Opinion
Cr.A. No. IN91-08-1747 R2, No. IN91-08-1749 R2, No. IN91-08-1754 R2
Submitted: April 12, 1998
Decided: April 27, 1999 Motion Denied: February 8, 2000
ORDER
Upon review of Movant Albert Lee Brown ("Defendant")'s Motion for Postconviction Relief and the record, it appears to the Court:
1) On September 14, 1998, Movant filed a pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 on a plea to three counts of Second Degree Burglary.
2) On December 11, 1992, Movant was sentenced to three counts of Burglary Second Degree. The State dropped all remaining charges. On December 11, 1992, this Court granted the State's motion to declare Defendant a habitual offender.
3) In this motion, Defendant asserts that his attorney mislead him during his plea agreement discussions, and therefore, this Court should allow Defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.
4) When considering a motion for postconviction relief this Court must apply the procedural requirements before considering the merits of the claim. Younger v. State, Del. Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 553 (1990), citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989); State v. Flowers, Del. Super., C.A. No. 930020980DI, Barron, J., (Nov. 6, 1995). This Court ordinarily should not consider the merits of postconviction claims where a procedural bar exists. Younger, 580 A.2d at 554, Flowers, supra at 1.
5) Defendant's motion for postconviction relief is procedurally barred. First, this is the second postconviction relief motion filed in this case. The Court denied Defendant's pro se motion for postconviction relief by Order on March 22, 1994. The current motion is, therefore, repetitive. Consideration of the claims raised in this second motion is not warranted in the interest of justice. The interest of justice exception is triggered when the movant shows that the trial court lacked the authority to convict or punish him. Younger, supra; Flowers, supra. Defendant has failed to make the required showing to lift the bar to repetitive motions. State v. Corbin, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. IN89-11-0457R2, 0467R2, 1800R2, 1804R2, Barron, J. (Feb. 9, 1999). His motion as a whole is therefore procedurally barred.
6) Second, this Court will not address Rule 61 claims that are conclusory and unsubstantiated. See Younger, 580 A.2d at 555; State v. Conlow, Del. Super., Cr.A. No. IN78-09-0985R1, Herlihy, J. (Oct. 5, 1990) at 5; State v. Gallo, Del. Super., Cr.A. No.. IN87-03-0589-0594, Gebelein, J. (Sept. 2, 1988) at 10. Pursuant to Rule 61(a), a motion for post conviction relief must be based on "a sufficient factual and legal basis." In addition, pursuant to Rule 61(b)(2), "[t]he motion shall specify all the grounds for relief which are available to movant . . ., and shall be set forth in summary form the facts supporting each of the grounds thus specified." Defendant has failed to set forth with specificity and supporting facts his claim.
7) The Court finds that defendant's claims are procedurally barred. This is a repetitive motion, movant fails to provide the Court with any facts or references to substantiate the allegations and should the merits ever be addressed in this case, the record indicates to the Court that the grounds for postconviction relief that movant asserts are unsubstantiated. This Court, therefore, denies relief.
Based upon the foregoing, Albert Lee Brown's Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.