Opinion
ID No. 92S05720DI.
July 6, 2011.
Motion for Post Conviction Relief.
N440 State Mail, Raymond E. Bradley, Georgetown, DE.
Dear Mr. Bradley:
On June 20, 2011, the defendant filed a Motion for Post Conviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(Rule "61").
The Court finds it is procedurally barred and, therefore is denied.
In 1992 the defendant was arrested for Murder in the First Degree and Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of the murder. Trial took place on November 15, 1993, with Judge William Swain Lee presiding. The defendant was found guilty of the murder and weapons offense as charged. On January 14, 1994, the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment by Judge Lee. On November 23, 1994, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. Bradley v. State, 1994 WL 679719 (Del.), 653 A.2d 304 (Del. 1994) (TABLE).
On appeal the issue was not whether or not the defendant killed the victim but his mens rea, i.e., had he intentionally killed the victim. In the present Rule 16 motion, the defendant states he has never disputed killing the victim but "the issue in question was one of motive", which returns us to his mens rea argument.
In 1995 the defendant filed his first Rule 61 motion. The grounds alleged in this post conviction motion were that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to perjured testimony, failing to object to mis-leading testimony, and failing to show contradictions in testimony, all of which violated the defendant's right to confront witnesses. Other grounds were alleged that are not relevant to the present motion.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the Rule 61 motion and a motion for a new trial were denied in May 1996. On December 11, 1996, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the defendant's first post conviction motion. Bradley v. State, 1996 WL 731777 (Del.) 687 A.2d 572 (Del. 1996) (TABLE).
In September, 2008, the defendant, represented by counsel, filed a second post conviction motion pursuant to Rule 61. This motion attacked the trial testimony of a key witness and alleged perjury. In addition, the defense alleged that the State suppressed exculpatory evidence. The defendant also sought a new trial based on new evidence that contradicted the key witness's credibility and/or possible recantation. In a comprehensive review of the background and the allegations contained in the second post conviction motion, Judge Richard F. Stokes denied the defendant's motion on December 19, 2008. Bradley v. State, No. 92S05720DI (R-2) (Del. Super. Dec. 19, 2008).
On May 11, 2009, the Supreme Court affirmed Judge Stokes decision noting it was time barred and repetitive. Bradley v. State, 2009 WL 1279108 (Del.), 972 A.2d 311 (Del. 2009)(TABLE).
In the present motion, the defendant alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for not making objections to evidence that was introduced pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 3507 and, therefore, the defendant's constitutional rights were violated.
The defendant argues that the case law as to the introduction of evidence pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 3507 was not clearly established or recognized until the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Blake v. State, 3 A.3d 1077 (Del. 2010).
In a nutshell, the defendant desires to revisit the trial testimony and the two previous post conviction motions by way of arguing that Blake created a newly recognized right.
The defendant is wrong. Blake applied the existing case law and reversed a conviction on direct appeal for the failure to follow the established procedure in laying a proper foundation for a 11 Del. C. § 3507 out-of-court statement.
The problem in Blake was the failure to inquire of the declarant whether or not the prior out-of-court statement was truthful. This foundational question was established in Ray v. State, 587 A.2d 439 (Del. 1991). Mr. Bradley's trial took place in November 1993 thus this requirement was already established law.
Blake did not establish a new basis to re-argue 11 Del. C. § 3507 statement.
The end result is the conviction, which is now over seventeen years old, remains valid.
The present motion is procedurally barred because (a) it is time barred pursuant to Rule 16 (i)(1); (b) it is repetitive pursuant to Rule 61 (i)(2); and (c) it attempts to "re-package" old arguments previously characterized and adjudicated as credibility and perjury attacks therefore must be barred pursuant to Rule 61 (I)(4).
It is time to let this case rest in peace.
The Motion for Post Conviction Relief is DENIED.