Opinion
No. 3-199 / 01-2022
Filed June 13, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, James C. Bauch, Judge (robbery trial and sentencing) and L.D. Lybbert, Judge (habitual offender trial) Criminal.
Bradford challenges his convictions and sentence for second-degree robbery, habitual offender, and contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and David Arthur Adams, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas S. Tauber, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and D. Raymond Walton, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Mahan, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
A jury found Calvin Bradford guilty of second-degree robbery. He was also found to be a habitual offender. On appeal, Bradford contends: 1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction, 2) the district court erred in calculating the length of his sentence, and 3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Bradford preliminarily challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's finding of guilt. Our review of this issue is on error. State v. Speicher, 625 N.W.2d 738, 740 (Iowa 2001).
The district court instructed the jury that the State would have to prove the following elements of second-degree robbery:
1. That on or about the 15th day of April, 2001, the defendant had the specific intent to commit a theft.
2. To carry out this intention or to assist in escaping from the scene with or without the stolen property, the defendant:
(a.) Committed an assault upon [Angela] or did aid and abet others or jointly participated with others in doing this act
or
(b.) Threatened [Angela] with, or purposely put [Angela] in fear of, immediate serious injury or did aid and abet others or jointly participated with others in doing this act.
The court defined theft for the jury "as the taking of the property of another with the intent to deprive that person of the property."
A jury reasonably could have found the following facts. After fighting with her boyfriend, Angela decided to walk to a friend's house. On the way, she met Bradford and his cousin. The three chatted, then went to a store, where Angela purchased cigarettes and several winning lottery tickets.
Bradford asked Angela to give him some of the money to purchase drugs. Angela declined. Bradford and his cousin obtained and smoked crack cocaine, then followed Angela to her friend's house. Angela agreed to lend Bradford $20.00 to buy more crack cocaine.
At this point, Bradford and another man led Angela into a bathroom. Bradford left. Several other men turned off the lights, took Angela's purse and assaulted her. One of them said, "get her wallet." During the melee, Bradford returned wearing a rubber glove, and choked Angela until she passed out. Angela escaped without her purse but with injuries to her neck, arm and knee that required hospitalization.
Meanwhile, Bradford asked a woman named Janice where Angela's billfold was. Janice said she gave it to another woman named Pam. Bradford asked Pam for the billfold. Pam refused to give it to him.
We believe this evidence is sufficient to establish that Bradford specifically intended to deprive Angela of the cash he knew she had and did so by, at a minimum, placing her in fear of immediate serious injury.
II. Length of Sentence
Iowa Code section 902.12 (1999) authorizes persons convicted of certain specified felonies, including second-degree robbery, to serve 100% of the maximum term of their sentence. SeeIowa Code § 902.12 (1999). Bradford claims the district court erred in applying this statute to the sentence, as enhanced by his habitual offender status, rather than to the unenhanced sentence for second-degree robbery. In his view, application of section 902.12 in this manner is unwarranted because "[t]he habitual offender's punishment is not related to the underlying offense."
The maximum sentence for second-degree robbery is ten years. See Iowa Code § 902.9(4). The maximum term increases to fifteen years if the person is deemed a habitual offender. Iowa Code § 902.9(3).
Our highest court, however, has broadly reiterated the principle that habitual offender statutes do not charge a separate offense but only provide for enhanced punishment on the current offense. State v. Woody, 613 N.W.2d 215, 217 (Iowa 2000). We believe this principle mandates a conclusion that Iowa Code section 902.12, requiring inmates to serve all of their maximum prison term, applies to the enhanced sentence for second-degree robbery rather than the unenhanced sentence.
We recognize that the precise language of Iowa Code section 902.12 does not compel this conclusion. However, as the State points out, to hold otherwise would be to essentially nullify the legislative goal, reflected in the habitual offender statute, of punishing recidivists more severely than those who are not repeat offenders. Id. at 218. For this reason, we find no error in the district court's application of Iowa Code section 902.12.
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
Bradford finally contends trial counsel was ineffective in failing to: 1) move for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence standard, 2) "act in the best interest of the defendant," 3) adequately investigate and take pretrial depositions, 4) obtain an expert witness "as to the distortions in perception and memory which accompany the use of crack cocaine," 5) advise the court of "inappropriate remarks about the defendant made by others in the presence of one or more jurors," 6) file pretrial motions to suppress and in limine, on unspecified grounds 7) object to unspecified bad acts evidence, 8) cross-examine certain witnesses for the State regarding immunity agreements and one of the witnesses' misidentification of the victim, 9) object to two of the court's proposed jury instructions on unspecified grounds, and 10) move for new trial based on the improper statements allegedly made in the presence of jurors.
We preserve the first, third, fourth, and eighth claims for postconviction relief proceedings. State v. Biddle, 652 N.W.2d 191, 203 (Iowa 2002). We find the remaining claims too general to preserve or decide. See State v. White, 337 N.W.2d 517, 518 (Iowa 1983).