Opinion
12712
August 12, 1929.
Before S.T. Lanham, Special Judge, Sumter, June, 1928. Affirmed.
Defendant was convicted on the charge of willfully and maliciously attempting to set fire to or attempting to procure the burning of a store house and sentenced for one year. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.
The first and second exceptions follow:
"I. That the presiding Judge erred in refusing to direct a verdict of not guilty in behalf of the defendant, there being no relevant and competent evidence sufficient in evidentiary force to warrant the submission of the case to the jury.
"II. That the presiding Judge erred in refusing to charge the following portion of the appellant's thirteenth request to charge:
"`It would be grossly improper on the part of a single juror to even mention such a fact to his fellow jurors in the room, or to discuss or even refer to the same, or to be in the least influenced by such fact, for the reason that to give any consideration to such fact would be to deprive him of a sacred constitutional right and guarantee in such a manner and under such circumstances as to render him helpless in the protection of his rights.'"
The thirteenth request to charge and the remarks of Judge Lanham thereon here follow:
"`The Constitution of this state (Article 1, § 17) provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." It is also provided under the statute law of the state (Code of criminal Procedure, § 97) that in the trial of all criminal cases the defendant may or may not testify, as he desires, as to the facts and circumstances of the case, but under no circumstances is he required to take the stand in his own behalf to testify. It is also provided that it would be grossly improper for the solicitor in argument to comment upon the defendant's failure to testify in a given case. You will, therefore, understand that the defendant is not required to take the stand in his own behalf, but he may absolutely rely upon the case of the state as made for his vindication, and no inference must be drawn by any juror against him for his failure to go on the stand.'
"It would not be proper, Mr. Foreman and gentlemen, for you to take it against him that he did not take the stand as a witness on his own behalf, for, if you did, you would invade a right guaranteed by our fundamental law, the Constitution of the State of South Carolina, which is the strongest bulwark that any citizen has for his protection.
"The defendant has entered a plea of not guilty to this charge, and that means that he denies that he had any connection with the offense whatever, and for the purpose of this trial that denial must be accepted by the jury as just as much a denial as if he had gone on the stand and denied the charge. When he presents his denial of the charge in his plea, the law immediately clothes him with the presumption of innocence and entitles him to an acquittal, without opening his mouth, at every stage of the trial, until it has been overcome by evidence — not speculative theory, surmise, suspicion, or probability, but evidence which is so substantial, well connected, direct, and strong as to exclude every reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
"The defendant is not called upon, either by his own testimony, or that of any other witness, to explain or contradict a single fact or circumstance relied on by the State, but the unshifting burden throughout the case is on the State to show that all the facts and circumstances relied on by the State are not inconsistent, but form an unbroken chain so direct and strong as to point to the guilt of the accused, and so strongly to his guilt as to remove every reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury as to his guilt."
Messrs. George D. Levy and Mendel L. Smith, for appellant, cite: Directed verdict in criminal case: 127 S.C. 392; 118 S.C. 21; 123 S.C. 486; 128 S.C. 469; 134 S.C. 72; 136 S.C. 300; 138 S.C. 164.
Solicitor Frank A. McLeod, for respondent.
August 12, 1929. The opinion of the Court was delivered by
The Court is satisfied that there was sufficient evidence presented by the State to require a submission of the issue of the defendant's guilt to the jury, and that there was no error on the part of the presiding Judge in refusing his motion for a directed verdict as complained of in the first exception.
We are of opinion, too, that the rights of the defendant were fully and clearly presented by the presiding Judge in his comments upon the thirteenth request to charge, and that there is no merit therefore in the second exception.
The third exception was abandoned upon the hearing.
The judgment of this Court is that the judgment of the Circuit Court be affirmed.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WATTS, and MESSRS. JUSTICES BLEASE, STABLER and CARTER concur.