Opinion
Nos. 108,324 108,325.
2013-08-16
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Cynthia BROWN, Appellant.
Appeal from Reno District Court; Joseph L. McCarville III, Judge. Rachel L. Pickering, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Thomas R. Stanton, deputy district attorney, Keith E. Schroeder, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Appeal from Reno District Court; Joseph L. McCarville III, Judge.
Rachel L. Pickering, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Thomas R. Stanton, deputy district attorney, Keith E. Schroeder, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before LEBEN, P.J., GREEN and STANDRIDGE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
In June 2011, Cynthia Brown pleaded no contest to several counts in 10 CR 575, 11 CR 289, and 11 CR 299. Before sentencing, Brown moved to withdraw her pleas. The trial court, however, denied her motion after conducting a hearing. After denying her plea withdrawal, the trial court sentenced Brown to 49 months' imprisonment. On appeal, Brown argues that she was taking several medications, including Dilantin, which affected her ability to understand her pleas when she entered them. But the trial court heard Brown's testimony and found no evidence that Brown's pleas were anything but knowingly and voluntarily made. Accordingly, we affirm.
In 10 CR 575 Brown was charged with several counts of forgery, identity theft, and theft. In 11 CR 289, Brown was charged with the following counts: (1) sale of alprazolam; (2) possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell; (3) possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to package a controlled substance for sale; (4) possession of alprazolam without a tax stamp; and (5) possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to introduce a controlled substance into the human body. In a complaint/information filed in 11 CR 299, Brown also was charged with failure to register as a drug offender.
Brown's preliminary hearing for 11 CR 289 and 11 CR 299 was scheduled for June 29, 2011. At the start of the hearing, Brown's defense counsel told the trial court that Brown had decided to waive her arraignment, waive her right to a preliminary hearing, and plead no contest to all of the charges. In exchange for the no contest pleas, the State agreed not to seek an upward departure under 11 CR 289 for Brown's alleged sale of alprazolam to a minor.
After Brown waived her arraignments and preliminary hearings, she confirmed that she had discussed her cases with her attorney and that she wished to plead no contest to all the charges. The trial court went through the standard colloquy with Brown. The trial court advised Brown of the various rights she was giving up by pleading no contest. Moreover, Brown stated that she understood the rights that she was giving up by pleading no contest. The trial court accepted Brown's pleas and found her guilty as charged.
Before sentencing, Brown moved to withdraw her pleas. Brown argued that she should be allowed to withdraw her pleas because “at the time of the plea[s], she was taking medication for certain mental health disorders, including borderline personality disorder. She may not have fully understood the full nature and consequence of her plea[s].” The trial court held a hearing on Brown's motion to withdraw pleas, and Brown presented testimony in support of her motion. In particular, Brown stated the following:
“Basically [I wanted to withdraw my pleas] because I didn't understand what was going on then. I was taking [the prescription medication Dilantin] because I was an IV drug user for methamphetamines. I had used drugs for so long that I used it to self medicate and I didn't take any medications, period and they, and then I had a suicide attempt and went to Prairie View and stopped medication. When I got out of Prairie View they gave me a thousand milligrams of Dilantin which is a whole lot for somebody my weight and size and it just seemed to make things worse and I was in here and I just wasn't coherent, wasn't understanding a lot of the things.”
After the conclusion of Brown's testimony, the State called her former defense attorney Alice Osburn as a witness. Osburn testified that she had multiple discussions with Brown regarding her cases. Moreover, Osburn testified that she never observed anything which would have indicated to her that Brown did not understand what she was doing in entering the pleas. Following the conclusion of the testimony and closing arguments, the trial court denied Brown's motion, concluding the evidence failed to show that her pleas were anything but freely and voluntarily made.
After denying Brown's motion, the trial court proceeded to sentencing. Brown's motion for a downward departure was denied, and she was sentenced to a controlling term of 49 months' imprisonment. Did the trial court err in denying Brown's motion to withdraw her no contest pleas?
Brown argues that she showed good cause to withdraw her guilty pleas before sentencing and that the trial court erred by denying her motion. Specifically, Brown argues that she presented evidence showing that her pleas were not knowing or voluntarily made because she was impaired by medication. The State disagrees and contends that Brown failed to establish a sufficient reason why she should be allowed to withdraw her pleas.
Whether a defendant's plea may be withdrawn is controlled by statute: “A plea of guilty or nolo contendere, for good cause shown and within the discretion of the court, may be withdrawn at any time before sentence is adjudged.” K.S.A.2012 Supp. 22–3210(d)(1). Kansas appellate courts will not disturb a trial court's decision to deny a defendant's presentence motion to withdraw his or her plea unless the defendant shows that the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Macias–Medina, 293 Kan. 833, 836, 268 P.3d 1201 (2012). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion. State v. Hulett, 293 Kan. 312, 319, 263 P.3d 153 (2011). A court abuses its discretion when its action:
“ ‘(1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e., if no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court; (2) is based on an error of law, i.e., if the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion; or (3) is based on an error of fact, i.e., if substantial competent evidence does not support a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of discretion is based.’ “ Macias–Medina, 293 Kan. at 836 (quoting State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 3, 256 P.3d 801 [2011],cert. denied132 S.Ct. 1594 [2012] ).
In Brown's case, we must keep in mind that the trial court, which hears the evidence, makes the factual findings. As a result, we must defer to those findings where they are supported by substantial evidence. State v. Anderson, 291 Kan. 849, 855, 249 P.3d 425 (2011). In addition, to the extent the trial court has not made explicit factual findings, we observe that neither party asked it to make additional findings. In such cases, our appellate courts presume that the trial court made the factual findings necessary to support its decision. State v. Gaither, 283 Kan. 671, 686, 156 P.3d 602 (2007).
Under Kansas law, a defendant must show good cause for withdrawing his or her plea. K.S.A.2012 Supp. 22–3210(d)(l). The “good cause” standard required for withdrawing a plea before sentencing is a lesser standard than the manifest-injustice standard required for withdrawing a plea after sentencing. Macias–Medina, 293 Kan. at 836–37. When assessing good cause, courts generally consider three factors: “ ‘(1) whether the defendant was represented by competent counsel; (2) whether the defendant was misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage of, and (3) whether the plea was fairly and understandingly made.’ “ 293 Kan. at 837 (quoting State v. Aguilar, 290 Kan. 506, 511, 231 P.3d 563 [2010] ). Other factors, however, may be considered, and all three factors do not have to be in a defendant's favor to establish good cause to withdraw a plea. Macias–Medina, 293 Kan. at 837.
In this case, Brown advances only one argument to show that she should have been allowed to withdraw her no-contest pleas before sentencing. Brown's sole argument on appeal is that she did not understand her pleas because of the prescription medications she was taking. Brown asserts that when she entered her pleas, she was taking Dilantin, Seroquel, Hydroxyzine Pam, Suspar, and Strattera to treat her physical and mental health problems.
Our Supreme Court has held that a defendant taking prescription drugs who tells the court that he or she is not under the influence of any intoxicating drugs usually is able to make a voluntary plea. See State v. Denmark–Wagner, 292 Kan. 870, 878–80, 258 P.3d 960 (2011). During a plea hearing, the court is not required to ask a defendant about medications the defendant may be taking, as long as the court ensures: “(1) that the defendant is informed of the maximum penalty that may be imposed if the defendant accepts the plea, (2) that the defendant understands the nature of the charge, and (3) that the defendant understands the consequences of pleading guilty.' 292 Kan. 870, Syl. ¶ 4. Under certain circumstances, however, the failure of a court to make an on-the-record inquiry and determination about whether a defendant is under the influence of medication before accepting a plea is reversible error if there is any indication at the plea hearing that the defendant is on medication. See Price v. State, No. 89,202, 2004 WL 2238643, at *2 (Kan.App.2004) (unpublished opinion) (citing United States v. Rossillo, 853 F.2d 1062, 1065–67 [2d Cir.1988] ).
The underlying facts of this case do not fall within the limited exception of Price. A review of the record does not give any indication that the trial court would have known that Brown was on medication or that medication affected her ability to enter her no contest pleas. At the plea withdrawal hearing, Brown testified that she did not understand what was going on at her plea hearing because she was taking the medication Dilantin.
Essentially, Brown's appellant argument presents two questions: (1) Did Brown's medication prevent her pleas from being knowingly and voluntarily made? and (2) Did Brown's ingestion of the medication cause her to have a lack of understanding when she entered her pleas? Here, Brown is relying on the logical fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc. Ruggero J. Aldisert describes the post hoc fallacy as follows:
“The post hoc fallacy consists of reasoning from sequence to consequence. It is reasoning from what happened in sequence to the assumption of a causal connection. We commit this fallacy whenever we argue that because a certain event was preceded by another event, the preceding event was the cause of the latter. This is the fallacy of inferring causation from temporal succession only.” Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers; A Guide to Clear Legal Thinking, p. 199 (3d ed.1997).
Brown's argument is a post hoc fallacy because she failed to offer any proof or evidence to establish the causal connection between her allegation that she did not understand her pleas based on the medication that she was taking. Indeed, Brown's counsel failed to produce Brown's medical records from June 2011, which possibly could have supported her testimony. It cannot be said that Brown's pleas were involuntary simply because she was taking the drug Dilantin when she entered them.
Moreover, Brown's defense counsel testified that Brown did not seem to be under the influence of any medication when she entered her pleas. In fact, defense counsel testified that she had multiple discussions with Brown regarding her cases and that she never observed anything which would have indicated to her that Brown did not understand what she was doing in entering the pleas.
Based on this analysis, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Brown's motion to withdraw her no-contest pleas. We also note that the trial court heard the evidence, so we must defer to its factual findings. Here, it seems that the trial court simply did not believe that Brown's ability to think was affected by the drugs she was taking or believe that Brown lacked either the knowledge or the ability needed to freely and voluntarily enter her pleas. Under Kansas law, we cannot reweigh the evidence or assess witness credibility. Anderson, 291 Kan. at 855.
The only evidence about Dilantin's affect on Brown's decisionmaking came from Brown herself. Brown's attorney's testimony, however, supports a contrary conclusion: there was no indication at the plea hearing that Brown's medication affected her decision to plead no contest. See State v. Frost, No. 100,743, 2010 WL 1379112, at *3–4 (Kan.App.2010) (unpublished opinion) (rejecting motion to withdraw plea in part because defendant's attorney testified he did not notice defendant under influence of drugs). In this case, the same judge presided over the plea hearing and the plea withdrawal hearing, so he was able to observe Brown for indications that medication was affecting her judgment. See Macias–Medina, 293 Kan. at 839 (finding it important that same judge presided at plea hearing and motion hearing to withdraw plea).
The record of the plea hearing indicates that the court told Brown of the charges against her and the potential penalties for those charges. Brown responded that she understood the charges and the possible punishment. Based on this information, the trial court was not required to inquire about Brown's medications. See Denmark–Wagner, 292 Kan. 870, Syl. ¶ 4. Consequently, Brown's argument concerning the influences the medication had on her ability to understand her pleas fails.
Affirmed.