State v. Christianson, 217 Neb. 445, 348 N.W.2d 895 (1984); State v. Garcia, 216 Neb. 769, 345 N.W.2d 826 (1984); State v. Billups, 209 Neb. 737, 311 N.W.2d 512 (1981); State v. Ohler, 208 Neb. 742, 305 N.W.2d 637 (1981); State v. Morgan, 206 Neb. 818, 295 N.W.2d 285 (1980); State v. French, 203 Neb. 435, 279 N.W.2d 116 (1979); State v. Rathburn, 195 Neb. 485, 239 N.W.2d 253 (1976); State v. Van Ackeren, 194 Neb. 650, 235 N.W.2d 210 (1975); State v. Skonberg, 194 Neb. 550, 233 N.W.2d 919 (1975); State v. Holloway, 187 Neb. 1, 187 N.W.2d 85 (1971). See, also, In re Interest of Clinton G., 12 Neb.App. 178, 669 N.W.2d 467 (2003); In re Interest of Frederick C., 8 Neb.App. 343, 594 N.W.2d 294 (1999); State v. Tierney, 7 Neb.App. 469, 584 N.W.2d 461 (1998); State v. Butzke, 7 Neb.App. 360, 584 N.W.2d 449 (1998). See, State v. Howell, 26 Neb.App. 842, 924 N.W.2d 349 (2019); State v. Zuniga, 25 Neb.App. 706, 911 N.W.2d 869 (2018); State v. Bond, 23 Neb.App. 916, 877 N.W.2d 254 (2016); State v. Turner, 23 Neb.App. 897, 880 N.W.2d 403 (2016).

Typically, the consenting party's youth will be one of many factors considered when the trier of fact analyzes the legality of a minor's consent. See State v. Tomlinson (Wis. 2002), 648 N.W.2d 367, 376 ("[w]hether the child possesses such authority will depend on a number of factors, and courts must look at the totality of the circumstances to make such a determination"); State v. Butzke (Neb.App. 1998), 584 N.W.2d 449, 458 (the court must analyze voluntariness and common authority over the premises, or whether law enforcement reasonably believed the child had apparent authority); State v. Kriegh (Kan.App. 1997), 937 P.2d 453, 457 ("[a]lthough age is a factor to consider in ascertaining whether consent was given willingly, minority status alone does not prevent one from giving consent"); State v. Will (Or.App. 1994), 885 P.2d 715, 720 ("age is merely one factor to be considered in determining the scope of the minor's authority to consent and whether the minor's consent was knowing and voluntary" (citation omitted)); Saavedra v. State (Fla. 1993), 622 So.2d 952, 956 ("the State must show by clear and convincing evidence from the totality of the circumstances that the minor gave free and voluntary consent"); Davis v. State (Ga. 1992), 422 S.E.2d 546, 549 (a court must "examine a child's mental maturity and his ability to understand the circumstances in which he is placed, and the consequences of his actio

When the State relies upon a minor's third-party consent to justify a warrantless search, the child's age, intelligence, and maturity are critical on the voluntariness issue, on the question of whether the child possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the area or thing sought to be inspected, and on whether the searching party reasonably believed the child possessed authority to consent even if it is later demonstrated that the child did not possess such authority. State v. Butzke, 7 Neb.App. 360, 584 N.W.2d 449 (1998), disapproved on other grounds, State v. Hammond, supra.

nsent requested and given was proper); State v. Hargrove, 631 So.2d 1208, 1212 (La.Ct.App. 1994) ("[S]ince defendant failed to even allege that he manifested an expectation of exclusivity over the greenhouse, we see no error in the trial judge's determination that [the minor child] had authority to consent to a search of the greenhouse located in the backyard."); In re Anthony F., 293 Md. 146, 442 A.2d 975 (1982) (holding that the trial court did not err in finding that a 16-year-old had apparent authority and sufficient relationship to the premises to provide third-party consent to a request to search); State v. Lotton, 527 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn.Ct.App. 1995) (holding that under the totality of the circumstances a "mature and intelligent 10-year-old" could provide valid third-party consent to search her parent's apartment); State v. Griffin, 756 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1988) (holding that a 13-year-old resident of the house had authority to consent to the entry to common areas of the house); State v. Butzke, 7 Neb.App. 360, 584 N.W.2d 449 (1998) (holding that a minor child's third-party-consent to search is ultimately subject to the same analysis as any other third-party consent case); People v. Hardgers, 222 A.D.2d 1038, 636 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1995) (holding that the trial court did not err in denying suppression motion when it found that police reasonably relied on the consent of a 16-year-old when the circumstances indicated that she had the authority to consent); State v. Scott, 82 Or.App. 645, 729 P.2d 585 (1986) (rejecting a per se rule that minors cannot provide valid third-party consent and holding that age is just one factor to be considered); Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 505 Pa. 152, 477 A.2d 1309 (1984) (holding that minority status alone does not prevent one from giving consent; evidence supports a finding that 14-year-old made a rational decision when she allowed police to search her house); State v. Jones, 22 Wash.App. 447, 451-52, 591 P.2d 796, 799 (1979) ("Some minors, simply by reason of their age or immaturity, may b

Thus, we believe that requiring county courts to comply with the dictates of Osborn is appropriate. See State v. Butzke, 7 Neb. App. 360, 584 N.W.2d 449 (1998) (county court made specific findings of fact regarding motion to suppress). Having made this determination, we now proceed to consider whether the county court's findings of fact in the instant case were sufficient.

In the case of a search and seizure conducted without a warrant, the State has the burden of showing the applicability of one or more of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Craven, supra; State v. Butzke, 7 Neb. App. 360, 584 N.W.2d 449 (1998). To determine whether any physical evidence is constitutionally inadmissible, a court must first examine the circumstances surrounding the officer's stop of the vehicle, for, if the initial stop was unconstitutional, any subsequent search and evidence obtained through that search are constitutionally inadmissible as the "fruit of the poisonous tree."

Such matters are for the finder of fact, and a conviction will be affirmed, in the absence of prejudicial error, if the properly admitted evidence, viewed and construed most favorably to the State, is sufficient to support the conviction. State v. Parks, 253 Neb. 939, 573 N.W.2d 453 (1998); State v. Butzke, 7 Neb. App. 360, 584 N.W.2d 449 (1998). Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-324 (Reissue 1995) provides that "[a] person commits robbery if, with the intent to steal, he forcibly and by violence, or by putting in fear, takes from the person of another any money or personal property of any value whatever."