On the first circumstance, it is well settled "that death by strangulation presents strong evidence of premeditation." See State v. Walker , 304 Kan. 441, 446–47, 372 P.3d 1147 (2016) (listing cases); see also State v. Brown , 234 Kan. 969, 972–73, 676 P.2d 757 (1984) (evidence of premeditation sufficient when severely beaten victim was killed by strangulation).On the second circumstance, we also do not see any evidence that A.I. provoked Davis. A slumbering child is a threat to no one. See State v. Kettler , 299 Kan. 448, 468, 325 P.3d 1075 (2014) (lack of evidence that victim enticed defendant belies finding of provocation).

We have noted many times that death by strangulation presents strong evidence of premeditation. See State v. Lloyd , 299 Kan. 620, 634, 325 P.3d 1122 (2014) ; State v. Gunby , 282 Kan. 39, 64–65, 144 P.3d 647 (2006) ; State v. Jones , 279 Kan. 395, 403, 109 P.3d 1158 (2005) ; see also State v. Scott , 271 Kan. 103, 111, 21 P.3d 516 (2001) (when finding premeditation jury could conclude defendant's state of mind changed during the violent episode, including at any time during the strangulation); State v. Brown , 234 Kan. 969, 972–73, 676 P.2d 757 (1984) (evidence of premeditation sufficient when severely beaten victim was killed by strangulation). In view of the truly overwhelming evidence of premeditation here, much of it from the defendant's story as reported by Wilson, Walker has failed to firmly convince us that the lesser included instruction would have made a difference in the verdict.

Manual strangulation is strong evidence of premeditation because it provides time for deliberation. See State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, 64–65, 144 P.3d 647 (2006); State v. Jones, 279 Kan. 395, 403, 109 P.3d 1158 (2005) (same); see also Scott, 271 Kan. at 111, 21 P.3d 516 (when finding premeditation jury could conclude defendant's state of mind changed during the violent episode, including at any time during the strangulation); State v. Brown, 234 Kan. 969, 972–73, 676 P.2d 757 (1984) (evidence of premeditation sufficient when severely beaten victim was killed by strangulation). This alone was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude Lloyd intended to kill the child, but there is more.

Also, the Gunby court noted that in State v. Jones, 279 Kan. 395, 404, 109 P.3d 1158 (2005), where the victim was manually strangled, this court reaffirmed Scott's holding that a jury can find a defendant's state of mind changed from mere intent to premeditation at any time during the violent episode that ultimately caused the victim's death, including at any time during a strangulation. Gunby, 282 Kan. at 65; see State v. Moncla, 262 Kan. 58, 73, 936 P.2d 727 (1997) (18 hammer strikes to the head sufficient to show premeditation and deliberation); State v. Phillips, 252 Kan. 937, 939-40, 850 P.2d 877 (1993) (continual stomping and kicking resulting in death sufficient to support premeditation); State v. Brown, 234 Kan. 969, 972-73, 676 P.2d 757 (1984) (struggle, beating, and prolonged strangulation sufficient to show premeditation). Reflecting on those cases, Gunby found the prosecutor's statements were "barely outside" the broad latitude permitted in discussing the evidence, but this court found any error was harmless.

Premeditation is the time of reflection or deliberation. Premeditation does not necessarily mean that an act is planned, contrived, or schemed beforehand. . . . Indeed, death by strangulation can be strong evidence of premeditation." 271 Kan. at 108-09 (citing State v. Brown, 234 Kan. 969, 676 P.2d 757) (struggle, beating, and a prolonged strangulation sufficient to show premeditation). Our recent decision in State v. Jones, 279 Kan. 395, 109 P.3d 1158 (2005), also involved a situation somewhat similar to this case.

This court has stated that death by strangulation can be strong evidence of premeditation. Scott, 271 Kan. at 108; see also State v. Brown, 234 Kan. 969, 972-73, 676 P.2d 757 (1984) (evidence of premeditation sufficient where severely beaten victim was killed by strangulation). Next, there is no evidence whatsoever of Paddock's possible provocation of Jones.

Indeed, death by strangulation can be strong evidence of premeditation. This court hinted at as much in State v. Brown, 234 Kan. 969, 676 P.2d 757 (1984), where we affirmed the defendant's conviction for premeditated first-degree murder when the victim died from prolonged strangulation. In doing so, we specifically noted that the evidence of a struggle, the beating, and then the strangulation were sufficient to show premeditation.

There is ample evidence that may be inferred from the extent of Winter's injuries to conclude that her death was premeditated. See State v. Moncla, 262 Kan. 58, 73, 936 P.2d 727 (1997) (18 hammer strikes to the head sufficient to show premeditation and deliberation); State v. Brown, 234 Kan. 969, 973, 676 P.2d 757 (1984) (severe beating of victim who died from strangulation sufficient for factfinder to determine killing was deliberate, premeditated, willful, and intentional). We held in Moncla that while the element of premeditation is not inferred from use of a deadly weapon alone, an inference of premeditation may be supported where additional circumstances are shown, including lack of provocation, conduct before and after the killing, or the striking of a lethal blow after the deceased was rendered helpless.

See State v. Lloyd, 299 Kan. 620, 634, 325 P.3d 1122 (2014) (manual strangulation is strong evidence of premeditation because it provides time for deliberation); State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, Syl. ¶ 9, 144 P.3d 647 (2006) ( “Death by manual strangulation can be strong evidence of premeditation.”); State v. Brown, 234 Kan. 969, 972–73, 676 P.2d 757 (1984) (struggle, beating, and prolonged strangulation sufficient to show premeditation). There is no other reason to choke or wrap a wire around someone's throat except to hurt them—badly.