Opinion
No. 5-383 / 03-1801
Filed June 15, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jasper County, Sherman Phipps, Judge.
Matthew Bucklin appeals his conviction for first-degree robbery. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Patricia Reynolds, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kristin Guddall, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Johnson, County Attorney, and Scott W. Nicholson, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Zimmer and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
On April 9, 2003, Matthew Bucklin sought to purchase some methamphetamine because he wanted to get high one last time before he entered a substance abuse treatment program the next day. At the request of Bucklin, his girlfriend, Jennifer Danks, and brother, Adam Bucklin, went to the home of Nicole Ahn to purchase the drugs. Bucklin previously had been in a romantic relationship with Ahn and had lived with her.
Danks, Adam, and Ahn used methamphetamine together. Then Ahn sold Danks and Adam a purported bag of methamphetamine for about $200. When it was delivered to Bucklin, however, he discovered he had been sold sugar. Ahn testified she did this on purpose because Bucklin "had lived off me for months. He never paid any bills at my house." Bucklin became very angry and called Ahn several times demanding that she give him drugs. Bucklin had some alcoholic drinks that day.
In the evening, Bucklin armed himself with a shotgun and had Danks drive him to Ahn's house. At the home, Bucklin pointed the gun alternately at Ahn and Danks and again demanded drugs. Ahn gave Bucklin the money she had and told him she did not have any methamphetamine. Eventually, Bucklin left Ahn's home, and she called police officers.
That same evening, officers found Bucklin hiding in a closet in his parents' house. Bucklin was told his Miranda rights. Deputies Dennis Stevenson and Gary Marshall of the Jasper County Sheriff's Department testified Bucklin seemed coherent. Bucklin admitted he had gone to Ahn's home with a shotgun to either get his money back or get some drugs. He gave the officers the $200 he had taken from Ahn. At the sheriff's department, Bucklin repeated the same story during a videotaped interview. At about 2:00 a.m., Bucklin had a blood alcohol level of .074, below the legal limit for intoxication.
Bucklin was charged with robbery in the first degree, in violation of Iowa Code sections 711.1 and 711.2 (2003), and burglary in the first degree, in violation of sections 713.1 and 713.3. Bucklin filed a motion to suppress, claiming his statements were not voluntary because he was under the influence of numerous substances. He later withdrew the motion. During the trial, Bucklin objected to the admission of the deputies' testimony and the videotape on voluntariness grounds. The district court overruled his objections.
Bucklin was convicted of first-degree robbery and trespass. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment not to exceed twenty-five years. Bucklin appeals the robbery conviction, claiming he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Our review of an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel is de novo. State v. Bergmann, 600 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 1999). To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) the attorney failed to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted to the extent it denied defendant a fair trial. State v. Ceaser, 585 N.W.2d 192, 195 (Iowa 1998).
In proving the first prong, the defendant faces a strong presumption the performance of counsel falls within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance. State v. Hepperle, 530 N.W.2d 735, 739 (Iowa 1995). We will not second guess reasonable trial strategy. State v. Wissing, 528 N.W.2d 561, 564 (Iowa 1995). The second prong is satisfied if a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Davis v. State, 520 N.W.2d 319, 321 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994).
A.
Bucklin asserts that he received ineffective assistance because his attorney withdrew the motion to suppress. He claims his counsel should have sought to suppress the videotape. Bucklin states that he was intoxicated and had taken prescription medication, which made his confession involuntary.
On appeal, Bucklin's arguments refer to his videotaped interview. We note, however, that the deputies who found Bucklin testified to similar statements he made at that time. The deputies testified Bucklin seemed coherent and was able to answer questions. Bucklin was not prejudiced by the videotape because similar evidence was already in the record.
Deputy Stevenson testified as follows:
Q. Did Matthew Bucklin repeat basically the same story during the videotaped interview that he had told you at the time you placed him under arrest?
A. Yes, he did.
. . . .
Q. And at the time of his videotaped interview, did Mr. Bucklin appear coherent to you?
A. Yes.
Also, although the motion to suppress was withdrawn, defense counsel worked strenuously during the trial to keep the videotape from the jury. Defense counsel objected at every opportunity to the introduction of Bucklin's statements to the deputies and on videotape on the ground the confession was involuntary due to intoxication. The district court overruled all of these objections. Thus, defense counsel raised the objections Bucklin now asserts on appeal, and they were rejected by the district court. Bucklin has not shown how the district court's ruling would have been different if the objections were presented in a motion to suppress instead of during the trial.
Furthermore, through the testimony of Ahn and Danks there was extensive evidence detailing Bucklin's participation in the crimes. We conclude Bucklin has failed to show the result of the trial would have been different if the videotape had been suppressed.
B.
Bucklin claims he received ineffective assistance because his trial counsel failed to object to evidence of prior bad acts. During cross-examination, Ahn was questioned:
Q. Is it your testimony that you ripped him off on purpose? A. Yes, I did.
Q. And why was that? A. Because Matt had lived off me for months. He never paid any bills at my house. He never did anything. He stole money from me. He stole everything out of my garage to sell.
Bucklin contends his trial counsel should have objected to this testimony that he stole things from Ahn.
Generally, evidence of prior bad acts is not admissible to show the person acted in conformity with the prior acts. Iowa R. Evid. 5.404(b); State v. Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d 19, 23 (Iowa 2004). Such evidence may be admissible, however, if it is relevant to a legitimate issue in dispute, and there is clear proof the defendant committed the act. Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d at 25; State v. Mitchell, 633 N.W.2d 295, 298 (Iowa 2001). If the evidence is relevant, we consider whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 124 (Iowa 2004).
The evidence in question was relevant to show Ahn's motivation to give Bucklin simulated drugs. Also, because Bucklin and Ahn had previously lived together, the evidence was relevant to help explain Bucklin's relationship with Ahn, and whether he had the right to enter her home. "Evidence immediately surrounding the offense is admissible in order to show the complete story of a crime, even when it shows commission of another crime." State v. Shortridge, 589 N.W.2d 76, 83 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998).
We then consider whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Taylor, 689 N.W.2d at 124. Evidence may be considered unfairly prejudicial "when the evidence would cause the jury to base its decision on something other than the proven facts and applicable law, such as sympathy for one party or a desire to punish a party." State v. Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 240 (Iowa 2001). We conclude the evidence in this case could not be considered unfairly prejudicial. Bucklin has failed to show he received ineffective assistance due to counsel's failure to object to Ahn's statements.
We affirm Bucklin's convictions.