Opinion
CUMCD-CR-2022-02188 CUMCD- CR-2022-02190 CUMCD- CR-2022-02319
09-20-2023
STATE OF MAINE v. DAMION BUTTERFIELD, ANTHONY OSBORNE, and JONATHAN GEISINGER, Defendants.
ORDER SEVERING CASES FOR TRIAL
MARYGAY KENNEDY, JUSTICE
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Damion Butterfield, Jonathan Geisinger, and Anthony Osborne's (collectively, "Defendants") respective motions to sever as well as the State's Motion in Support of Joinder. For the following reasons, the Court grants Defendants' motions and severs Defendants' cases for trial.
I. Background
Defendants Damion Butterfield, Jonathan Geisinger, and Anthony Osborne were indicted on July 8, 2022, on charges arising from an incident alleged to have occurred on April 26, 2022, in Portland, Maine, that allegedly resulted in the death of Derald Coffin. Mr. Butterfield was indicted on four counts including one count each of Intentional or Knowing Murder and Aggravated Attempted Murder. Mr. Geisinger and Mr. Osborne are both indicted on one count each of Felony Murder and Robbery. Also on July 8, 2022, the State filed a Notice of Joinder joining as codefendants Mr. Butterfield, Mr. Osborne, and Mr. Geisinger for trial. Defendants have each filed a motion requesting severance.
A fourth codefendant, Thomas MacDonald, was joined at the same time. That case, docket number CUMCD-CR-2022-02189, is continued for sentencing.
II. Legal Standard
Defendants "who are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting a crime or crimes" may be joined for a single trial. M.R.U. Crim. P. 8(b). If it appears that a defendant or the State will be prejudiced by joinder, the court may grant a severance. M.R.U. Crim. P. 8(d).
Joint trials are generally favored to "promote economy and efficiency and to avoid a multiplicity of trials." State v. Williams, 2012 ME 63, ¶ 21, 52 A.3d 911 (quoting State v. Lakin, 2006 ME 64, ¶ 8, 899 A.2d 777). When acting on a motion to sever, the Court "must balance the general policy in favor of joint trials against any prejudice to a defendant that may result." Id. The Court has "substantial discretion" when it acts on a motion to sever. Lakin, 2006 ME 64, ¶ 7, 899 A.2d 777 (quoting State v. Parsons, 2005 ME 69, ¶ 13,874 A.2d 875).
III. Discussion
Defendants move for severance on the following grounds: (1) mutually antagonistic defenses and the potential for a "spillover effect," (2) Bruton problems, and (3) concerns related to the logistics and feasibility of a joint trial. The Court will address each argument in turn, although the Court would note at the outset that the logistical and feasibility concerns associated with trying these three cases simultaneously weigh most heavily in the Court's analysis.
A. Mutually Antagonistic Defenses and "Spillover Effect"
Conflicting defenses do not necessarily require separate trials. State v. Sexton, 2017 ME 65, ¶ 25, 159 A.3d 342; State v. George, 2012 ME 64, ¶ 25, 52 A.3d 903; see Lakin, 2006 ME 64, ¶¶ 12-13, 899 A.2d 777. If, however, the moving defendant's defense is "irreconcilable" with a codefendant's defense or if "the jury will be unable to compartmentalize the evidence as it relates to the separate defendants," then severance is appropriate. Williams, 2012 ME 63, ¶ 22, 52 A.3d 911 (quoting United States v. Washington, 318 F.3d 845, 858 (8th Cir. 2003)).
In the case of irreconcilable defenses, whether severance is required "turns on the degree of conflict, and the extent to which the antagonism goes beyond mere fingerpointing into the realm of fundamental disagreement over core and basic facts." United States v. Luciano-Pacheco, 794 F.2d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1986). Defendants have not identified any defense theories that would require severance. The Court agrees, however, that it is possible that irreconcilable defenses rising above mere "finger-pointing" could develop between now and the conclusion of a trial.
Regarding the "spillover effect," the United States Supreme Court has said: "[E]vidence of a codefendant's wrongdoing in some circumstances erroneously could lead a jury to conclude that a defendant was guilty. When many defendants are tried together in a complex case and they have markedly different degrees of culpability, this risk of prejudice is heightened." Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993). Limiting instructions can in many cases mitigate any prejudicial spillover effect.
Aside from the volume of inculpatory statements made by Mr. Butterfield discussed further below, Defendants have not identified any significant disparity in the evidence against each of them that would mandate severance.
B. Bruton Problems
Defendants also argue that joinder is prejudicial because of the existence of "Bruton problems." See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1986) A Bruton problem is created by the introduction of a non-testifying defendant's confession or inculpatory statement that also implicates a codefendant in a crime Id. at 135-36; see State v Dobbins, 2019 ME 116, ¶ 70, 215 A.3d 769 (Alexander, J, concurring). Although admissible as to the non-testifying defendant, admission of the inculpatory statement violates the codefendant's right to confrontation because the codefendant will be unable to cross-examine the defendant who has invoked his privilege against self-incrimination. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 126, Williams, 2012 ME 63, ¶ 34, 52 A.3d 911. Such statements are also inadmissible hearsay against the codefendant. See State v, Larsen, 2013 ME 38, ¶ 19 n. 4, 65 A.3d 1203.
A Bruton, problem may be solved either by severance or by redacting the non-testifying defendant's statements to remove "any reference to [a codefendant's] existence," and giving a limiting instruction. Williams, 2012 ME 63, ¶ 35, 52 A.3d 911; see Samia v. United States, 599 U.S.___, 143 S.Ct. 2004, 2017-18 (2023). Redaction becomes increasingly difficult as the context makes the reference to codefendant more obvious. See, e.g., State v. Boucher, 1998 ME 209, ¶¶ 6, 16, 718 A.2d 1092 (holding that the trial court erred by admitting a defendant's confession regarding "four" individuals when the line of questioning elicited the names of three of the four individuals). But see Samia, 599 U.S.___, 143 S.Ct. at 2018 (declining to expand Bruton rule to require trial courts to determine whether jury could infer from the Government's case in its entirety that a codefendant had been referred to in a redacted confession).
The potential Bruton issues in the matter at hand weigh in favor of severance even if they do not yet mandate severance. Mr. Butterfield has made many inculpatory statements while awaiting trial, some of which implicate his codefendants. Although redaction may reduce the risk of the jury inferring a reference to a co defendant in one statement, the volume of statements and context able to be gleaned from his statements as a whole may still generate a prejudicial suggestion. Severance would avoid potential prejudice to Defendants as well as the thorny task of redacting numerous confessions.
C. Judicial Economy and Feasibility
Although joinder generally promotes judicial economy, the Court is not persuaded that a joint trial in this case would do so.
The logistical issues-including jury selection, adequacy of available space, transportation of Defendants, the need for frequent limiting instructions, and more-that will inevitably abound if these cases proceeded to trial together would be significantly greater than if the cases are severed. Simply put, the Court doubts the feasibility of a joint trial of these three defendants.
The Court has considered the prospect of proceeding with three simultaneous severed trials before three juries. It is, however, highly doubtful that that proposal would adequately address many of the logistical concerns. Indeed, accommodating three juries and choreographing their movements would strain judicial resources and capacity even more than a joint trial before a single jury.
The State's arguments about the likely delays for the second and third trials are not persuasive. At hearing on the present motion, Defendant Geisinger and Defendant Osborne indicated that they understand and accept that granting the motions to sever may delay their respective trials. The State did not demonstrate any substantial prejudice that will result to it by the delay.
The State's concerns about the difficulty of selecting a jury for subsequent trials following publicity surrounding the first trial may be addressed if and when the need arises.
Finally, the Court gives very little weight to the State's argument that three separate trials might entail a greater financial burden for the Court. The Court assigns far more weight to the interest in ensuring feasible and fair trials than any budgetary considerations.
IV. Conclusion
In conclusion, the risk of prejudice to Defendants and logistical issues associated with a joint trial greatly outweigh the benefits of proceeding with a joint trial in this case. Defendants' cases will be severed.
The entry is:
1. Defendant Damion Butterfield's Motion for Relief from Prejudicial Joinder is GRANTED;
2. Defendant Jonathan Geisinger's Motion to Sever is GRANTED;
3. Defendant Anthony Osborne's Motion for Relief from Prejudicial Joinder is GRANTED;
4. The State's Motion in Support of Joinder is DENIED; and
5. The three cases previously joined in this matter, docket numbers CUMCD-CR-2022-02188, CUMCD-CR-2022-02190, and CUMCD-CR-2022-2319, are SEVERED for trial.
The clerk is instructed to incorporate this Order by reference on the docket pursuant to M.R.U. Crim. P. 53(a).