Opinion
No. 1 CA-CR 18-0004
03-05-2019
STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. KEITH R. BOUQUOT, Appellant.
COUNSEL Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix By Alice Jones Counsel for Appellee Adair Law Group PLLC, Phoenix By Marc A. Adair Counsel for Appellant
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2016-103033-002 CR2017-001092-002
The Honorable Peter A. Thompson, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix
By Alice Jones
Counsel for Appellee
Adair Law Group PLLC, Phoenix
By Marc A. Adair
Counsel for Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge James P. Beene joined.
CATTANI, Judge:
¶1 Keith R. Bouquot appeals his convictions and sentences for burglary and theft. He argues the superior court erred by denying his motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. For reasons that follow, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 After an initial investigation, officers stopped Bouquot in a vehicle carrying stolen materials from a United States naval yard. Bouquot admitted to police that he removed materials from the naval yard. He was convicted of burglary and theft and sentenced to 9 years' imprisonment.
¶3 Bouquot timely appealed his convictions and sentences. We have jurisdiction under Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") § 13-4033(A).
DISCUSSION
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
¶4 The superior court denied Bouquot's motion to dismiss the burglary charge for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, rejecting Bouquot's assertion that the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over the naval yard. Bouquot raises the same issue on appeal and raises the same argument for the theft conviction. We review subject matter jurisdiction de novo. State v. Dixon, 231 Ariz. 319, 320, ¶ 3 (App. 2013).
¶5 Arizona courts have jurisdiction over a criminal offense if "[c]onduct constituting any element of the offense or a result of such conduct occurs within this state." A.R.S. § 13-108(A)(1). Jurisdiction may be established if conduct constituting an element of the offense occurs in Arizona. See State v. Bussdieker, 127 Ariz. 339, 341 (1980) (jurisdiction established when criminal intent is formed in Arizona); see also State v. Willoughby, 181 Ariz. 530, 539-40 (1995).
¶6 Here, Bouquot formed his criminal intent to commit burglary while on state land. See A.R.S. § 13-1506(A)(1) (burglary in the third degree requires proof of intent to commit a theft or felony in a commercial yard). The evidence showed that Bouquot intended to commit the theft before entering the naval yard. Bouquot was picked up by his codefendant, and the pair then parked the vehicle within walking distance of the naval yard, waited in the vehicle for approximately six hours before driving into the naval yard, and left the naval yard after the minute or two needed to load the stolen materials into the vehicle. They carried tools to break down the materials to sell them at a scrap yard. Further, their same vehicle traveled between the naval yard and the scrap yard on a prior occasion, confirming this incident was part of a pattern of conduct. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, see State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 509, ¶ 93 (2013), Bouquot's coordination with his codefendant, parking in close proximity to the naval yard for six hours, the tools he possessed, and his pattern of conduct all indicate that he formed the intent to steal from the naval yard before entering the yard. Because conduct constituting an element of the burglary offense occurred on state land, the superior court had jurisdiction.
¶7 The court also had jurisdiction over the theft conviction. The State was required to prove—among other elements—that Bouquot controlled the U.S. Navy's radiator coils. See A.R.S. § 13-1802(A)(1). Law enforcement officers stopped Bouquot after he had left the naval yard. He was sitting in a vehicle with radiator coils. Thus, Bouquot controlled the radiator coils on state land, establishing the court's jurisdiction.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence.
¶8 The superior court denied Bouquot's motion for judgment of acquittal. We review the denial of this motion de novo. State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 15 (2011). When reviewing the evidence, we assess whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at ¶ 16 (citation omitted).
¶9 Here, sufficient evidence supported the burglary conviction. Under A.R.S. § 13-1506(A)(1), the State was required to prove Bouquot unlawfully entered a fenced commercial yard with the intent to commit any theft or any felony inside the yard. Bouquot admitted he entered the yard, and GPS data confirmed that he did. The naval yard was a "fenced commercial yard," defined as property that is "surrounded completely by fences . . . and . . . where . . . commercial items are located." A.R.S. § 13-1501(4). The yard was completely surrounded by barbed-wire fencing, and
items used for commercial purposes were located in the yard. Further, Bouquot entered the naval yard unlawfully. Unlawful entry is defined as an entry that is "not licensed, authorized or otherwise privileged." A.R.S. § 13-1501(2). Bouquot did not have permission to enter the private property. Thus, a rational jury could have found that the State proved the essential elements of the crime.
¶10 Sufficient evidence also supported the theft conviction. The jury found Bouquot guilty of knowingly controlling—without lawful authority—the U.S. Navy's radiator coils valued at $250 or more but less than $1,000. See A.R.S. § 13-1802(A)(1), (G). Again, Bouquot was stopped in a vehicle containing the radiator coils, and Bouquot admitted to removing the coils from the naval yard. Finally, according to a witness's testimony, a new radiator coil is worth $5,000, whereas a radiator coil sold for scrap metal is worth between $150 and $200. The scrap value of the five stolen radiator coils thus could have ranged between $750 and $1,000. Accordingly, reasonable evidence established each of the essential elements of the offense, and we find no error.
CONCLUSION
¶11 For the foregoing reasons, Bouquot's convictions and sentences are affirmed.