Opinion
ID#0103020924
Submitted: February 19, 2002
Decided: May 30, 2002
Upon Defendant's Motion to Suppress — DENIED.
ORDER
Defendant asks the court to suppress evidence he discarded as he ran from the police, who were detaining his co-defendant after a car stop. Defendant also challenges the search of the car in which he was a passenger before he ran. On November 29, 2001, the court heard the co-defendant's Motion to Suppress. The court upheld the initial stop, but the car search was invalid. The court suppressed all the evidence seized in the car. The co-defendant's charges were dropped. But Brown still faces charges relating to the drugs and a weapon found during the chase and the car search. As mentioned above and discussed below, Brown was a passenger who fled during the car stop.
State v. Anderson, Del.Super., Cr. A. No. I N010302919, Slights, J. (Nov. 29, 2001) (Mem. Op.)
I.
On March 27, 2001, Brown and his co-defendant, Anderson, were sitting in a parked car on a "dimly lit" Wilmington street. Anderson was behind the steering wheel. An undercover officer noticed the car and its partially covered license plate. Ostensibly because a partially hidden license plate is an equipment violation, the officer approached the car. The officer detained the car's occupants, except Brown. He ran. While chasing him, the police saw Brown throw something to the ground. After he caught Brown, the officer retrieved the item. It held cocaine. Another officer searched the car and found a weapon and more drugs under Brown's car seat.
II.
In its short presentation, the State initially contends that Brown "is without standing to assert a right to contest a search of the vehicle in which he was a passenger." It asserts that the evidence here was discarded by Brown "as he ran from the police as a passenger of the car which was being stopped for a registration [sic] violation." Further, the State argues that because Brown, "as a mere passenger" has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the areas searched or items seized, he lacks standing to assert his rights and seek to suppress the evidence as fruit of an illegal search.
Brown moves to suppress the evidence "on the ground that said evidence was seized as a result of an unlawful stop . . . ." In his two page letter memorandum, Brown relies entirely on Jarvis v. State. He asserts that despite having no expectation of privacy, he has standing to challenge the stop and subsequent search. He argues that being chased "when he decided to leave the area, is evidence to support . . . [that] he was not free to leave." Brown reasons that he was "detained and as a detainee has the same standing as his co-defendant. . . ." Thus, because the car search was ruled illegal "the seizure of contraband as a result of the search must be suppressed."
600 A.2d 38 (Del. 1991).
III.
Under Rakas v. Illinois, a passenger in a car does not have standing to challenge the car's search. Under Jarvis, however, the passenger of a stopped vehicle can challenge the stop if the passenger is seized and searched as part of the stop. In this case, Brown was minding his own business when the police decided to confront Anderson. At that point, the police were interested in the car and the man in its driver's seat. Brown was just a bystander, in effect. As such, under Rakas he lacks standing to challenge the initial confrontation between the police and Anderson. That conclusion does not settle the standing issue entirely.
439 U.S. 128 (1978). See also, Robertson v. State, 596 A.2d 1345, 1353 (Del. 1991).
For a discussion of Jarvis v. State, please see State v. Oliver, Del. Super. Cr. No. IN0012008550, Silverman, J. (Apr. 9, 2002) (Op. And Order).
Brown aroused suspicion in himself when he fled. At that moment the police had a choice: let Brown leave or go after him. The police gave chase and by doing that, the police directly challenged Brown's liberty interests. Although he lacks standing to challenge the initial confrontation between his co-defendant and the police, Brown now has standing to question the decision by the police to chase him and that decision's consequences. While Jarvis is not factually on point, it controls as to Brown's standing to challenge the chase, his detention, the evidence's seizure from the bag he dropped as he ran and the search of the car from which fled.
IV.
The fact that Brown has standing does not make the foot chase unreasonable, much less does it provide a reason to suppress the evidence obtained by the police. As the chase began, Brown was running and the police were following. There is no law against that. If the chase had ended on that note, however, Brown's detention would be debatable. Cummings v. State, holds that merely trying to avoid the police without "undue haste," under unsuspicious circumstances does not justify a detention. Cummings, however, leaves open the question whether unprovoked, headlong flight is enough. Illinois v. Wardlow, holds that under the federal Constitution headlong flight from the police under suspicious circumstances supports a detention. Under the totality of the circumstances here, however, the court does not have to decide whether Wardlow's rationale applies under Delaware's Constitution.
765 A.2d 945 (2001).
See also Woody v. State 765 A.2d 1257, 1265 (Del. 2001).
528 U.S. 119 (2000).
While Brown was running, he gave the police ample justification to stop him. He threw contraband on the ground. By the time the police caught up with Brown they not only had seen him run, pell-mell, from the scene without provocation. The police also had associated him directly with criminal, or at least very suspicious, behavior. Brown's ultimate capture and detention were based on reasonable suspicion.
Moreover, after the police got their hands on Brown and the things he discarded, the police were entitled to search the car he was sitting in when they first saw him. A reasonable police officer might have assumed that Brown had fled with all the incriminating evidence, hoping to get away scot-free. Nevertheless, it also was reasonable to believe that more evidence could be found in the car.
The court holds that the police are not required to stand still when the passenger of a car they properly have stopped runs from them. If the police pursue a passenger who runs, however, the passenger has standing to challenge the chase and its results. The court further holds that if during the chase, and apart from it, the runner gives the police further reason to suspect that criminal conduct is afoot, the police may stop and detain the runner. Furthermore, the fruits of the chase and detention may support the subsequent search of the car from which the runner emerged.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.