Opinion
I.D. No. IN80-12-0863.
Date Submitted: January 7, 2004.
Date Decided: March 24, 2005.
Upon Defendant's Pro Se Motion for Post-Conviction Relief.
SUMMARILY DISMISSEDBrian J. Chapman, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Carvel State Building, Wilmington, Delaware, Counsel for the State of Delaware.
Raymond L. Bruton, Delaware Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware Defendant, pro se.
Eugene J. Maurer Jr., Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, Counsel for the Defendant.
ORDER
Before the Court is a motion for post-conviction relief filed by Raymond L. Bruton (hereinafter the "Defendant") pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. For the reasons that follow, the Defendant's motion is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
1. In 1981, the Defendant was convicted of Delivery of a Narcotic Schedule I Controlled Substance (heroin). He was sentenced to twenty-five years at Level V. On July 31, 2001, the Defendant filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. On September 26, 2001, this Court denied the motion. The Defendant appealed and on February 22, 2002, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed. On September 8, 2004, the Defendant filed the present motion for post-conviction relief.
2. In a motion for post-conviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, the Court is to apply the rules governing procedural requirements before addressing substantive claims. Rule 61(i)(4) specifically bars consideration of any claim that has been "formerly adjudicated, whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a post-conviction proceeding" or otherwise unless reconsideration of the claim would serve the "interest[s] of justice."
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del.Super.Ct. 1990).
See DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i)(4).
3. In this motion, the Defendant raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest and a claim that his sentence violated the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. These claims are the same that the Defendant argued in his July 31, 2001 motion for post-conviction relief. The Court previously considered these claims and denied the Defendant post-conviction relief in its September 26, 2002 Order. Moreover, the Delaware Supreme Court also considered these claims in its February 22, 2002 Order affirming the Superior Court's Order. Therefore, the claims that the Defendant asserts in this motion have been formerly adjudicated in his prior motion for post-conviction relief and are procedurally barred. Additionally, the Defendant has not offered any evidence that the "interest of justice" exception is applicable. As a result of these procedural bars, the Court will not address these claims for a second time and each of the claims is Summarily Dismissed.
See D.I. 59.
See D.I. 65.
See Bruton v. State, 791 A.2d 750 (Del. 2002).
See DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(d)(4) ("If it plainly appears from the motion for post-conviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to relief, the judge may enter an order for its summary dismissal and cause the movant to be notified.").
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant's Motion for Post-conviction Relief is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.