"The first Barker factor, the length of the delay, is a threshold requirement for invoking a speedy trial analysis; it functions as a triggering mechanism for further inquiry into the other three Barker factors." State v. Brown , 2011–0947, p. 9 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/7/12), 88 So.3d 662, 668, citing State v. Love , 2000–3347, p. 16 (La. 5/23/03), 847 So.2d 1198, 1210. "Only if there is a „presumptively prejudicial' delay will courts proceed to analyze the other Barker factors." Id.
The district attorney's discretionary prosecutorial authority is vast, and Louisiana jurisprudence has recognized that the state has the authority to enter a nolle prosequi and reinstitute the charge. State v. Brown, 11–0947, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/7/12), 88 So.3d 662, 665;Batiste, 05–1571, pp. 5–6, 939 So.2d at 1249;State v. Millet, 05–1122, p. 2 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/8/06), 946 So.2d 196, 198.
This Court has recognized that “[t]he governing standard of review of a district court's ruling on a motion to quash is the abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Brown, 11–0947, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/7/12), 88 So.3d 662, 665 (citing State v. Love, 00–3347, pp. 9–10 (La.5/23/03), 847 So.2d 1198, 1206–07). In this case, at the time the motion to quash was filed, approximately three years had elapsed from the date of the filing of the bill of information without the defendant being brought to trial.
The first of the four Barker v. Wingo factors, the length of the delay, is the “triggering mechanism,” and if the length of the delay is not “presumptively prejudicial,” the court need not inquire into the other three Barker factors. See State v. Brown, 2011–0947 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/7/12), 88 So.3d 662; State v. Scott, 2004–1142 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/27/05), 913 So.2d 843; State v. Santiago, 2003–0693 (La.App.
Hayes, 10–1538, p. 10, 75 So.3d at 15.Luther, 11–1003 at pp. 7–8, 91 So.3d at 563;see also State v. Brown, 11–0947, p. 3, n.4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/7/12), 88 So.3d 662, 664 (noting that “[b]oth the Louisiana Supreme Court and this court have rejected the separation of powers and due process claims”) (citing King, supra;State v. Batiste, 05–1571 (La. 10/17/06), 939 So.2d 1245;State v. Lee, 11–0892 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/18/12), 80 So.3d 1292; and Hayes, supra).
Louisiana jurisprudence has recognized that the State has the authority to enter a nolle prosequi and reinstitute the charges. State v. Batiste , 05-1571, pp. 5-6 (La. 10/17/06), 939 So.2d 1245, 1249 ; State v. Brown, 11-0947, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/7/12), 88 So.3d 662, 665. Moreover, La. C.Cr.P. art. 691 confers on the district attorney the power to dismiss a formal charge, in whole or in part, without leave of court. La. C.Cr.P. art. 693 provides, subject to narrowly delineated exceptions, that dismissal of a prosecution "is not a bar to a subsequent prosecution."
Appellate courts review a trial court's ruling on a motion to quash for an abuse of discretion. State v. Brown, 11-0947, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/7/12), 88 So.3d 662, 664 (citing State v. Love, 00-3347, p. 9-10 (La. 5/23/03), 847 So.2d 1198, 1206-07). In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the United States Supreme Court reasoned that none of the four factors is considered to be a "necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of a speedy trial."
State v. Batiste, 2005–1571, p. 5 (La.10/17/06), 939 So.2d 1245, 1249, citing, Love, 2000–3347, p. 14, 847 So.2d at 1209.State v. Brown, 2011–0947, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/7/12), 88 So.3d 662, 665 ; Batiste, 2005–1571, pp. 5–6, 939 So.2d at 1249 ; State v. Millet, 2005–1122, p. 2 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/8/06), 946 So.2d 196, 198.
Hayes, 10–1538 at p. 3, 75 So.3d at 11–12 (where this Court rejected the defendant's due process and related separation of powers claim, in which he primarily argued the holding in Wardius v. Oregan, 412 U.S. 470, 474, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 37 L.Ed.2d 82 (1973)); State v. Luther, 11–1003, pp. 7–8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/9/12), 91 So.3d 560, 563 (where this Court, citing to Hayes, supra, again rejected due process and separation of powers arguments made by the defendant); and State v. Brown, 11–947, p. 3, n. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/7/12), 88 So.3d 662, 664 (noting that “[b]oth the Louisiana Supreme Court and this court have rejected the separation of powers and due process claims”). Nevertheless, the jurisprudence has recognized that the State's dismissal-reinstitution authority may be overborne under the circumstances of any given case by proof either that the defendant's right to a fair or speedy trial was violated.
The first of the four Barker factors, the length of the delay, is the "triggering mechanism," and if the length of the delay is not "presumptively prejudicial," the court need not inquire into the other three Barker factors. See State v. Brown, 2011-0947 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/7/12), 88 So. 3d 662; State v. Scott, 2004-1142 (La. App 4 Cir. 7/27/05), 913 So. 2d 843; State v. Santiago, 2003-0693 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/23/03), 853 So.2d 671. The defendant has the burden of showing a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial.