Opinion
A23-1055
02-14-2024
State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Carl Christopher Brown, Appellant.
Blue Earth County District Court File No. 07-CR-17-4404
Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Judge; and Klaphake, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
RENEE L. WORKE, JUDGE
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. In November 2017, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Carl Christopher Brown with second-degree controlled-substance possession, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd. 2(a)(1) (2016). Brown agreed to plead guilty in exchange for the state's agreement to recommend a stayed sentence. The district court accepted Brown's plea, stayed imposition of sentence, and placed Brown on five years of probation, which was to expire on January 29, 2023.
2. In 2019, Brown's probation officer filed a probation-violation report. The report alleged multiple violations of the terms of Brown's probation, including (1) three failed urinalyses, (2) possession of a controlled substance, (3) failure to follow state and federal laws, (4) failure to complete court-ordered sentence-to-service (STS), (5) failure to contact his probation agent as directed, (6) failure to complete a court-ordered chemical-dependency evaluation, and (7) failure to comply with mental-health programming as directed.
3. At a probation-violation hearing, Brown admitted to multiple violations. The district court accepted Brown's admissions and expressed concern with Brown having failed to contact probation for over three and half years while living in two different states. The district court noted that "at this time it would just unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation were not revoked." The district court revoked the stay of imposition and imposed an executed sentence of 48 months in prison.
4. Brown challenges the district court's decision to revoke his probation and execute his prison sentence.
5. District courts have "broad discretion in determining if there is sufficient evidence to revoke probation and should be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that discretion." State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980). A district court "abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record." Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).
6. When a defendant violates a condition of probation, a district court may revoke probation and execute the previously stayed sentence. Minn. Stat. § 609.14, subds. 1, 3 (2022). Before a district court revokes a defendant's probation, it must (1) "designate the specific condition or conditions that were violated"; (2) "find that the violation was intentional or inexcusable"; and (3) "find that [the] need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation." Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250.
7. The district court determined that all three Austin factors weighed in favor of revoking Brown's probation. Brown's appeal challenges the district court's findings for each of the Austin factors. In addressing the first two Austin factors, the district court revoked Brown's probation for possessing and using controlled substances, failing to complete STS, failing to remain in contact with his probation officer, and failing to complete a chemical-dependency evaluation. Brown admitted that these actions violated conditions of his probation, and the district court found the violations to be intentional and inexcusable.
8. Brown claims that he admitted to only some of the alleged probation violations. In total, Brown admitted to five violations and denied one alleged violation- his failure to complete mental-health programming. The district court accepted Brown's admissions and, in so doing, stated that "Brown has admitted to [the violations] and that the violations were intentional or inexcusable." The record does not show that the district court acted impulsively or reflexively when it found that Brown's violations were intentional or inexcusable, and its findings were not ambiguous as to which violations Brown had admitted at the probation-violation hearing.
9. Brown argues that "[t]he district court never found the third Austin factor and its [d]iscussion of the Modtland subfactors was inadequate." See State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602 (Minn. 2005).
10. When considering the third Austin factor, district courts must balance "the probationer's interest in freedom and the state's interest in insuring his rehabilitation and the public safety." 295 N.W.2d at 250. To make a finding on the third Austin factor, a district court weighs the three Modtland subfactors: whether (1) "confinement is necessary to protect the public from further criminal activity by the offender; or" (2) "the offender is in need of correctional treatment which can most effectively be provided if [the offender] is confined; or" (3) "it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation were not revoked." 695 N.W.2d at 607 (quotation omitted). Because "or" is disjunctive, only one Modtland subfactor is necessary to support revocation. See Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 283 (Minn. 2008).
11. The district court found that "[Brown] ha[d] intentionally . . . made a choice to be out of contact with probation not only in Minnesota, but Arkansas, . . . and at this time it would just unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation were not revoked." Accordingly, the district court made the requisite findings regarding a Modtland subfactor in reaching its conclusion on the third Austin factor. The district court's probation-revocation decision satisfies the three Austin factors. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked the stay and imposed an executed sentence.
12. Brown argues that "[t]he district court impermissibly shifted the burden to Brown to [show] why his probation should not be revoked." Specifically, that the district court's analysis "focused on Brown's failure to provide evidence to support keeping him on probation." It is the state's burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Brown violated a condition of probation. See State v. Cottew, 746 N.W.2d 632, 636 (Minn. 2008). Brown admitted to five probation violations. Therefore, the state met its burden of proof in showing that Brown violated the conditions of his probation.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.