Opinion
No. 56316-5-I.
June 12, 2006.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Snohomish County, No. 03-1-00092-7, Richard J. Thorpe, J., entered May 20, 2005.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Suzanne Lee Elliott, Attorney at Law, Ste 1300 Hoge Bldg, 705 2nd Ave, Seattle, WA 98104-1741.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Constance Mary Crawley, Prosecutors Office, Snohomish Co Courthouse, 3000 Rockefeller Ave, Everett, WA 98201-4060.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Bradley challenges the order revoking his special sex offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA). But because the evidence supports the determination that Bradley violated conditions of his sentence and failed to make progress in treatment, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking his suspended sentence. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
In May 2003, following a trial on stipulated evidence, the trial court found Bradley guilty of one count of first degree child rape and one count of second degree child rape. The victims were Bradley's two daughters. The court imposed a SSOSA and suspended all but six months of the 130-month term of imprisonment. See RCW 9.94A.670. As required by the conditions of sentence, Bradley entered into sexual deviancy treatment with Sylvia Ringen.
In September 2004, Bradley admitted that he had violated his treatment program in the period from December 30, 2003, to May 20, 2004, by failing to be honest in his daily journal and by initiating sexual contact with his wife. Following a hearing, the trial court ordered Bradley to work with a Department of Corrections crew for two days.
On April 25, 2005, the State filed a petition alleging that Bradley had committed six violations of the conditions of his sentence. Several of the violations involved Bradley's repeated visits to the Marysville McDonald's Restaurant, where both his wife and one of the victims worked. The State also alleged that Bradley had failed to make progress in his treatment from August 31, 2004, to January 4, 2005, and that Sylvia Ringen had terminated Bradley from sexual deviancy treatment.
Following a hearing on May 13, 2005, the trial court found that Bradley had violated the conditions of his sentence by (1) frequenting the Marysville McDonald's Restaurant; (2) failing to be honest in treatment by not disclosing the frequent trips to McDonald's; (3) failing to make progress in treatment; and (4) being terminated from the sexual deviancy treatment program. The court then revoked Bradley's suspended sentence based primarily on his failure to make progress in treatment:
I'm satisfied that . . . he failed to make progress in treatment. These other violations I'm not revoking by reason of them alone or even necessarily in conjunction with the failing to make progress. But he flat did not make any progress, and it isn't because he wasn't capable. It wasn't because of the dyslexia and ADD.
When he was truly motivated, like when Ms. Ringen practically locked the doors and told him he wasn't going to get out of the room until he got something accomplished, he got it accomplished.
I find that he has sufficiently failed to make progress in treatment that the SSOSA should be revoked.
Report of Proceedings (May 13, 2005) at 54.
DECISION
On appeal, Bradley challenges only the trial court's findings that he violated conditions of his sentence by frequenting the Marysville McDonald's and by failing to make progress in treatment. The trial court is authorized to revoke a suspended sentence at any time during the period of community custody if the defendant violates the conditions of sentence or the court finds that the defendant is failing to make satisfactory treatment progress. RCW 9.94A.670(10). The evidence need only `reasonably satisfy' the court that a violation occurred. See State v. Kuhn, 81 Wn.2d 648, 650, 503 P.2d 1061 (1972). We review the trial court's decision on revocation for an abuse of discretion. State v. Badger, 64 Wn. App. 904, 908, 827 P.2d 318 (1992); State v. Drake, 16 Wn. App. 559, 563, 558 P.2d 828 (1976).
Bradley first contends the evidence established that he did not violate the conditions of his sentence by repeatedly using the drive-through window of the Marysville McDonald's. Bradley claimed that because his wife was the manager of the restaurant, he was entitled to free meals and that both Sylvia Ringen and his community corrections officer (CCO) gave him permission to use the drive-through of the restaurant to pick up the food. Bradley also maintained that he had repeatedly disclosed the visits in his daily treatment journal, which Ringen had reviewed, pointing to references to McDonald's, `drive-through,' and visiting his wife's `work.' Bradley acknowledged that he did not tell Ringen that his daughter one of his victims was working at the McDonald's until much later.
Bradley's wife testified that Ringen had given Bradley permission to use the restaurant drive-through as long as he did not stop or come inside. She explained that she and Bradley had worked out a `system' in which Bradley would call her to ascertain whether he could use the drive-through. Bradley's wife acknowledged that she had not sought DOC approval for this `system.'
Sylvia Ringen flatly denied giving Bradley permission to use the restaurant drive-through to obtain meals during business hours. Ringen testified that following extensive negotiations, including discussions with Bradley's therapy group, she and Bradley's CCO had authorized Ringen to go to the restaurant after midnight — when no minors could be present solely for the limited purpose of performing repairs. Ringen acknowledged that she may have overlooked references to the situation in Bradley's treatment journal, but explained that some of the references may have occurred before she knew where Bradley's wife worked.
Ringen noted that Bradley's treatment contract expressly prohibited him from frequenting fast-food restaurants because of the danger that he would encounter minor children and that Bradley had been going to the McDonald's at a time when one of the members of his therapy group was involved in revocation of his suspended sentence because of visits to a fast-food restaurant. Ringen rejected as `outrageous' Bradley's claim that she allowed him to go to a fast-food restaurant where one of his victims was working.
Although Bradley claimed that he had permission to go to the McDonald's, the trial court clearly found Ringen's testimony more credible. The evidence amply supported the finding that Bradley violated the conditions of his sentence by frequenting the McDonald's restaurant.
Bradley also contends the trial court erred in finding that he failed to make treatment progress. He argues that his progress was hampered by dyslexia and attention deficit disorder (ADD) and that once he received proper treatment and assistance in transcribing his work, his work improved. Bradley maintains that under the circumstances, he did not willfully violate his treatment plan.
Ringen, who saw Bradley weekly in individual and group sessions throughout the period of treatment, testified that he never received a `positive' progress report and that he failed to complete the reading and written work required under the terms of his treatment plan. For example, Bradley was required to complete a series of written workbooks, but did not turn in the first one until 19 months after treatment began, by which time he should have completed at least two workbooks. Even then, Bradley had not completed all of the assignments for the workbook. Bradley was also unable to complete letters of responsibility to the two victims despite constant prodding from Ringen and from the other members of his therapy group. Finally, when Ringen essentially forced Bradley to complete the assignment, he produced a single `small letter' that did not satisfy the program requirements.
In addition, during group sessions, Bradley generally did not talk, seek help, or assume any responsibility for running the group. According to Ringen, the group `spent an inordinate amount of time' unsuccessfully attempting to encourage Bradley to improve his participation in both the group and his treatment plan. Ringen acknowledged that medication for Bradley's disorders `helped considerably.' But she concluded that his failure to make progress was not caused by disabilities, but rather by the lack of willingness. When forced, Bradley was able to complete work satisfactorily.
The foregoing circumstances support the trial court's determination that Bradley failed to make satisfactory progress in treatment. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Bradley's suspended sentence or by refusing to allow Bradley to continue community-based treatment with a different provider.
Affirmed.
ELLINGTON, SCHINDLER, and GROSSE, JJ., concur.