was thirty-three years old at the time. The victim knew the defendant as someone who lived in her neighborhood in Baton Rouge, and she described the beginning of their relationship as a friendship. When the victim was fifteen years old, the relationship became sexual, specifically consisting of vaginal intercourse on a regular basis. The defendant continued to have sex with the victim, and she became pregnant and gave birth to the defendant's child on October 30, 2006, at the age of seventeen.
Herein, only initials will be used to identify the victim. See LSA-R.S. 46:1844(W). The defendant's date of birth is September 23, 1969.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
In the sole assignment of error, the defendant argues that the mandatory sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. The defendant notes that he was in a consensual, ongoing relationship with the victim. He further notes that when the indictment was filed she was twenty years old and had two children with him. Additionally, the defendant notes that the sentence will deprive his children of a relationship with their father.
At the outset, we note that our review of the record shows that it does not contain a written motion to reconsider sentence or evidence that the defendant orally moved for reconsideration of the sentence. The failure to file or make a motion to reconsider sentence precludes a defendant from raising an objection to the sentence on appeal. See LSA-C.C.Pr. art. 881.1(E); State v. Duncan, 94-1563 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/15/95), 667 So.2d 1141, 1143 (en banc per curiam).
It is well settled that a contemporaneous objection to a sentence on excessiveness grounds alone preserves a bare claim of excessiveness. See State v. Mims, 619 So.2d 1059 (La. 1993) (per curiam). A general objection to a sentence, however, preserves nothing for appellate review. See State v. Bickham, 98-1839 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/25/99), 739 So.2d 887, 891.
On appeal, the defendant acknowledges the fact that a motion to reconsider sentence was not filed, but contends that his objection to the sentence should preserve his rights to appeal the excessiveness of his sentence, citing State v. Caldwell, 620 So.2d 859 (La. 1993). In Caldwell, "counsel objected generally to the penalties imposed by the trial court and specifically to the excessiveness of the sentences, including their consecutive nature, to the court's departure from the recommended range provided by the new Sentencing Guidelines, and to particular factual allegations regarding the defendant's background." The supreme court concluded that these oral remarks constituted an oral motion to reconsider sentence made "at the time of sentencing," which alerted the court to specific problems that counsel found at a time when the trial court could take corrective action, obviating the need for a written motion filed after resentencing.
Herein, defense counsel objected after the habitual offender sentencing stating: "[P]lease note our objection to the court's ruling ... and our intention to file additional materials relative to appeal status." However, defense counsel did not voice any particular objection to the sentence. Thus, the defendant's failure to urge a claim of excessiveness or any other specific ground for reconsideration of the sentence by oral or written motion at the trial court level precludes our review of his claim of sentence excessiveness. This assignment of error lacks merit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the conviction, habitual offender adjudication, and sentence.
CONVICTION, HABITUAL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION, AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.