Opinion
ID No. 0009019170.
May 24, 2007.
Upon Consideration of Motion for Postconviction Relief.
DENIED.ORDER
This 24th day of May 2007, upon consideration of Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, it appears that:
1. Troy Bratcher ("Bratcher") has filed a Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. For the reasons set forth below, Bratcher's Motion is DENIED.
2. On November 23, 2004, Bratcher pled guilty to one count of Trafficking Cocaine, and the Court sentenced him to 20 years at Level V, suspended after serving 12 years at Level V for 6 months at Level IV, followed by 18 months at Level III; hold at Level V until space is available at Level IV Home Confinement. The first five years of this sentence is a mandatory incarceration.
3. On February 2, 2005, Bratcher filed a Motion for Sentence Modification, which the Court denied in part on March 31, 2005; the Court granted Defendant credit time for 18 days. Next, Defendant filed a Motion for Resentence on August 18, 2005. The Court denied this Motion on December 2, 2005. Following the Court's denial, Bratcher filed this Motion for Postconviction Relief on February 28, 2006.
4. Bratcher raises two main contentions in support of his Motion for Postconviction Relief: 1) ineffective assistance of counsel, and 2) fourth amendment rights. In essence, Bratcher claims that he provided his attorney, Darryl K. Fountain ("Attorney Fountain"), with important information about his case, and Attorney Fountain failed to conduct further investigation. Bratcher argues that, before encouraging him to take the guilty plea, counsel should have filed a Motion to Suppress to protect his fourth amendment rights in regard to drug evidence. According to Bratcher, police illegally initiated the search and seizure that led to his arrest. Bratcher alleges that he "had already been unreasonably seized when his moving car was blocked in by the officers." In more detail, Bratcher explains that:
Movant (Bratcher) pulled up, exited his vehicle and approached Mr. Amos' vehicle. As he was approaching Amos' vehicle, he observed a marked police car in the parking lot next to the gas station. Movant walked back to his vehicle, got in it, put it in gear and attempted to move. That's when he was seized. So Movant was arrested before his exit from the car in an attempt to flee . . .
Hence, under these facts, Bratcher claims that a Motion to Suppress would have been successful.
5. The State contends that Bratcher's claims are without merit. The State first refutes Defendant's claim that counsel failed to investigate the facts of his case. For example, counsel's paralegal visited Defendant in prison and questioned him about the case. Also, Defendant Bratcher received the Initial Crime Report, a Medical Examiner's Controlled Substance's Laboratory Report, a copy of the Indictment and a copy of the Defendant's known Criminal Record. Both Defendant Bratcher and his attorney had sufficient information to assess the success of a Motion to Suppress and the quality of a plea agreement. Accordingly, the State contends that, "The evidence against the Defendant was overwhelming to support a conviction." In its Reply Brief, the State explains that:
The Police had a Confidential Informant phone Defendant. Defendant agreed to sell the informant two "eight-balls" of cocaine. Defendant also agreed to meet the informant at a gas station. The informant also gave an exact description of the vehicle that Defendant would drive. The Police responded to the arranged meeting spot. Defendant arrived at the gas station in the exact car that the informant described. Defendant attempted to flee and was taken into custody by the Police.
Based on these facts, the State offered Defendant Bratcher a plea agreement by which two of his three charges were Nolle Prossed, and he was discharged from probation. The State also declined seeking habitual offender status, which would have resulted in a mandatory life sentence for Defendant if found guilty at trial.
6. Before addressing the merits of any postconviction relief claim, the Court must determine whether the defendant has met the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i) imposes four procedural imperatives: 1) the motion must be filed within three years of a final order of conviction; 2) any ground for relief that was not asserted in a prior postconviction proceeding is thereafter barred; 3) any basis for relief must have been asserted at trial or on direct appeal as required by the court rules; and 4) any ground for relief must not have been formerly adjudicated in any proceeding leading to the judgment of conviction. The Postconviction Relief Motion is timely filed and not repetitive. Therefore, the Court will consider the merits of the Motion below.
7. Under Strickland v. Washington, and Flamer v. State, the test for ineffective assistance of counsel is (1) whether counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that there is a reasonable probability, that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. There is a strong presumption that legal representation is professionally reasonable. To withdraw a plea after sentence has been imposed, the defendant must show either that his plea was not voluntarily entered or that it was entered because of misapprehension or mistake as to his legal options. A defendant is bound by the statements he made on the signed Plea Form and during the in court colloquy unless he proves otherwise by clear and convincing evidence.
8. A recent Delaware Supreme Court case provides additional support for the Court's decision here. The Delaware Supreme Court held in Dorsey v. State that, "To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with a guilty plea, a defendant must show that, but for his counsel's unprofessional errors, he would not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on proceeding to trial." Prior to this ruling, the Superior Court had denied the defendant's Motion for Postconviction on underlying drug charges. The defendant, Quinton Dorsey, appealed the Superior Court's decision, claiming that: 1) his guilty plea resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to investigate the facts of his case and file a Motion to Suppress; and 2) the Superior Court committed "legal error by not expanding the record" in order to make a determination on the defendant's Postconviction Motion. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision, stating that they found "no evidence in the record that any error on the part of Dorsey's counsel caused him to plead guilty." The Supreme Court also noted that the plea agreement provided the defendant with "significant benefits." Accordingly, "given the circumstances of his arrest, the evidence against him, and his criminal history, there (was) no reason to believe that Dorsey would have received a lesser sentence had he not pleaded guilty and proceed to trial."
9. The Court finds that Defendant Bratcher's claim for ineffective assistance of counsel must fail under Strickland and Flamer. By pleading guilty to Trafficking Cocaine, Bratcher signified that he understood the constitutional rights he was relinquishing. He indicated to the Court that he was satisfied with his attorney's representation and that his attorney had fully advised him of his rights. Now, Bratcher generally contests the validity of his plea agreement due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant adheres to his argument that counsel failed to conduct discovery that would have resulted in a successful Motion to Suppress. However, the Court finds that Bratcher's attorney acted reasonable under the circumstances. As noted by the State, counsel and Defendant Bratcher received the Initial Crime Report, a Medical Examiner's Controlled Substance's Laboratory Report, a copy of the Indictment and a copy of the Defendant's known Criminal Record. These documents provided counsel with sufficient information to determine the success of a Motion to Suppress and the quality of a plea agreement. Considering the nature of Defendant's arrest, the evidence against Defendant and his habitual offender status, counsel took professionally reasonable steps in recommending a plea agreement. Nothing supports the contention that Defendant did not understand or disagree with the aspects of his plea agreement.
10. This Court also finds no evidence in the record demonstrating that Defendant Bratcher would not have accepted the plea agreement. The State's plea agreement provided Bratcher with "significant benefits" here. Under this agreement, two of Bratcher's three charges were Nolle Prossed, and Bratcher was discharged from probation. Most importantly, the plea agreement allowed Defendant Bratcher to avoid the possibility of life in prison. The benefit of a plea agreement, therefore, significantly outweighed the risks posed by going to trial here.
11. Based upon the above reasoning, Bratcher's Motion for Postconviction Relief is, hereby, DENIED.
Def. Resp. to Aff. of Darryl K. Fountain and State's Resp. at 8.
Id.
The Court also notes that Attorney Fountain filed an affidavit in response to Bratcher's ineffective assistance of counsel allegation. In this affidavit, Attorney Fountain contends that Bratcher delayed the prosecution of drug charges against him by absconding from courthouse proceedings and occasionally called Attorney Fountain's office in order to learn information about his case. During this time, Attorney Fountain asserts that he filed appropriate motions and addressed discovery issues raised by Defendant Bratcher. However, the Department of Justice "took the position that they were not going to cooperate until Mr. Bratcher was brought to justice." (Darryl K. Fountain's Aff. Resp. to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Allegation, ¶ 3.)
State Resp. at 4.
Id.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
The July 1, 2005 amendment substituted "one year" for "three years" twice in (i)(1). Since the judgment of conviction in the case at hand falls prior to the date of this amendment, the one year time limit is not applicable here.
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
585 A.2d 736 (Del. 1990).
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694.
Flamer, 585 A.2d at 753-54.
Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 58 (Del. 1988).
Smith v. State, 1990 WL 1475, at *1 (Del.Supr. 1990).
2006 WL 889364 (Del.), at *2.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
IT IS SO ORDERED.