Opinion
A24-0018
10-28-2024
State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Michael Edward Burkman, Appellant.
Ramsey County District Court File No. 62-CR-23-4026
Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and John P. Smith, Judge.[*]
ORDER OPINION
Matthew E. Johnson, Judge.
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Michael Edward Burkman pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement specifying an 18-month prison sentence, so long as he satisfied certain conditions. The district court imposed a 21-month prison sentence after finding that Burkman did not satisfy one of the conditions of the plea agreement. We conclude that the district court clearly erred by finding that Burkman did not satisfy a condition of the plea agreement and, thus, erred by imposing a sentence that is longer than the sentence to which Burkman agreed. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
2. In November 2022, Burkman was convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. As a consequence, he was required to register as a predatory offender.
3. In July 2023, the state charged Burkman with failure to register as a predatory offender, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a)(1) (2022). In August 2023, Burkman and the state entered into a plea agreement, which is reflected in a plea petition that Burkman signed. Burkman agreed to plead guilty to the sole charge, and the parties agreed that Burkman would receive an executed 18-month prison sentence, which is a downward durational departure from the presumptive guidelines sentence of between 34 and 46 months. The plea petition states that, if the district court does not approve the agreement, Burkman would have "an absolute right" to withdraw his guilty plea, unless he failed to either (1) "cooperate with probation in the preparation of the pre-sentence investigation" (PSI), (2) "remain law abiding," or (3) "reappear for sentencing." At the plea hearing, the district court confirmed Burkman's understanding of the first condition by informing him that he was required "to cooperate with the presentence investigation and interview process." The district court postponed acceptance of the plea until the completion of the PSI. Burkman requested an interim commitment to the commissioner of corrections pending sentencing, which the district court granted. The district court scheduled sentencing for a date in mid-September 2023.
4. In early September 2023, the assigned probation officer informed the district court that she was unable to complete the PSI because she had been unable to interview Burkman because correctional officers had placed him in segregation. The probation officer recommended that Burkman be moved to the county jail so that she could interview him before the sentencing hearing. The district court revoked the prior order for an interim commitment and ordered that Burkman be held at the county jail until sentencing. The district court rescheduled sentencing for late October 2023.
5. The probation officer completed the PSI report. Before the rescheduled sentencing hearing, Burkman filed a memorandum in support of the agreed-upon downward durational departure. Burkman's memorandum explained that he was placed in segregation on three successive occasions during his interim commitment after correctional officers refused his multiple requests for a different cellmate. The memorandum states that Burkman explained to a correctional officer that he and his assigned cellmate have a "history on the street" and that he was trying to "avoid conflict while incarcerated."
6. At the rescheduled sentencing hearing, Burkman's attorney argued that Burkman did not violate the plea agreement because he did not refuse to cooperate with the PSI. Burkman's attorney explained that Burkman requested a different cellmate after he realized that the situation "could potentially be dangerous for him." His attorney further explained that correctional officers would not allow the probation officer to meet with Burkman while he was in segregation. Notably, the prosecutor agreed with Burkman's attorney, stating that Burkman did not violate the plea agreement because he did not refuse to cooperate with the preparation of a PSI report. The prosecutor asked the district court to impose the agreed-upon sentence. In the alternative, the prosecutor asked the district court to give Burkman "some nominal amount" of additional prison time, such as "an additional month."
7. When given an opportunity to speak in allocution, Burkman admitted that he violated a department of corrections rule during his interim commitment by disobeying a direct order and that segregation was the consequence for that violation. But he stated that he was not trying to avoid the probation officer, interfere with the PSI, or violate a condition of the plea agreement. When the district court stated to Burkman that the probation officer was trying to interview him, Burkman said, "I had no idea." The district court acknowledged that Burkman "didn't know" that the probation officer was trying to arrange an interview of him but nonetheless found that Burkman violated the condition of the plea agreement that required him to cooperate with the PSI. The district court adjudicated Burkman guilty and imposed a sentence of 21 months of imprisonment.
8. Burkman appeals. He argues that the district court erred by imposing a sentence longer than the agreed-upon sentence specified in the plea agreement. Specifically, he argues that the district court erred by finding that he violated a condition of the plea agreement. In response, the state filed a one-page letter stating that it "agrees the case should be remanded to the district court for resentencing pursuant to the plea agreement."
9. If a guilty plea "'rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.'" State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000) (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)). "Allowing the government to breach a promise that induced a guilty plea violates due process." Id. (quotation omitted). If an appellate court determines that "a plea agreement has been breached, the court may allow withdrawal of the plea, order specific performance, or alter the sentence if appropriate." Id.
10. "In determining whether a plea agreement was violated, courts look to what the parties to [the] plea bargain reasonably understood to be the terms of the agreement." Id. (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). "What the parties agreed to involves an issue of fact to be resolved by the district court." Id. (citing Kochevar v. State, 281 N.W.2d 680, 687 (Minn. 1979)). Accordingly, we apply a clear-error standard of review to the district court's findings concerning the meaning of the plea agreement and whether Burkman breached a condition of the plea agreement. See State v. Robledo-Kinney, 615 N.W.2d 25, 32 (Minn. 2000).
11. The district court found that Burkman violated the plea-agreement condition that required him to "cooperate with probation in the preparation of the pre-sentence investigation." The district court expressly stated that it was not finding that Burkman intended to show disrespect for the district court or to frustrate the PSI. Rather, the district court found that, because of Burkman's conduct while in prison, he was not "able to do one of the three things that were required to get the benefit of" the plea agreement. Consequently, the district court found that Burkman violated the plea agreement.
12. Burkman contends that, while he was in segregation, he was unaware that the probation officer was trying to interview him. He also contends that his inability to meet with the probation officer was due to reasons outside his control. He further contends that he fully cooperated with the PSI when he was allowed to meet with the probation officer.
13. There is no evidence in the record that Burkman intended to not cooperate with the PSI. Similarly, there is no evidence in the record that Burkman chose to be placed in segregation for the purpose of frustrating the PSI. To the contrary, the record reflects that Burkman sought to avoid conflict with his assigned cellmate and violated a department of corrections rule that is unrelated to the PSI. The record also reflects that, while Burkman was in segregation, correctional officers prevented him from meeting with the probation officer. Furthermore, the record reflects that, when Burkman was allowed to meet with the probation officer at the county jail, he fully cooperated with the PSI. Thus, the district court clearly erred by finding that Burkman violated the first condition of the plea agreement. Accordingly, the district court erred by imposing a sentence that is longer than the sentence to which Burkman agreed. This conclusion is consistent with the state's position in both the district court and this court.
14. For appellate relief, Burkman requests that this court modify his sentence so that it conforms to the agreed-upon sentence of 18 months of imprisonment. In support of his request, he cites State v. Jumping Eagle, 620 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 2000). In that opinion, the supreme court reversed and remanded and instructed the district court to either allow the defendant to withdraw his plea or modify the sentence so that its duration would not exceed the agreed-upon sentence. Id. at 45. We order the same relief in this case. We reverse and remand with instructions that the district court "must either (1) allow [Burkman] to withdraw his plea, or (2) modify his sentence so that the maximum period of incarceration . . . does not exceed the [18]-month upper limit to which [Burkman] agreed." See id. As in Jumping Eagle, "[t]he state should be allowed to present to the court argument regarding whether the court should modify the sentence or allow the plea to be withdrawn." See id.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's sentencing order is reversed and remanded.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
[*]Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.