Opinion
No. 110981.
04-03-2015
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Shylah BOYLE, Appellant.
Heather Cessna, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Daniel D. Gilligan, assistant district attorney, Keith Schroeder, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Heather Cessna, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.
Daniel D. Gilligan, assistant district attorney, Keith Schroeder, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before McANANY, P.J., BRUNS, J., and JOHNSON, S.J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
After pleading no contest to criminal use of her former employer's credit card, felony theft, and making false information, Shylah Boyle appeals from a district court order requiring her to pay $13,178.49 in restitution. Specifically, Boyle contends that there was insufficient evidence presented to the district court to establish the amount of restitution. Our review of the record, however, reveals that the State presented sufficient reliable evidence to establish the amount of restitution and that the district court found this evidence to be credible. Thus, we affirm the order of restitution.
Facts
On March 21, 2013, Boyle—a former office assistant at Siemens Wind Power in Hutchinson—pled no contest to one count each of criminal use of a financial card, felony theft, and making false information. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Boyle to serve 18 months' probation with an underlying prison term of 8 months. The district court also deferred its ruling on restitution until a hearing held on June 6, 2013.
At the restitution hearing, the State called Ronald Williams, who was Boyle's manager at Siemens Wind Power. Williams testified that Siemens Wind Power issued Boyle a company credit card in January 2011 so that she could purchase miscellaneous supplies for the company's warehouse. According to Williams, Boyle used the card to purchase $13,178.49 in personal goods between October 2011 and February 2012. After learning of the charges, Siemens Wind Power terminated Boyle's employment and informed the authorities.
Upon comparing the physical receipts kept by Boyle with the scanned copies she submitted for approval, Williams discovered that Boyle had manipulated the receipts by taking parts of valid receipts and placing them on top of invalid receipts before scanning and submitting them for approval. As an example, Williams testified that an actual receipt reflected a gas-station purchase for beer and cigarettes; but the scanned copy—after it had been altered—reflected a purchase for donuts to be provided for workers at the company's warehouse.
Without objection, the State admitted into evidence a spreadsheet compiled by Williams reflecting all the charges made by Boyle to her company credit card during the relevant timeframe. Williams testified that he had determined the validity of the charges by looking to see if the vendor was one that Siemens Wind Power regularly conducted business with; considering the time of day the charges were incurred, i.e., if they were made during normal business hours and on days Boyle worked; and by identifying whether the goods purchased were related to Boyle's job. The spreadsheet divided the charges into three categories: valid, invalid, and unknown charges. Siemens did not claim restitution for the unknown charges. Some of the invalid charges on the spreadsheet included a $593.63 charge to Victoria Secret's and an $821.22 charge to The Buckle. Williams also testified that each credit card is kept by the assigned employee and that nobody else had access to the credit card assigned to Boyle.
Although Boyle failed to present evidence, nor did she point to any specific charges, she disputed various charges made at gas stations. In cross-examining Williams, Boyle's attorney inquired regarding the purchase of gas for a company truck. Williams responded that Boyle had filled up 3– to 5–five gallon gas cans when the facility first opened; he also testified that gas was only purchased by employees other than Boyle using a different type of credit card during the relevant time period.
The district court ultimately ordered Boyle to pay $13,178.49 in restitution. In doing so, the district court found that Siemens “thoroughly researched this issue and Mr. Williams' credibility in that regard is enhanced greatly by the fact he gave the benefit of the doubt to the defendant on the charges he couldn't absolutely determine whether they were valid or not.” Thereafter, Boyle filed a timely appeal.
Analysis
Boyle's sole contention is that the district court erred in establishing the amount of restitution. Pursuant to K.S.A.2012 Supp. 21–6604b(b)(1), the district court “shall order the defendant to pay restitution, which shall include, but not be limited to, damage or loss caused by the defendant's crime....” District courts have considerable discretion in determining the amount of restitution. “Although the rigidness and proof of value that lies in a civil damage suit does not apply in a criminal case, the sentencing judge's determination of restitution must be based on reliable evidence which yields a defensible restitution figure.” State v. Chambers, 36 Kan.App.2d 228, 241, 138 P.3d 405, rev. denied 282 Kan. 792 (2006).
When we review restitution awards, we evaluate the amount of restitution and the manner in which it was determined under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Hall, 298 Kan. 978, 989, 319 P .3d 506 (2014). Abuse of discretion means that the decision was (1) arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) based on an error of law; or (3) based on an error of fact. Fischer v. State, 296 Kan. 808, 825, 295 P.3d 560 (2013). The factual findings underlying the causal link between the crime and the victim's loss are subject to the substantial competent evidence standard. Hall, 298 Kan. at 989.
Boyle argues that the amount of restitution is indefensible because “the State did not present the actual agreement that [she] signed when she received the card to indicate whether she was fully informed of the terms of use associated with the card and the Siemens company policies.” But it is important to recognize that Boyle pled no contest to criminally using her former employer's credit card. Moreover, the State presented evidence that Boyle manipulated several credit card receipts. This evidence, which was believed by the district court, suggests that Boyle was aware that her actions were not authorized by her employer.
Further, Williams testified that each credit card is kept by the assigned employee and nobody other than Boyle had access to the card assigned to her. Accordingly, we find that there was substantial evidence upon which the district court could conclude that Boyle understood that she was not supposed to purchase personal items using her employer's credit card and that she was, in fact, the person who made the unauthorized purchases.
The record reveals that when the State sought to introduce Williams' spreadsheet detailing the charges, Boyle stated that she had no objection to its introduction. Furthermore, she took advantage of her constitutional right to cross-examine Williams but presented no evidence of her own for the district court to consider. See In re C.A.D., 11 Kan.App.2d 13, 21, 711 P.2d 1336 (1985). Ultimately, the district court found Williams' testimony to be credible, and this court does not reweigh the evidence, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or determine a witness' credibility. State v. Qualls, 297 Kan. 61, 66, 298 P.3d 311 (2013). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm the restitution ordered.
Affirmed.