The courtβs failure to inform Hoehn of the potential maximum penalty is an error because it conflicts with the clear mandate of N.D.R.Crim.P. 11. SeeVandehoven , 2009 ND 165, 772 N.W.2d 603 (reversed and remanded because the district court failed to comply with Rule 11 in several ways, including failure to inform the defendant of the maximum possible penalty); State v. Boushee , 459 N.W.2d 552, 555-56 (N.D. 1990) (reversed and remanded where the district court failed to inform defendant of the minimum or maximum penalties until after accepting the plea); see alsoWallace , 2018 ND 225, ΒΆ 10, 918 N.W.2d 64 (reversed and remanded where the record failed to show defendant was informed of mandatory minimum); State v. Farrell , 2000 ND 26, ΒΆΒΆ 19-21, 606 N.W.2d 524 (reversed and remanded where district court failed to advise the defendant that the court was not bound by the recommended sentence prior to accepting the guilty plea); State v. Schweitzer , 510 N.W.2d 612, 616 (N.D. 1994) (reversed and remanded because the record did not contain an express statement informing the defendant of the mandatory minimum); Schumacher , 452 N.W.2d at 346, 348 (reversed and remanded because the court did not advise the defendant of his mandatory minimum sentencing penalty prior to accepting his guilty plea). B
In short, "[t]he purpose of the procedure outlined in Rule 11(b) is to ensure that the defendant is fully aware of the consequences of a guilty plea before he enters his plea." Froistad v. State, 2002 ND 52, ΒΆ 25, 641 N.W.2d 86 (quoting State v. Boushee, 459 N.W.2d 552, 555 (N.D. 1990)); see also Blurton, 2009 ND 144, ΒΆ 11, 770 N.W.2d 231. [ΒΆ 25] In this case, the district court failed to address Vandehoven's constitutional rights to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, to be protected from compelled self-incrimination, to testify and present evidence, and to compel the attendance of witnesses.
NDRCrimP 32(d)(1). A manifest injustice includes procedural errors by the sentencing court. See, e.g., State v. Boushee, 459 N.W.2d 552, 556 (N.D. 1990) (allowing withdrawal of a guilty plea when the sentencing court failed to comply with NDRCrimP 11(b)(2)). Gunwall alleges that the trial court failed to substantially comply with NDRCrimP 11; therefore, withdrawal of his guilty plea is required in order to correct a manifest injustice. Boushee, 459 N.W.2d at 556.
However, compliance with Rule 11 does not require the court to examine the defendant in a predetermined, ritualistic manner. State v. Boushee, 459 N.W.2d 552, 555 (N.D. 1990) (citing State v. Storbakken, 246 N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1976)). See also, State v. Hoffarth, 456 N.W.2d 111, 113 (N.D. 1990); Schumacher, 452 N.W.2d at 347; Hagemann, 326 N.W.2d at 866.
State v. Murphy , 2014 ND 202, ΒΆ 7, 855 N.W.2d 647. "The purpose of the procedure outlined in Rule 11(b) is to ensure that the defendant is fully aware of the consequences of a guilty plea before he enters his plea." Froistad v. State , 2002 ND 52, ΒΆ 25, 641 N.W.2d 86 (quoting State v. Boushee , 459 N.W.2d 552, 555 (N.D. 1990) ). Rule 11(b), N.D.R.Crim.P., provides:"(1) The court may not accept a plea of guilty without first, by addressing the defendant personally [except as provided in Rule 43(b) ] in open court, informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant understands the following:
"The purpose of the procedure outlined in Rule 11(b) is to ensure that the defendant is fully aware of the consequences of a guilty plea before he enters his plea." Froistad v. State, 2002 ND 52, ΒΆ 25, 641 N.W.2d 86 (quoting State v. Boushee, 459 N.W.2d 552, 555 (N.D. 1990)). The rule does not require ritualistic compliance, but the district court must substantially comply with the rule to ensure the defendant enters a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea.
"The purpose of the procedure outlined in Rule 11(b) is to ensure that the defendant is fully aware of the consequences of a guilty plea before he enters his plea." State v. Boushee, 459 N.W.2d 552, 555 (N.D. 1990) (quoting State v. Schumacher, 452 N.W.2d 345, 346 (N.D. 1990)). A
Rule 11, N.D.R.Crim.P., does not require any ritualistic, predetermined formality by the trial court. State v. Boushee, 459 N.W.2d 552, 555 (N.D. 1990). Instead, the court must substantially comply with the procedural requirements of the rule to ensure the defendant is entering a voluntary plea of guilty. State v. Hoffarth, 456 N.W.2d 111, 114 (N.D. 1990).
The determination of manifest injustice is ordinarily within the trial court's discretion, and will be reversed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Boushee, 459 N.W.2d 552, 556 (N.D. 1990). An abuse of discretion under the rule occurs when the court's legal discretion is not exercised in the interests of justice.
When a person seeks to withdraw a guilty plea under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, NDCC Ch. 29-32.1, the action is generally treated as a NDRCrimP 32(d) motion. State v. Boushee, 459 N.W.2d 552, 555-56 (N.D. 1990). Under Rule 32(d), withdrawal of a guilty plea is allowed when necessary to correct a manifest injustice.