Opinion
No. COA12–20.
2012-07-17
STATE of North Carolina v. Ronnie Junior BRIM, Jr.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Torrey D. Dixon, for the State. Reece & Reece, by Michael J. Reece, for defendant appellant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 9 August 2011 by Judge R. Allen Baddour, Jr., in Rockingham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 2 July 2012. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Torrey D. Dixon, for the State. Reece & Reece, by Michael J. Reece, for defendant appellant.
McCULLOUGH, Judge.
Ronnie Junior Brim, Jr. (“defendant”) appeals from a jury verdict finding him guilty of harboring a fugitive from justice. Defendant was sentenced to a minimum term of six months and a maximum term of eight months, and this sentence was suspended for twenty-four months of supervised probation. The sole issue he presents is whether the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. For the following reasons, we find no error.
The State presented evidence tending to show that on 23 March 2010, Lieutenant Dawud Muhammad (“Muhammad”) of the Reidsville Police Department obtained a warrant for the arrest of Wayne Anthony Lee, Jr. (“Lee”) for second-degree murder. Endeavoring to find and arrest Lee, Muhammad posted flyers and sent e-mails to media sources soliciting the assistance of the public in locating Lee. Knowing that defendant and Lee “hung out together,” Muhammad daily drove by a residence where defendant resided with his sister and her child.
On 9 April 2010, Muhammad saw Lee sitting on the front porch of this residence. After calling and waiting for other officers to arrive and assist, Muhammad walked to the front door of the residence and knocked. Defendant answered the door. Muhammad asked defendant whether Lee was in the house. Defendant did not answer. With the consent of defendant's sister, Muhammad searched the residence and did not find Lee. Muhammad asked defendant where Lee had gone. Defendant replied that Lee was not the person Muhammad had seen on the porch earlier. Muhammad described defendant's demeanor during the encounter as agitated and uncooperative. Muhammad told defendant that a warrant for Lee's arrest had been issued, that he knew defendant and Lee hung out together, that defendant should call the police immediately if he saw Lee, and that defendant should not provide Lee with any assistance.
On 12 April 2010, Muhammad returned to the residence after receiving an anonymous tip. Muhammad knocked on the door and screamed, “Reidsville Police Department” several times. Muhammad also called out Lee's name. Muhammad heard Lee tell defendant and another man standing near the stairwell inside the house that he intended to turn himself in. Lee then emerged from the residence and surrendered. Defendant and the other man came out of the residence thereafter. Defendant was hostile and belligerent to Muhammad and the other officers assisting with the arrest.
Muhammad testified on cross-examination that the second-degree murder offense with which Lee had been charged was retaliatory and gang related. Muhammad further testified on redirect examination that Lee and defendant belonged to the same gang at the time of the foregoing events. Defendant did not present any evidence.
In reviewing the denial of a motion to dismiss, we determine whether there is substantial evidence (1) to establish each essential element of the offense charged, and (2) to prove the defendant committed the offense. State v. Scott, 356 N.C. 591, 595, 573 S.E.2d 866, 868 (2002). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’ “ State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 66, 296 S.E.2d 649, 652 (1982) (quoting State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78–79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980)). We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. State v. Benson, 331 N.C. 537, 544, 417 S.E.2d 756, 761 (1992). If the evidence is sufficient only to raise a suspicion or conjecture as to the defendant's commission of the offense, then the motion to dismiss should be allowed. State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980). If the evidence “gives rise to a reasonable inference of guilt,” then the court must deny the motion and submit the case for the jury to decide whether or not the defendant is guilty of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jones, 303 N.C. 500, 504, 279 S.E.2d 835, 838 (1981).
A defendant commits the offense of harboring a fugitive if he conceals, hides, harbors, feeds, clothes or otherwise aids and comforts a person who is the subject of an outstanding warrant for arrest, with knowledge or having reasonable cause to believe that this person is the subject of an arrest warrant. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–259 (2011). Defendant argues the evidence adduced in the case at bar only raised a suspicion that defendant concealed, harbored, fed, clothed or offered aid or comfort to Lee. We disagree.
“Where there is no direct evidence as to the essential fact involved in the issue to be passed upon by the jury, such fact may nevertheless be inferred by the jury from facts and circumstances which they may find from the evidence.” State v. Weston, 197 N .C. 25, 28, 147 S.E. 618, 620 (1929). At trial in the present case, evidence was admitted which indicated that defendant and Lee belonged to the same gang; that the offense with which Lee had been charged was retaliatory and gang related; that defendant and Lee hung around together; that Muhammad had seen Lee sitting on the porch of defendant's residence on 9 April 2010; that when Muhammad initially asked defendant on that date whether Lee was at defendant's house, defendant failed to respond; that Muhammad advised defendant that a warrant for Lee's arrest had been issued and to call him immediately if he saw Lee; that defendant did not call Muhammad when he subsequently saw Lee inside his residence on 12 April 2010; and that defendant was belligerent and uncooperative each time the officers came to defendant's residence. We conclude a reasonable inference may be drawn from these circumstances that defendant harbored and assisted Lee, with knowledge that a warrant for Lee's arrest was outstanding.
No error. Judges HUNTER (ROBERT C.) and ELMORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).