State v. Bowden

12 Citing cases

  1. State v. Marino

    555 A.2d 455 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 8 times

    Consequently, we will abstain from undertaking such an analysis. See State v. Bowden, 15 Conn. App. 539, 543 n. 2, 545 A.2d 591 (1988). A search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is per se unreasonable, subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.

  2. State v. Nelson

    17 Conn. App. 556 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 29 times
    Rejecting claim that impoundment and inventory search of car unreasonable because defendant should have been allowed to make other arrangements to tow his car to his residence

    In light of this briefing failure, we decline to undertake such an analysis and therefore analyze his claim under the federal standard. State v. Bowden, 15 Conn. App. 539, 543 n. 2, 545 A.2d 591, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 810, 548 A.2d 438 (1988). The following facts were established during the evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress.

  3. State v. Manfredi

    17 Conn. App. 602 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 14 times

    We therefore see no reason to undertake such an analysis. State v. Bowden, 15 Conn. App. 539, 543 n. 2, 545 A.2d 591 (1988); State v. Cosby, 6 Conn. App. 164, 166 n. 1, 504 A.2d 1071 (1986). Although a defendant may have a sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel "before submitting to the pretrial psychiatric interview"; (emphasis added); Estelle v. Smith, supra, 469; United States v. Byers, supra, 1119; State v. Johnson, supra, 589-90; "[t]he [Supreme] Court [has] specifically disavowed any implication of a `constitutional right to have counsel actually present during the examination.

  4. State v. Bowden

    548 A.2d 443 (Conn. 1988)

    Decided September 20, 1988 The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 15 Conn. App. 539, is denied. William M. Bloss, special public defender, in support of the petition.

  5. State v. Ward

    83 Conn. App. 377 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004)   Cited 11 times

    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bowden, 15 Conn. App. 539, 546, 545 A.2d 591, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 810, 548 A.2d 438 (1988). We find nothing in this record to persuade us that the duration of this stop was illegal.

  6. State v. Ortiz

    47 Conn. App. 333 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997)   Cited 17 times
    Concluding defendant had not satisfied first prong of Golding because he failed to provide adequate record for review of claim of improper denial of motion to suppress out-of-court identification by witness

    Where the defendant concedes that the initial stop was proper pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), we need not address the propriety of the initial stop. State v. Casey, 45 Conn. App. 32, 40, 692 A.2d 1312, cert. denied, 241 Conn. 924, 697 A.2d 360 (1997); State v. Bowden, 15 Conn. App. 539, 543-44, 545 A.2d 591, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 810, 548 A.2d 438 (1988). "One function of a constitutionally permissible Terry stop is to maintain the status quo for a brief period of time to enable the police to investigate a suspected crime.

  7. State v. Casey

    45 Conn. App. 32 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997)   Cited 8 times
    In Casey, police officers spotted a vehicle that matched the description of a vehicle driven by three suspects in a recent shooting.

    We therefore need not address the propriety of the initial stop. See State v. Bowden, 15 Conn. App. 539, 543-44, 545 A.2d 591, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 810, 548 A.2d 438 (1988). The constitutional issue raised by this stop, therefore, is whether the actions of the police officers exceeded the permissible limits of an investigative detention under Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. 1.

  8. State v. Holloman

    20 Conn. App. 521 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 18 times
    In State v. Holloman, 568 A.2d 1052 (Conn.App. 1990), also a robbery case, the defendant offered evidence that his alleged accomplice, who owned the get-away car used in the crime, was friends with and lived in the same building as a third party whose physical description matched the description of the robber given by eyewitnesses to the crime, that the car could be operated without a key, that the accomplice was aware that people used his car without permission, and that the accomplice had left his car at his residence and not driven it on the day of the robbery.

    The officers did not immediately arrest the two men; rather, they subjected the men to a reasonable investigatory stop. See State v. Bowden, 15 Conn. App. 539, 542-46, 545 A.2d 591, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 810, 548 A.2d 438 (1988). The defendant argues to the contrary, that the men were immediately arrested and that the officers' explanations of why they stopped the Blazer were merely pretextual. He contends that he was arrested when the police stopped the Blazer because the officers had their revolvers drawn when they ordered the occupants out of the car.

  9. State v. Siano

    20 Conn. App. 369 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 7 times

    (Emphasis added.) Practice Book 852; see also State v. Shindell, supra, 142; State v. Bowden, 15 Conn. App. 539, 549, 545 A.2d 591, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 810, 548 A.2d 438 (1988). This authority is not only recognized by, but is also cited in, the state's brief.

  10. State v. Daniels

    18 Conn. App. 134 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 11 times
    Concluding that the presence of the police and the emotional state of the victim rendered defendant's choice to remain silent ambiguous

    We decline to undertake an analysis of whether the defendant's rights under article first, 8, of the Connecticut constitution were violated because the defendant offers no separate analysis of the Connecticut constitution as a basis for different treatment of the federal and state claims. See State v. Bowden, 15 Conn. App. 539, 543, 545 A.2d 591, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 810, 548 A.2d 438 (1988). The state charged the defendant by substitute information with sexual assault in the first degree, in violation of General Statutes 53a-70 (a), alleging that the defendant "compelled the victim to engage in sexual intercourse by the use of force and the threat of use of force . . . ."