We have never held that, where new facts are adduced in a motion to reconsider, the court is required to reconsider its ruling. In State v. Bruno, 157 Vt. 6, 595 A.2d 272 (1991), we stated that it is better practice for the court to reconsider a pretrial ruling "where serious grounds arise as to the correctness of the . . . ruling." Id. at 8, 595 A.2d at 273-74.
The State has urged affirmance here on the theory that defendant was reported to have been involved in a domestic disturbance. We considered a situation similar to this case in State v. Bruno, 157 Vt. 6, 595 A.2d 272 (1991) where the motions judge had found a DUI stop to be constitutionally lawful based on one theory, with supporting findings, and the trial judge found it lawful based on a different theory, supported by new findings inconsistent with those of the motions judge. We held that the action of the trial judge controlled and found this judge's rationale to be valid.
¶ 12. Taken together, defendant’s actions were sufficient to create a reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant may have been driving impaired. Cf. State v. Bruno, 157 Vt. 6 , 11, 595 A.2d 272 , 275 (1991) (concluding that arresting officer’s observations of defendant swerving and drifting in his lane before briefly parking and then operating his vehicle without headlights were sufficient to raise officer’s reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant was driving impaired). In a relatively short period of time, the officer observed multiple indications of defendant’s lack of attention while operating her vehicle.
¶ 5. A legal investigatory stop is justified if a police officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Bruno, 157 Vt. 6, 11, 595 A.2d 272, 275 (1991). "The officer must have more than an unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity, but needs considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence."
, 94 Ariz. 417, 385 P.2d 709, 710 (1963) (warrantless arrest); State v. Whitaker, 215 Conn. 739, 578 A.2d 1031, 1033 (1990) (voluntariness of confession); People v. Gilliam, 172 In.2d 484, 218 Ill.Dec. 884, 670 N.E.2d 606, 614 (1996) (voluntariness of statement); Lamb v. State, 264 Ind. 563, 348 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1976) (voluntariness of statement); State v. Jackson, 542 N.W.2d 842, 844 (Iowa 1996) (inventory search); State v. Chopin, 372 So.2d 1222, 1224, n. 2 (La. 1979) (investigatory stop); State v. Parkinson, 389 A.2d 1, 10 (Me. 1978) (warrantless arrest); State v. Sharp, 217 Mont. 40, 702 P.2d 959, 961 (1985) (investigatory stop); State v. Huffman., 181 Neb. 356, 148 N.W.2d 321, 322 (1967) (warrantless search); State v. Martinez, 94 N.M. 436, 612 P.2d 228, 231 (1980) (warrantless arrest and search); Commonwealth v. Chacko, 500 Pa. 571, 459 A.2d 311, 318, n. 5 (1983) (voluntariness of statement); State v Keeling, 89 S.D. 436, 233 N.W.2d 586, 590, n. 2 (1975) (pretrial identif1cation); State v. Bruno, 157 Vt. 6, 595 A.2d 272, 273 (1991) (investigatory stop); Carroll v. State, 938 P.2d 848, 850 (Wyo. 1997) (warrantless arrest); Henry v. State, 468 So.2d 896, 899 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (voluntariness of statement); Sayers v. State, 226 Ga. App. 645, 487 S.E.2d 437, 438 (1997) (investigatory stop); State v. Kong, 77 Haw. 264, 883 P.2d 686, 688 (1994) (voluntariness of statement); State v. Sims, 952 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Mo. App. 1997) (pretrial identification); Woodson v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 621, 491 S.E.2d 743, 745 (1997) (warrantless search). But see contra Trusty v. State, 308 Md. 658, 521 A.2d 749, 755 (1987) (warrantless arrest); Commonwealth v. Doulette, 414 Mass. 653, 609 N.E.2d 473, 474 (1993) (warrantless search); People v. Kaigler, 368 Mich. 281, 118 N.W.2d 406, 409 (1962) (warrantless search); State v. Buzzard, 194 W. Va. 544, 461 S.E.2d 50, 58 (1995) (warrantless search); People v. Breault, 223 Cal.App.3d 125, 273 Cal.Rptr. 110, 117 (4 Dist. 1990) (warrantless search); People v. Braithwaite, 172 A.D.2d 548,
Where no new facts are adduced at trial, it would be counterproductive and a waste of judicial resources to require redetermination of a pretrial ruling by the trial judge. State v. Bruno, 157 Vt. 6, 8 n.1, 595 A.2d 272, 274 n.1 (1991) (for reasons of judicial economy, "trial court reconsideration of pretrial suppression rulings is to be the exception, not the rule"). We shall not require a trial judge to reconsider a pretrial decision under such circumstances.
Thus, the trial court is given discretion on whether to review a pretrial ruling with the understanding that reconsideration is the exception, not the rule. See State v. Bruno, 157 Vt. 6, 8 n.1, 595 A.2d 272, 274 n.1 (1991). Consistent with this view, we recently held that it was error for the trial judge to reconsider a pretrial ruling granting a motion to suppress in the absence of new evidence or similar circumstances.
And in State v. Bruno, we affirmed a traffic stop on suspicion of impaired driving where the officer observed the defendant swerving in the lane before briefly parking on a deadend street and then operated the vehicle without headlights. 157 Vt. 6, 11, 595 A.2d 272, 275 (1991). We agreed "that these facts are sufficient to give rise to a reasonable and articulable suspicion on the part of the officer that the defendant was operating his motor vehicle while intoxicated." Id.
And in State v. Bruno, we affirmed a traffic stop on suspicion of impaired driving where the officer observed the defendant swerving in the lane before briefly parking on a dead-end street and then operated the vehicle without headlights. 157 Vt. 6, 11, 595 A.2d 272, 275 (1991). We agreed "that these facts are sufficient to give rise to a reasonable and articulable suspicion on the part of the officer that the defendant was operating his motor vehicle while intoxicated."
on); People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill.2d 484, 670 N.E.2d 606, 614, 218 Ill.Dec. 884 (Ill. 1996) (voluntariness of statement); Lamb v. State, 264 Ind. 563, 348 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind. 1976) (voluntariness of statement); State v. Jackson, 542 N.W.2d 842, 844 (Iowa 1996) (inventory search); State v. Chopin, 372 So.2d 1222, 1224, n. 2 (La. 1979) (investigatory stop); State v. Parkinson, 389 A.2d 1, 10 (Me. 1978) (warrantless arrest); State v. Sharp, 217 Mont. 40, 702 P.2d 959, 961 (Mont. 1985) (investigatory stop); State v. Huffman, 181 Neb. 356, 148 N.W.2d 321, 322 (Neb. 1967) (warrantless search); State v. Martinez, 1980- NMSC 066, 94 N.M. 436, 612 P.2d 228, 231 (N.M. 1980) (warrantless arrest and search); Commonwealth v. Chacko, 500 Pa. 571, 459 A.2d 311, 318, n.5 (Pa. 1983) (voluntariness of statement); State v. Keeling, 89 S.D. 436, 233 N.W.2d 586, 590, n.2 (S.D. 1975) (pretrial identification); State v. Bruno, 157 Vt. 6, 595 A.2d 272. 273 (Vt. 1991) (investigatory stop); Carroll v. State, 938 P.2d 848, 850 (Wyo. 1997) (warrantless arrest); Henry v. State, 468 So.2d 896, 899 (Ala.Crim.App. 1984) (voluntariness of statement); Sayers v. State, 226 Ga.App. 645, 487 S.E.2d 437, 438 (Ga.App. 1997) (investigatory stop); State v. Kong, 77 Haw. 264, 883 P.2d 686, 688 (Hawaii App. 1994) (voluntariness of statement); State v. Sims, 952 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Mo. App. 1997) (pretrial identification); Woodson v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 621, 491 S.E.2d 743, 745 (Va. App. 1997) (warrantless search). State v. Henning, 975 S.W.2d 290, 297-98 (Tenn. 1998).