Opinion
No. 07-1073.
Filed April 1, 2008.
Mecklenburg County Nos. 06CRS212105, 06CRS212106.
Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 18 April 2007 by Judge Timothy S. Kincaid in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 March 2008.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Daniel D. Addison, for the State. Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Katherine Jane Allen, for Defendant-Appellant.
Robert Gregory Brown (Defendant) was convicted of breaking or entering a motor vehicle and felonious larceny on 18 April 2007. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of nine months to eleven months in prison on the breaking or entering a motor vehicle charge, and to a consecutive term of fifteen months to eighteen months in prison on the larceny charge. Defendant appeals.
The State's evidence at trial tended to show that James Gregory Brown (Mr. Brown) worked as a cable installer for Time Warner Cable Company. Mr. Brown drove a Time Warner Cable Company truck (the truck) to a shopping center in Charlotte, North Carolina, on 16 March 2006, for his lunch break. Mr. Brown backed the truck into a parking space, slightly opened both windows, and locked the truck before entering KW Cafeteria.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Captain David Poston (Captain Poston) and two sergeants were driving down Village Lake Drive near the shopping center, on their way to lunch. Earlier that day, Captain Poston had been informed that Defendant had outstanding warrants. Captain Poston saw Defendant standing next to the passenger side door of a Time Warner Cable Company truck that was parked in the shopping center parking lot. Captain Poston said to the two sergeants, "there's the gentleman I'm looking for." As Captain Poston drove into the parking lot, Sergeant James Jacobs observed Defendant walk from the front passenger door around to the back of the truck, step up onto the back platform, step down, and walk back to the passenger side of the truck.
Captain Poston stopped his patrol car near the truck, and he and Sergeant Jacobs exited. Captain Poston went toward Defendant, who took a step back, but Captain Poston grabbed Defendant and told him he was under arrest. Defendant said, "I was not in that truck" and told the officers that he had been at another vehicle in the parking lot. Police found that the doors to the truck were unlocked. Sergeant Jacobs noticed that the passenger window was down a couple of inches. Captain Poston secured Defendant while Sergeant Jacobs looked around the truck and located an electronic device in the bushes next to the truck.
Sergeant Jacobs entered the KW Cafeteria and noticed Mr. Brown wearing a Time Warner Cable Company shirt. Mr. Brown confirmed that his company truck was in the parking lot, and Sergeant Jacobs asked Mr. Brown to accompany him outside because the truck had been broken into. In the parking lot, Mr. Brown informed police that the electronic box found in the bushes was a modulator, that the modulator was the property of Time Warner Cable Company, that the modulator had been on the passenger seat in the truck, and that the truck was locked when he went to eat lunch. Police obtained Defendant's latent fingerprints from the outside and inside of the passenger side window of the truck.
Mr. Brown testified at trial that he had not seen Defendant before the incident. Mr. Brown further testified that he had not given Defendant or anyone else permission to enter the truck and remove the modulator. Defendant did not testify at trial.
A jury found Defendant guilty of breaking or entering a motor vehicle and of felonious larceny on 18 April 2007. Defendant appeals.
Defendant first contends the larceny indictment in this case was fatally defective because it failed to properly name the lawful owner of the property. We disagree.
In order for a bill of indictment to be valid, it must allege all essential elements of the offense with which a defendant is charged. State v. Williams, 153 N.C. App. 192, 194, 568 S.E.2d 890, 892 (2002), disc. review improvidently allowed, 357 N.C. 45, 577 S.E.2d 618 (2003). A sufficient "indictment for larceny must allege the owner or person in lawful possession of the stolen property." State v. Downing, 313 N.C. 164, 166, 326 S.E.2d 256,258 (1985). "If the entity named in the indictment is not a person, it must be alleged `that the victim was a legal entity capable of owning property[.]'" State v. Phillips, 162 N.C. App. 719, 721, 592 S.E.2d 272, 273 (2004) (quoting State v. Woody, 132 N.C. App. 788, 790, 513 S.E.2d 801, 803 (1999)). Further, "`[i]f the property alleged to have been stolen . . . is the property of a corporation, the name of the corporation should be given, and the fact that it is a corporation stated, unless the name itself imports a corporation.'" State v. Thornton, 251 N.C. 658, 662, 111 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1960) (quoting Nickles v. State, 71 S.E.2d 578 (Ga.Ct.App. 1952)).
In this case, the indictment for larceny named the property owner as "Time Warner Cable Company, Inc., a corporation." Defendant asserts the indictment is defective because the named owner-entity "is not a legal entity capable of owning property in North Carolina." Instead, Defendant claims that "Time Warner Cable, Inc., a Delaware corporation" is the true owner of the property. Defendant, however, does not point to any evidence in the record to support this claim. More importantly, because the larceny indictment used the abbreviation "Inc.," and stated that the entity was a corporation, it sufficiently alleged the owner-entity under Thornton. This information was also sufficient to establish the entity's ability to own property. See Phillips, 162 N.C. App. at 721, 592 S.E.2d at 274 (stating that identifying the victim as a corporation is an indication of the victim's legal ownership status). This assignment of error is without merit. Defendant also contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss based on insufficient evidence that he was the perpetrator of the crimes. Specifically, Defendant asserts that evidence of his fingerprints found at the scene of the crimes, standing alone, did not constitute substantial evidence linking him to the crimes.
The standard for ruling on a motion to dismiss "is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged and (2) that [the] defendant is the perpetrator of the offense." State v. Lynch, 327 N.C. 210, 215, 393 S.E.2d 811, 814 (1990). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and the State is entitled to all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. State v. Davis, 130 N.C. App. 675, 679, 505 S.E.2d 138, 141 (1998).
"Fingerprint evidence, standing alone, is sufficient to withstand a motion [to dismiss] only if there is ` substantial evidence of circumstances from which the jury can find that the fingerprints could only have been impressed at the time the crime was committed.'" State v. Irick, 291 N.C. 480, 491-92, 231 S.E.2d 833, 841 (1977) (emphasis in original) (quoting State v. Miller, 289 N.C. 1, 4, 220 S.E.2d 572, 574 (1975)). Our Court has previously stated: Evidence of such circumstances include, but are not limited to, "statements by the defendant that he had never been on the premises," "statements by prosecuting witnesses that they had never seen the defendant before or given him permission to enter the premises," and "the discovery of the fruits of the crime in [the defendant's] possession."
State v. Gilmore, 142 N.C. App. 465, 469-70, 542 S.E.2d 694, 697-98 (2001) (quoting Irick, 291 N.C. at 492, 231 S.E.2d at 841; State v. Scott, 296 N.C. 519, 523, 251 S.E.2d 414, 417 (1979)). Whether there is substantial evidence that the fingerprints could only have been impressed at the time the crime was committed is a question of law. Scott, 296 N.C. at 523, 251 S.E.2d at 417.
In this case, the State presented evidence that Defendant's latent fingerprints were located on the outside and inside of the passenger side window of the truck. Additionally, the State presented evidence that police observed Defendant stand next to the passenger side door of the truck, walk around to the back of the truck, step onto the back platform of the truck, and walk back to the passenger side of the truck. The officers found the truck unlocked and also found a modulator, property of Time Warner Cable Company, hidden in a bush next to the truck. Mr. Brown testified that he had locked the truck before going to lunch and that he did not give Defendant permission to enter the truck and remove the modulator that was located on the passenger seat. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that the circumstances surrounding the presence of Defendant's fingerprints on the truck's window constituted sufficient evidence to establish that the fingerprints were impressed at the time the crime was committed. The trial court therefore properly denied Defendant's motion to dismiss.
No error.
Judges STROUD and ARROWOOD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).