Opinion
No. 2-985 / 01-1932
Filed February 12, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott D. Rosenberg, Judge.
James Boyd Brown appeals from his convictions for manufacturing a controlled substance; possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver; three counts of receipt, transportation, dominion, or control over a firearm while being a convicted felon; and possession of a controlled substance. AFFIRMED.
Matthew Sheeley, West Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Tabor, Assistant Attorney General, John Sarcone, County Attorney, and Daniel Voogt, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Brown appeals from his convictions for manufacturing a controlled substance in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(b)(7) (2001); possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in violation of section 124.401(1)(b)(7); three counts of receipt, transportation, dominion, or control over a firearm while being a convicted felon in violation of section 724.26; and possession of a controlled substance in violation of section 124.401(5). We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Brown was charged with these offenses based on allegations that he was manufacturing methamphetamine in his garage. The record indicates that on April 24, 2001, narcotics enforcement officers visited Brown's residence to investigate complaints about the strong smell of anhydrous ammonia emanating from Brown's garage. When they arrived, no one responded to knocks on the garage or house doors, and agents detected no unusual odors. The agents, however, noticed surveillance cameras on the garage scanning the driveway in front of the garage and in the alley behind the garage.
The same agents returned to Brown's residence on May 18, 2001, to continue their investigation. Although no one responded to their knocks on the door, the officers noticed a car parked in the alley near the garage with its windows down. They also noticed the garage's air conditioner was running and a strong smell of ether emanating from the air conditioner. After consulting the Polk County Attorney's office concerning the legality of a warrantless entry into the garage, the officers forcibly entered the garage. No one was in the garage. The agents saw empty ether containers, propane tanks, and marijuana. The garage was secured pending application and receipt of a warrant to search the garage. Upon execution of that search warrant, officers discovered and seized numerous items used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. As a result of the evidence seized, Brown was charged with the offenses earlier mentioned.
Prior to trial, Brown moved to suppress the evidence seized arguing that officers had illegally entered and searched his garage without a warrant. Brown also argued that the search warrant and his incriminating statements subsequently obtained should also be suppressed as fruit of the illegal warrantless search. In its ruling denying Brown's motion to suppress, the court stated:
Under these circumstances the Court finds that probable cause existed to enter the residence not only with a search warrant but also to make a warrantless entry due to exigent circumstances. Those exigent circumstances included not only the possibility of danger to persons inside or in the immediate area of the residence but also to the possibility of evidence being destroyed due to the cameras on the outside of the garage. To merely post officers and wait while application would be made for a search warrant could allow persons to be in further danger whether inside the residence or outside and also to allow the destruction of evidence.
The fact that the officers waited fifteen minutes prior to entry, used no protective gear when going into the garage, and made no warning to people or residents in the area, nor alerted a fire department or hazardous material agency to help upon entry, are merely factors to be considered in the totality of the circumstances presented.
Under these circumstances the Court does not believe the fifteen-minute delay was unreasonable. The fact that the officers did not alert other people in the area nor contacted the fire department nor hazardous material unit nor don protective gear merely adds to the exigency at the time. Indeed, it may have become more dangerous to take further time to alert other neighbors and fire department personnel rather than to immediately go in to see if persons were in need of help. The further fact that the officers retreated without seizing any items after the initial entry indicates that their intentions were reasonable under the circumstances.
Brown was subsequently convicted of all of the offenses charged resulting in this appeal.
On appeal Brown argues the warrantless entry into the garage was not justified under the emergency aid or exigent circumstances exceptions to the warrant requirement cited by the trial court. He further argues the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant and his purported admissions are "fruits of the poisonous tree" and should be suppressed.
II. Scope of Review.
We review constitutional claims de novo, independently evaluating the totality of the circumstances. State v. Prior, 617 N.W.2d 260, 262 (Iowa 2000).
III. The Merits.
Searches and seizures are unconstitutional if they are unreasonable, and warrantless searches are per se unreasonable if they do not fall within an exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d 101, 107 (Iowa 2001). A search based on probable cause and exigent circumstances is such an exception. Exigent circumstances supporting a warrantless search and seizure include "danger of violence and injury to the officers; risk of the subject's escape; or the probability that, unless immediately seized, evidence will be concealed or destroyed." Id. Viewed from an objective point of view, officers must have specific, articulable grounds to justify a finding of exigency. Id. at 109. The existence of probable cause is based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 108. The probable cause standard is "whether a person of reasonable prudence would believe a crime has been committed or that evidence of a crime might be located in the particular area to be searched. Id. The State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a warrantless search falls within one of the exceptions. Id. at 107.
We, like the trial court, find the State has met its burden to prove the warrantless entry into Brown's garage was necessitated by exigent circumstances. The officers observations including the parked car, surveillance cameras, the operating air conditioner, and odors emanating from the garage supported their belief that a crime was in progress. Moreover, the presence of the surveillance cameras and resulting detection of their presence increased the likelihood that evidence of that crime would be concealed or destroyed. We accordingly affirm on this issue. Because we have upheld the legality of the warrantless entry and search of Brown's garage on an exigent circumstances theory, we do not need to address the remaining issues raised.
The district court's judgment is therefore affirmed.