Opinion
No. COA13–31.
2013-06-18
STATE of North Carolina v. James Andrew BROOME.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Derek L. Hunter, for the State. Peter Wood for defendant-appellant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 7 September 2012 by Judge Anna M. Wagoner in Union County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 June 2013. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Derek L. Hunter, for the State. Peter Wood for defendant-appellant.
ELMORE, Judge.
James Andrew Broome (defendant) appeals from a judgment entered upon revocation of his probation. Because defendant's probation violation hearing was held after the effective date of the amendments to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1344(f) enacted in N.C. Session Law 2008–129, § 4, we find no merit to defendant's claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
Defendant pled guilty to felonious possession of cocaine on 22 September 2009. The court imposed a suspended prison sentence of 6–8 months and placed him on 18 months of supervised probation. A violation report filed 9 July 2010 charged defendant with willfully violating the conditions of probation as follows: (1) testing positive for illegal drug use; (2) failing to report to his probation officer as scheduled; (3) non-payment of costs and fees; and (4) leaving the court's jurisdiction without permission. Arrest warrants were issued in 2010 but were not served on defendant until 13 April 2012, because he could not be located. After a hearing held 7 September 2012, the trial court found each of the violations alleged in the report, revoked defendant's probation, and activated his suspended sentence. Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to revoke his probation, because it held the violation hearing after his probation term had expired. Defendant asserts that the trial court failed to make necessary findings regarding the State's effort to provide him with notice and to conduct the hearing prior to the expiration of his probation. As the State observes, however, defendant's claim is based on an outdated version of the relevant statute, N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1344.
For probation violation hearings held prior to 1 December 2008, the following statutory rule prevailed:
The court may revoke probation after the expiration of the period of probation if:
(1) Before the expiration of the period of probation the State has filed a written motion with the clerk indicating its intent to conduct a revocation hearing; and
(2) The court finds that the State has made reasonable effort to notify the probationer and to conduct the hearing earlier.
N.C. Gen. § 15A–1344(f) (2007) (emphasis added). In Section 4 of N.C. Session Law 2008–129, however, the General Assembly amended subsection (f) to eliminate the “reasonable effort” requirement. See Act of July 28, 2008, 2008 N.C. Sess. Laws 129. Section 5 made this amendment applicable “to probation violation hearings on or after” 1 December 2008. Id.
For purposes of defendant's 7 September 2012 hearing, the statute now provides as follows:
The court may extend, modify, or revoke probation after the expiration of the period of probation if all of the following apply:
(1) Before the expiration of the period of probation the State has filed a written violation report with the clerk indicating its intent to conduct a hearing on one or more violations of one or more conditions of probation.
(2) The court finds that the probationer did violate one or more conditions of probation prior to the expiration of the period of probation.
(3) The court finds for good cause shown and stated that the probation should be extended, modified, or revoked.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1344(f) (2011). As required, the violation report was filed 9 July 2010, well before the expiration of defendant's probation supervision period in March of 2011. The trial court found defendant in willful violation of multiple conditions of his probation; it further found that “[e]ach violation is, in and of itself, a sufficient basis upon which this Court should revoke probation and activate the suspended sentence.”
Because the trial court made the requisite findings to support the revocation of defendant's probation, we affirm the judgment.
Affirmed. Judges McGEE and STEPHENS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).