Opinion
Cr. A. No. IN 98011219
Submitted: July 30, 1999
Decided: August 17, 1999 Motion Denied: February 8, 2000
ORDER
Upon review of Movant Patrick C. Byrd ("Movant")'s Motion for Postconviction Relief and the record, it appears to the Court:
1) Movant filed a pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 on a plea to Trafficking in Cocaine 5-50 grams (IN9801011219), Driving With a Suspended License (IN98011226) and a Violation of Probation (VN9706062601).
2) On February 24, 1998, after the return of an indictment charging Movant with eight separate crimes, Movant agreed to plead guilty to a single count of Trafficking in Cocaine 5-50 grams, Driving With a Suspended License and a Violation of Probation.
3) In this motion, Movant asserts that "this plea was offered before discovery in this matter was finalized and therefore the defendant had no way of knowing that the evidence collected by the police did not support the charge in this matter." A field test of cocaine in the possession of Movant indicated a weight of 8.6 grams. Movant alleges that the medical examiner's findings are such that a trafficking charge is unfounded. He complains that he was not provided with all discoverable material, and therefore, he did not receive effective assistance of counsel. Movant also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in accepting Movant's plea. Movant fails to provide any substantiation for his allegations.
4) In reviewing motions for postconviction relief, the Court must first determine whether a defendant's claims are barred by procedural requirements prior to addressing the merits of the underlying claims. Rule 61(i)(4) provides for summary dismissal by the court "[i]f it plainly appears from the motion . . . and the record . . . that the movant is not entitled to relief, the judge may enter an order for its summary dismissal . . ."
Bailey v. State, Del. Supr., 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (1991); Younger v. State, Del. Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 554 (1990).
5) The Court finds that defendant's claim is essentially one of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant has the burden of showing that an attorney's conduct did not meet reasonable professional standards and that such conduct was prejudicial to him.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
In the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, "[t]he movant must support the ineffective assistance of counsel claims with concrete allegations of actual prejudice, otherwise the movant risks summary dismissal." In the case of a guilty plea, the United States Supreme Court has held that the second prong of the Strickland test becomes whether the defendant has shown that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and have insisted on going to trial." The Delaware Supreme Court has also noted that a defendant's burden in establishing a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is difficult to meet:
State v. Mason, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. IN98-02-0279-R1, Barron, J. (Apr. 11, 1996) (Mem. Op.), citing Younger v. State, Del. Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 556 (1990).
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). See Albury v. State, Del.Supr., 551 A.2d 53, 58 (1988).
A retrospective examination of a lawyer's representation to determine whether it was free from any error would exact a higher measure of competency than the prevailing standard. Perfection is hardly attainable and certainly is not the general rule, especially in professional work where intuitive judgments and spontaneous decisions care often required in varying circumstances. . . . [W]hat is required is normal and not exceptional representation. . . .
Renai v. State, Del.Supr., 450 A.2d 382, 384 (1982) (quoting Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970)).
6) After reviewing the record, the Court finds that there is no basis for Movant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Movant indicates that defense counsel advised defendant to consider taking a plea in this case. Movant filled out and signed the Truth in Sentencing Guilty Plea form, he signed the plea agreement, and accepted his plea in open court after a full colloquoy with the sentencing judge. There is no indication that Movant was misinformed by counsel, or that counsel committed any errors in this plea agreement process or in Movant's acceptance of the plea. The fact that Movant now disagrees with his attorney's advice is not a ground for relief on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.
7) Further, there are no facts whatsoever within Movant's motion which would support or indicate that the sentencing court abused its discretion in accepting Movant's 11(e)(1)(C) plea. As a result, Movant's claims are entirely conclusory. The motion, therefore, is summarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 61(d)(4).
For the reasons stated above, defendant's motion for post-conviction relief is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.