Opinion
I.D. No. 9412012391-R1. CR.A. Nos. IN94-12-1399-R1, 1401-R1, 1403-R1, IN95-01-1175-R1, 1177-R1.
Submitted: October 6, 1999.
Decided: October 19, 1999.
Upon Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief. Summarily Dismissed.
ORDER
Having reviewed Movant Rodney A. Bright's motion for postconviction relief, the Court finds and concludes as follows:
1. Bright was convicted by a jury of his peers of Attempted Murder First Degree and four counts of Terroristic Threatening. This Court denied Bright's motion for a new trial. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal, and his motion for reargument was denied. A recitation of the facts surrounding Bright's attempt to murder his ex-wife, Ona Bright, is provided in both Bright I and Bright II.
State v. Bright (Bright I), Del. Super., ID No. 941201391, Barron, J. (Feb. 4, 1998) (Mem. Op.).
Bright v. State (Bright II), Del. Supr., ___ A.2d ___, No. 436, 1998, Walsh, J. (June 15, 1999).
Bright v. State, Del. Supr., No. 436, 1998, Walsh, J. (July 21, 1999) (ORDER).
2. Bright has filed with this Court a motion for postconviction relief, pursuant to Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61 (Rule 61). He alleges two grounds for relief.
3. Bright alleges first that his trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to object to the admission of the testimony of Bright's psychiatrist, Dr. Aimee Mayeda. Bright asserts that if such an objection had been made, the testimony would have been found to be inadmissible character evidence under D.R.E. 404(b). Although not so stated in the motion, the Court infers that Bright also argues that the result of the trial would have been different without Dr. Mayeda's testimony.
4. To prevail on this claim, Bright must meet the well-established Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel. Bright must first show that defense counsel's conduct fell below "an objective standard of reasonableness." He must then show that counsel's deficiencies were prejudicial, creating a reasonable probability that, but for those errors, the result of the trial would have been different.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), adopted by Albury v. State, Del. Supr., 551 A.2d 53 (1988).
Id. at 688.
Id. at 694.
5. However, the Strickland Court also stated that when "it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed." This proposition fits Bright's claim in the following ways. First, the Court unequivocally rejects Bright's assertion that "[i]f a proper objection had been made, such testimony would have been ruled inadmissible." Second, Bright's appellate attorney raised the 404(b) issue on appeal, and the Delaware Supreme Court found that, "to the extent that portions of Dr. Mayeda's testimony would constitute character evidence, that testimony was relevant evidence of Bright's charged conduct." It follows that Bright cannot show prejudice stemming from trial counsel's failure to make a 404(b) objection. The Court therefore follows Strickland's guidance in disposing of this claim for lack of prejudice.
Id. at 697 (emphasis added).
Motion at 4.
Bright II at 5.
6. Bright's second alleged ground for relief also pertains to the so-called character evidence. Bright argues that his constitutional right to due process was violated by the Delaware Supreme Court's decision on appeal that admission of the "character evidence" was proper under the Delaware Rules of Evidence. The 404(b) issue was clearly resolved against Bright on appeal and is therefore procedurally barred under Rule 61 (i)(4).
7. Although not so stated, the Court infers that Bright intended this argument to meet the exception that allows reconsideration of a claim "because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness" of the proceedings. However, after reviewing the record, as well as Bright II, the Court rejects this notion. The appellate decision is legally sound, and, in addition, is binding on this Court.
Rule 61(i)(5).
8. The Court notes that a postconviction relief motion is a collateral attack on a conviction, not a substitute for an appeal, and that the procedural safeguards are intended to eliminate claims that have already been decided, such as this one.
9. Having reviewed the motion, as well as the record of the proceedings, the Court finds that it plainly appears that Bright is not entitled to the relief he seeks and that his motion must therefore be dismissed.
Rule 61(d)(4).
For the above reasons, Bright's motion for postconviction relief is hereby Summarily Dismissed .
IT IS SO ORDERED .