Opinion
No. COA12–1015.
2013-04-2
STATE of North Carolina v. Cheo A. BURROUGHS.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Mary Carla Hollis, for the State. Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Charlesena Elliott Walker, for defendant appellant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 7 December 2011 by Judge Paul Gessner in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 February 2013. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Mary Carla Hollis, for the State. Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Charlesena Elliott Walker, for defendant appellant.
McCULLOUGH, Judge.
On 7 December 2011, Cheo Burroughs (“defendant”) was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court's failure to intervene ex mero motu to halt and/or strike the State's line of questioning addressing possible motive during the State's cross-examination of defendant constituted plain error. Defendant further contends the trial court committed reversible error in overruling his objection to the State's question on cross-examination concerning whether he felt remorse for his father's death. We hold defendant received a fair trial free from prejudicial error.
I. Background
On the morning of Sunday, 12 July 2009, William Burroughs (“William” or “the victim”) was murdered in his home on Red Cedar Circle in the Treyburn neighborhood in Durham, North Carolina. Deborah Burroughs (“Deborah”), William's wife, returned home around 11:18 a.m. after attending church services and discovered William lying face down on the living room floor. William was nonresponsive, so Deborah called emergency services. As Deborah tried to render assistance to William, she noticed blood on the back of William's head and she saw that the rug underneath William was saturated with blood.
Sergeant Dale Gunter (“Sergeant Gunter”) of the Durham Police Department responded to the Burroughses' home, which he described at trial as having “blood everywhere.” Sergeant Gunter observed trails of blood leading from the living room to a downstairs bathroom and to a downstairs bedroom and from the foyer of the house to the front door. Sergeant Gunter also observed that bar stools and the living room coffee table were turned over, the living room rug was soaked with “copious amounts of blood,” and the downstairs bathroom sink also contained drips of blood. Sergeant Gunter observed William lying on his back in a pool of blood on the living room floor with numerous wounds to his head, wounds to his hands, lacerations to his forearms, and a large amount of blood on his chest. Sergeant Gunter testified that his observations at the scene clearly indicated that a violent altercation had occurred.
Medical Examiner Kevin Greene, M.D. (“Dr.Greene”), performed an autopsy on William and testified at trial that William was stabbed in the chest and that the resulting stab wound penetrated through the left ventricle of his heart, causing his death. Dr. Greene testified that William sustained sixteen incise wounds to his head area; multiple injuries to his left forearm, including a deep stab wound to the upper part of his left forearm; and a stab wound to his right shoulder. Dr. Greene testified that William also sustained six distinct incise wounds to his left hand and fingers. These wounds were consistent with defensive-type wounds, such as an injury sustained in an attempt to block a sharp object.
William had three children: a daughter who lived in Fayetteville, North Carolina; defendant, who lived in Buffalo, New York; and defendant's half-brother, who was living away at college. Deborah first met defendant in January 2008, when defendant drove from his home in Buffalo in a burgundy or wine-colored Cadillac with custom gold-rimmed tires to visit his father in Durham. On that occasion, defendant stayed with Deborah and William in their home for three or four days.
Defendant again visited Deborah and William in January 2009, traveling to Durham from Buffalo in his burgundy or wine-colored Cadillac. During this visit, defendant's car broke down, and William gave defendant money to take the train back to New York. William then paid to have defendant's car repaired. Sometime during the spring of 2009, after the car had been repaired, defendant returned to Durham to retrieve his car and then drove back to Buffalo. This visit was the last time Deborah saw defendant prior to William's death.
At the scene, police officers discovered a gold men's watch at the base of the Burroughses' stairwell. Deborah informed the officers that the watch did not belong to William but that she recognized the watch as one she had seen defendant wearing during his visit in January of that year. Deborah testified that she specifically remembered complimenting defendant on the watch and that she was certain the watch belonged to defendant. No weapon was uncovered at the crime scene or in the surrounding area.
Multiple neighbors of the Burroughses observed an unfamiliar car in the neighborhood on the morning of William's murder. The car was described as being a gold-trimmed, maroonish-blue colored, late 1990's model Cadillac with oversized tires and rims, dual tailpipes, and tinted windows. Claude Hosch (“Hosch”) observed the car parked in front of his house near the intersection of Red Cedar Circle and Loblolly Drive for approximately thirty to forty minutes, after which time he saw a silhouette moving inside the car before the car pulled away and drove down Red Cedar Circle. This intersection is approximately 642 feet from the Burroughses' residence. Pearl Shipkowski (“Shipkowski”) wrote down a description of the car and the car's license plate as well as the car's license plate number. Shipkowski noted that the car's license plate had a white background with dark blue or black letters and the number “DDY 1121.”
Also on the morning of William's murder, Harvey Zimmerman (“Zimmerman”) observed an unfamiliar black male, approximately six feet tall and on “the heavy side but not fat” with medium complexion walking on Red Cedar Circle in the direction of the Burroughses' home. Approximately fifteen to thirty minutes later, Zimmerman observed the same man walking in the opposite direction, away from the Burroughses' home, and moving at a faster pace with no shirt on. Both Zimmerman and Shipkowski observed that the individual had a hairy torso, was wearing a cap, and was carrying what appeared to be a white or clear plastic bag on his left arm and a brown or tan shirt rolled up around his right hand. Both Zimmerman and Shipkowski observed the man run to the maroon vehicle and drive away down Red Cedar Circle. Zimmerman also subsequently informed police that he remembered having seen the same maroon Cadillac parked in the Burroughses' driveway on more than one occasion and that the car had New York plates.
Anthony White (“White”), defendant's uncle, testified at trial that sometime after William's death, defendant visited White unexpectedly at his home in a rural area outside of Aiken, South Carolina. White testified that defendant was driving a burgundy Cadillac. The State showed to White photographs of a burgundy Cadillac with gold-trimmed rims and New York tags with the number “DDY 1121.” White identified the car in the photographs as defendant's. White testified that defendant had told him that he was travelling to South Carolina directly from Buffalo. White stated that he noticed a bandage wrapped around defendant's hand and asked defendant about it, and defendant explained that he had hurt his hand while changing a tire. Defendant did not stay with White, but defendant returned one or two days later to travel to William's funeral in Durham with White and other family members. Defendant left his car in White's backyard while attending the funeral.
Investigator Shawn Pate (“Investigator Pate”) and Corporal D.A. Gaither (“Corporal Gaither”) of the Durham Police Department arrested defendant without incident at the conclusion of his father's funeral on 18 July 2009. At the time of his arrest, defendant had a cut to his left index finger and another cut to the back of his right hand, which was bandaged. Investigator Pate read defendant his Miranda rights and interviewed defendant briefly. During the interview, defendant stated that he was in Buffalo on the day of his father's death and that he had last spoken to his father on the telephone three weeks prior to his father's death. A photograph of defendant's torso taken at the time of his arrest showed defendant had hair on his chest and abdominal area.
Durham police officers located and searched defendant's car in South Carolina. Photographs taken by the officers depicted a magenta vehicle with gold-trimmed rims and a New York license plate with the number “DDY 1121.” Several dried red stains were located throughout the car and in the car's trunk. The trunk also contained a bottle of “Clorox 2,” and a new steering wheel cover was located on the floorboard of the rear passenger seating area. The car also contained several white plastic bags, in which the officers found medical-related supplies, car cleaning supplies, several pieces of jewelry, two baseball caps with red stains on them, and a new unopened floor mat with a red stain on its packaging. Investigator Pate examined the car's tires and observed that there was a spare tire on defendant's car but the spare tire appeared to have been there for some time because it had rusted onto the wheel. Investigator Pate also observed that there was no blood on, or damage to, the spare tire or any of the car's tires, and no red stains were observed on the spare tire within its nesting hole located in the car's trunk.
Swabs taken of the red stains in defendant's car and the car's trunk had positive chemical indications for the presence of blood. DNA analysis of swabs of the red stains found in the car revealed DNA profiles that matched the profile of defendant. Swabs taken from multiple areas inside the Burroughses' home also showed positive chemical indications for the presence of blood. DNA analysis of the swabs taken from the Burroughses' home revealed that most of the blood evidence matched the DNA profile of defendant. The remaining samples were consistent with a blood mixture containing DNA profiles matching that of both defendant and the victim.
Defendant testified at trial on his own behalf. Defendant stated that, prior to his arrest in the present case, he lived in Buffalo, New York in his childhood home. Defendant testified that his parents separated in 1988, and his father moved out of the house at that time. Defendant stated that eventually, his father moved to Durham, after which he only saw his father once or twice a year.
Defendant testified that, during the entire weekend of his father's death, he was in Buffalo cleaning out the basement of his house and preparing to rent it. Defendant testified that he had hurt his hands moving tools and other “home improvement resources” while cleaning up his basement the Friday night prior to his father's death. When confronted with questions on cross-examination regarding how his blood had dripped inside of his car, defendant responded by stating that the trunk of his car was “malfunctioning” and that he had reinjured his hand when he used it to slam down his car trunk. Defendant explained that this incident was probably what his uncle had been referring to when his uncle testified that defendant had informed him that defendant had hurt his hand while changing a tire. Defendant further explained that, because he reinjured his hand, blood could have dripped in the car while he was driving.
Defendant testified that he found out about his father's death on Monday, 13 July 2009, when he ran into a friend of his father's in Buffalo. Defendant testified that the friend offered condolences and told defendant to contact his family but was vague as to what had occurred. Defendant stated that the telephone at his house was “acting up” and that he did not have a phone card to use to contact any of his family members. Defendant acknowledged that a cellular telephone was among the items recovered from his car after his arrest, but he explained that the phone was not in service and that he just used the phone's address book feature to retrieve telephone numbers. On cross-examination, the State reminded defendant that he had told Investigator Pate in his post-arrest interview that he had talked to his father by telephone a few weeks prior to his father's death. The State then asked defendant why he did not have his father's telephone number to call and check on him, and defendant responded by stating that he had probably written his father's telephone number on a piece of paper and somehow he had lost the number.
Defendant testified that on Tuesday around 5:00 or 6:00 p.m., he contacted his girlfriend, who kept in touch with defendant's mother, and asked his girlfriend if she had heard any news. Defendant testified that, without specifying what had occurred, his girlfriend informed him that something had happened to his father and that he needed to contact his mother, who was staying with his sister in Fayetteville. Defendant testified that he called his mother but could not reach her. Defendant testified that on Tuesday night, between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m., he decided to drive south so that he could find out precisely what had happened to his father. Defendant provided several explanations for why he bypassed Durham and Fayetteville and instead drove to South Carolina. Defendant testified that he did not go to his sister's home in Fayetteville because he was unfamiliar with that area. Defendant also testified that he did not go to Fayetteville because his sister was very busy and worked a lot and he did not want to intrude. In addition, defendant explained that although he was unable to get in contact with his mother, he knew his aunt in South Carolina could easily get in contact with her because they communicated more often. Defendant stated that because he was unsure about “what was going on,” he was more comfortable going to his aunt and uncle's house in South Carolina. Defendant testified that upon arriving at White's house in South Carolina, he learned of his father's death.
Defendant denied at trial that the watch found at the Burroughses' home on the day of the murder belonged to him. Defendant stated that he had never heard of that brand of watch, despite the fact that police recovered another watch of the same brand from his vehicle at the time of his arrest. When asked about Shipkowski identifying his exact license plate number on a maroon Cadillac in the Burroughses' neighborhood on the morning of the murder, defendant responded that Shipkowski had not identified which state had issued the license plate. Although the State pointed out that Shipkowski had noted the license plate was white with dark blue or black letters, defendant responded by explaining that “New York State has different license plates at different time periods that look different.” Nevertheless, defendant stated that he had not changed his license plate and confirmed that the maroon Cadillac with gold-trimmed rims and license plate number “DDY 1121” depicted in the photographs taken by police after his arrest was his vehicle. When confronted with the fact that his blood was found inside the Burroughses' home after his father's murder, defendant explained that because he had been in the home before, his DNA would logically be found there because he cuts himself when shaving and bites his fingers. In addition, defendant testified that he believed the blood analysis matching the red stains found in the Burroughses' home to his DNA was inconclusive. Defendant denied both being in the Treyburn subdivision on Sunday, 12 July 2009, and killing his father.
On 7 December 2011, the jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of first-degree murder. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict, sentencing defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Defendant gave oral notice of appeal from his conviction to this Court.
II. State's Cross-examination of Defendant
A. Motive
In his first argument on appeal, defendant argues that the trial court committed plain error by failing to intervene ex mero motu during a portion of the State's cross-examination of defendant addressing a possible motive for the crime. Specifically, defendant challenges the propriety of the following line of questioning by the State:
Q In your video interview with Investigator Pate, it doesn't last very long, but you did say a few things. You said that you had talked to your father on the phone, right?
A Yes.
Q And he was giving you money; isn't that right?
A No, the initial—the initial—what initially propagated the conversation was that he was contacting me in order to give me congratulations on my daughter's first birthday.
Q So when Ms. Burroughs testified that—well, let me ask you this, sir. Isn't it true that you called their residence and she answered the phone.
A Oh, I may have initiated the conversation, yes.
Q During that conversation, Mr. Burroughs let you know the money train was over with; isn't that right, sir? No more money?
A First of all, there never was any money train. I don't know where that—I've never had a continuous source of money from him, per se. What he would do is, from time to time, you know, say buy gifts and things of that nature
Q Fix your car?
A Yeah, things like that. But as far as the money train is what you're trying to insinuate, I wouldn't categorize as that.
Q So he just let you know that you weren't getting any more money out of him.
A Well, I wouldn't even say any more money. I hadn't gotten a lot of money, to begin with. Truthfully, me and my father's relationship never focused on money.
The idea that somehow or another I had some animosity or visceral hatred towards him because of money, I think is rather absurd.
I don't have any—I don't have any ill feelings of him because of money. Basically, what had happened was
Q Why did you have ill feelings towards him, then, sir?
A What was that?
Q Why did you have ill feelings for him then?
A I didn't have ill feelings towards him.
Prior to trial, defendant moved in limine to exclude Deborah from testifying that (1) defendant made a telephone call to his father within a few weeks prior to his father's murder, during which defendant asked his father for money and his father refused his request, and (2) defendant had emotional and money problems. Defendant objected on grounds that Deborah's testimony addressing these issues would be impermissible hearsay. The trial court granted defendant's motion and prohibited testimony by Deborah concerning “anything that is necessarily a statement of the defendant—attributed to a statement of the defendant that has not previously been recorded and reported to the defense or provided to the defense[.]” During direct examination, the State did not question Deborah about either of those matters.
However, defendant argues that in pursuing the above-quoted line of questioning during its cross-examination of defendant, the State “insinuated” and “strongly implied” that Deborah had actually testified to hearing both defendant ask his father for money and his father refuse him. Defendant contends that this information was prohibited by the trial court's pre-trial ruling and that this line of questioning assumed facts not in evidence, as Deborah did not testify about the telephone call. Defendant argues that the trial court's allowing this line of questioning by the State on cross-examination violated his right to a fair trial and rises to the level of plain error because the prosecutor's questions “blatantly suggested” a motive on the part of defendant to kill his father. Defendant contends the error was fundamentally prejudicial because the State's case was otherwise devoid of evidence establishing a motive and therefore likely influenced the jury's determination of guilt.
During trial, defendant failed to object to the prosecutor's line of questioning that he now challenges on appeal. Nonetheless, defendant specifically contends on appeal that the trial court's failure to intervene to prohibit the challenged line of questioning constitutes plain error.
In criminal cases, an issue that was not preserved by objection noted at trial and that is not deemed preserved by rule or law without any such action nevertheless may be made the basis of an issue presented on appeal when the judicial action questioned is specifically and distinctly contended to amount to plain error.
N.C.R.App. P. 10(a)(4) (2013). Plain error arises when the error is “ ‘so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done[.]’ “ State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir.1982)). “For error to constitute plain error, a defendant must demonstrate that a fundamental error occurred at trial. To show that an error was fundamental, a defendant must establish prejudice—that, after examination of the entire record, the error had a probable impact on the jury's finding that the defendant was guilty.” State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, ––––, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 (2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also State v.. Towe, ––– N.C. ––––, ––––, 732 S.E.2d 564, 568 (2012).
“The bounds of cross-examination are limited by two general principles: 1) the scope of the cross-examination rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge; and 2) the questions must be asked in good faith.” State v. Bronson, 333 N.C. 67, 79, 423 S .E.2d 772, 779 (1992). “A prosecutor's questions are presumed to be proper unless the record shows that they were asked in bad faith.” Id. The prosecutor “is given wide latitude and has the right and duty to cross-examine vigorously a defendant who takes the stand in his own defense. ‘A [prosecutor] may ask a defendant ... questions tending to discredit [his] testimony, no matter how disparaging the question may be.’ “ State v. Rush, 340 N.C. 174, 186, 456 S.E.2d 819, 826 (1995) (alterations and ellipsis in original) (quoting State v. Daye, 281 N.C. 592, 596, 189 S.E.2d 481, 483 (1972)). “Abuse of discretion is generally found when a prosecutor affirmatively places before the jury an incompetent and prejudicial matter by injecting his own knowledge, beliefs, or personal opinions or facts which are either not in evidence or not admissible.” Bronson, 333 N.C. at 79, 423 S.E.2d at 779. “The trial court's decision as to whether cross [-]examination transcends propriety will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of discretion, or a showing that the jury verdict was improperly influenced thereby.” State v. Gallagher, 313 N.C. 132, 140, 326 S.E.2d 873, 879 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
We note that there appears to be a lack of unanimity in this jurisdiction regarding the propriety of reviewing for plain error issues left to the discretion of the trial court. See State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 256, 536 S.E.2d 1, 18 (2000) (“[T]his Court has not applied the plain error rule to issues which fall within the realm of the trial court's discretion, and we decline to do so now.”); State v. Cunningham, 188 N.C.App. 832, 837, 656 S.E.2d 697, 700 (2008) (“The balancing test of Rule 403 is reviewed by this court for abuse of discretion, and we do not apply plain error ‘to issues which fall within the realm of the trial court's discretion.’ “ (quoting Steen, 352 N.C. at 256, 536 S.E.2d at 18)); but see State v. Garcell, 363 N.C. 10, 36–39, 678 S.E.2d 618, 635–36 (2009) (applying plain error review to admission of testimony under Rule 403, a decision that is normally reviewed for abuse of discretion); State v. Chapman, 359 N.C. 328, 351–52, 611 S.E.2d 794, 813–14 (2005) (same); State v. Locklear, 174 N.C.App. 547, 554, 621 S.E.2d 254, 258–59 (2005) (same). Given this discrepancy in our case law, and in the interest of ensuring that defendant received a fair trial, free of prejudicial error, we address defendant's arguments on this issue.
In the present case, there is nothing tending to show that the questions were asked by the prosecutor in bad faith, despite defendant's assertions to the contrary. First, defendant contends that “the prosecutor deliberately contravened the court's ruling ... by incorporating the prohibited information into his questions.” However, the trial court's ruling on defendant's motion in limine prohibited the State from questioning Deborah regarding the telephone conversation and defendant's emotional and money problems on grounds that her testimony was hearsay. The trial court's ruling did not prohibit the State from eliciting that information from defendant.
Second, defendant highlights that portion of the questioning in which the prosecutor states, “So, when Ms. Burroughs testified that[,]” and argues the prosecutor purposefully did not finish his question. However, such accusation is not supported by the record. Although the prosecutor resumed his questioning by asking defendant whether Deborah had answered the phone, such question appears to address defendant's previous answer that his father had initiated the telephone call, rather than defendant. The record does not support defendant's argument that the prosecutor deliberately led the questioning by referring to Deborah in order to imply to the jury, in bad faith, that Deborah had both heard the conversation in question and informed the State that William had refused to give defendant money during that telephone conversation. Also, defendant had ample opportunity to explain and rebut any insinuations in the prosecutor's questions, which, in fact, defendant did.
Even if it is assumed, arguendo, that this line of questioning by the State was improper, defendant has failed to show that the trial court's alleged error in failing to intervene and exclude this testimony was a fundamental error necessitating a new trial under the plain error standard. The record in the present case reveals overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt. Multiple eyewitnesses placed an individual matching defendant's description at the scene on the morning of the murder. In addition, multiple eyewitnesses placed defendant's vehicle at the scene on the morning of the murder. One witness identified the vehicle at the scene by license plate number, which matched the license plate number on defendant's vehicle. Witnesses at the scene also observed that the individual running on Red Cedar Circle in the direction away from the Burroughses' home to defendant's vehicle was wearing a cap and had his hand rolled up in a shirt or cloth. Deborah identified the watch left at the scene as defendant's. Although defendant denied that the watch was his, a watch of the same brand was found in defendant's vehicle at the time of his arrest, along with medical and cleaning supplies and a baseball cap with a red stain on it. Trails of blood matching defendant's DNA were found throughout the first level of the Burroughses' home, as well as on the front door threshold of the home. Defendant's vehicle also contained drips of his own blood, and defendant's hands were injured with cuts at the time of his arrest. Defendant's testimony as to how he had injured his hand was entirely inconsistent with White's testimony, who stated that defendant had informed him that defendant had injured his hand while changing a tire on his car. Defendant offered no plausible explanations as to the multiple inconsistencies between his own testimony at trial and testimony provided by other witnesses.
Moreover, defendant's contention that the alleged error was fundamentally prejudicial because without this line of questioning by the State, the State's case was devoid of any evidence of motive, is inapposite. Our Supreme Court has expressly stated that “[m]otive is not an element of first-degree murder, nor is its absence a defense. The presence or absence of motive is merely a circumstance which may be considered in determining guilt or innocence in a criminal case.” State v. Elliott, 344 N.C. 242, 273, 475 S.E.2d 202, 216 (1996) (citations omitted). In fact, in the present case, the jury was instructed that “[i]f you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime, the presence or absence of motive is immaterial.” Rather, evidence of motive is circumstantial evidence “relevant to identify an accused as the perpetrator of a crime.” State v. Bell, 65 N . C.App. 234, 238, 309 S.E.2d 464, 467 (1983). Here, however, the State presented ample other evidence tending to show that defendant was the perpetrator of William's murder, as detailed above. Thus, we hold the prosecutor's cross-examination as to a possible financial motive for the crime did not deny defendant a fair trial.
B. Remorse
In his second argument on appeal, defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial error in overruling his objection to a question asked by the prosecutor during cross-examination of defendant regarding whether defendant felt any remorse for his father's death. Specifically, the prosecutor asked defendant, “You don't feel any remorse[,] do you?” Defendant argues the prosecutor's question was improper because it implicitly presumed defendant's guilt in killing his father, a crime that he denied committing. Defendant argues that the prosecutor's question was prejudicial because any answer he gave to the question would imply his guilt and likely influenced the jury's finding of guilt, as the State's evidence was not overwhelming against him.
During the cross-examination of defendant at trial, the following exchange occurred:
Q You don't feel any remorse; do you?
A What was that?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.
[PROSECUTOR]: You don't feel any remorse; do you, sir?
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Do I feel remorse?
CROSS EXAMINATION RESUMED—BY [PROSECUTOR]
Q Yes, sir. Do you feel any remorse
A About my father passing? Yes, yes. I'm saying anytime
Q He didn't just pass; did he, sir? He was murdered. He was murdered, right?
A Well, I choose not to really focus on that. I'm a positive individual. I don't really want to focus on the fact of a person dying from a very negative especially an individual who was closely related to me.
Q Because it's a horrible death; isn't it?
A Exactly.
Q A horrible way to die.
A Yes.
Q So, as it relates to his murder, do you feel any remorse?
A Of course, and I take exception to someone thinking that I don't. I take a great amount of exception and offense if somebody's thinking I don't feel remorse.
Assuming, arguendo, the State's question on cross-examination was improper because the question implied defendant's guilt, as defendant argues on appeal, we perceive no reasonable possibility that, had the alleged error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at trial. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the State produced overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, as detailed above. We fail to see how the State's question improperly influenced the jury's verdict, especially given defendant's answer to the challenged question under the circumstances presented.
III. Conclusion
In the present case, the State presented overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt such that defendant cannot meet his burden of showing prejudice from the two lines of questioning by the State addressing possible motive and whether he felt remorse for his father's death during his cross-examination. We hold defendant received a fair trial free of prejudicial error.
No prejudicial error. Judges HUNTER (Robert C.) and DAVIS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).