Opinion
No. 60597-6-I.
November 3, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Island County, No. 06-1-00192-4, Vickie I. Churchill, J., entered August 23, 2007.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Leach, J., concurred in by Appelwick and Lau, JJ.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION.
Ronald Bone appeals his conviction for refusal to give information to or cooperate with an officer under RCW 46.61.020(1). He argues that (1) he could not "refuse" to produce his driver's license under this provision because his license was not in his possession and (2) the State presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We disagree and affirm.
Background
On November 25, 2005, Deputy Sheriff Robert Davison and Reserve Deputy Scott Fortin pulled over Bone for operating a motor vehicle with a defective license plate light. Davison asked Bone for his driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance. Bone willingly produced a registration certificate and insurance card, but not his driver's license. Neither of these documents identified Bone. From this point, Davison and Bone give different accounts of the verbal exchange that took place between them.
Davison testified that Bone said that he would not produce his license until he was told why he was pulled over. When Davison explained the reason for the stop was a defective license plate light, Bone stated he would not give his license because Davison was violating his constitutional rights. According to Davison, Bone never told him that he did not have his license with him. Davison further said that he had not met Bone before that evening and that the registration certificate and insurance card provided by Bone belonged to a woman.
Bone testified that he told Davison that he did not have his license or any other identification with him at the time. When Davison asked for his license again, Bone stated that he wanted to know why he had been pulled over. Davison refused to tell him the reason for the stop, and Bone told him a second time that he did not have his license.
Bone physically resisted the ensuing arrest, and marijuana was found in a briefcase in his vehicle. In the search of Bone's vehicle, briefcase, and person, Davison testified that no driver's license was found. Bone was charged with refusal to give information to or cooperate with an officer, resisting arrest, and possession of marijuana. On February 27, 2006, Bone represented himself at a CrR 3.6 hearing. He was represented by counsel at a jury trial in Island County District Court on July 20, 2006, where he was convicted as charged.
On August 1, 2007, Island County Superior Court heard Bone's appeal under the Rules for Appeal of Decisions of Courts of Limited Jurisdiction. The court upheld the convictions. On April 11, 2008, this court granted Bone's motion for discretionary review, limited to the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction of refusal to give information to and cooperate with an officer under RCW 46.61.020.
Standard of Review
We review issues of statutory construction de novo. In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we decide whether any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. "[A]ll reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the State and interpreted most strongly against the defendant." Direct and circumstantial evidence are equally reliable. We defer to the trier of fact on issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and the persuasiveness of the evidence.
State v. Watson, 146 Wn.2d 947, 954, 51 P.3d 66 (2002).
State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992).
Salinas, 119 Wn.2d at 201.
State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d. 821, 874, 83 P.3d 970 (2004).
Thomas, 150 Wn.2d. at 874-75.
Discussion
Bone raises two challenges. First, he argues that the court misconstrued RCW 46.61.020(1) in holding that he "refused" to produce his license when it was not in his possession. Second, Bone claims that the State presented insufficient evidence to convict him under RCW 46.61.020 (1). Both of these arguments fail.
A. Interpretation of RCW 46.61.020(1)
In reading a statute, this court's obligation is to "ascertain and give effect to the intent and purpose of the Legislature." To achieve this, the court looks first to the language of the statute. In the absence of a statutory definition, this court gives a term "its plain and ordinary meaning ascertained from a standard dictionary."
Watson, 146 Wn.2d at 954.
Watson, 146 Wn.2d at 954.
Watson, 146 Wn.2d at 954.
RCW 46.61.020(1) provides:
It is unlawful for any person while operating or in charge of any vehicle to refuse when requested by a police officer to give his or her name and address and the name and address of the owner of such vehicle, or for such person to give a false name and address, and it is likewise unlawful for any such person . . . to refuse upon demand of such police officer to produce his or her certificate of license registration of such vehicle, his or her insurance identification card, or his or her vehicle driver's license or to refuse to permit such officer to take any such license, card, or certificate for the purpose of examination thereof.
RCW 46.61.020(1) (emphasis added).
Because this statute does not define "refuse," the court assigns this term its plain meaning according to standard dictionary definitions. The State cites the following definitions: "Dictionary definitions of the term `refuse' include a showing, indication, or expression of unwillingness to do or comply with something." Based on these definitions, the State asserts that "refusal" in this case may be defined as "an expression of unwillingness by the defendant to produce his driver's license."
For these definitions, the State cites Webster's Third International Dictionary (1993) and The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 2004).
Our Supreme Court in Medcalf v. Department of Licensing assigned a nearly identical ordinary meaning to "refuse" when it determined that a driver had refused to submit to a breath alcohol test because he did not "show or express any willingness to take the test." As in this case, the court in Medcalf reached this definition of "refuse" by first examining the language of the statute and then assigning "refuse" its ordinary meaning in the absence of a statutory definition.
133 Wn.2d 290, 944 P.2d 1014 (1997).
Medcalf, 133 Wn.2d at 301.
The statute at issue in Medcalf was former RCW 46.20.308(7), which provided that the scope of a hearing on a driver's license revocation shall cover "whether the person refused to submit to the test or tests upon request of the officer after having been informed that such refusal would result in the revocation of the person's privilege to drive." Former RCW 46.20.308(7) (1994).
The word `refuse' is not defined in the statute and it is, therefore, given its ordinary meaning. . . . [Previously] we held that `refuse' . . . means to express a positive unwillingness to comply with the officer's request for a breath or blood sample. . . . [We] [also] stated that if a driver does not willingly submit to and cooperate in the administration of a breath or blood test, he or she will be deemed to have refused the test.
Medcalf, 133 Wn.2d at 298 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (citing Dep't of Licensing v. Lax, 125 Wn.2d 818, 822, 888 P.2d 1190 (1995) and Dep't of Motor Vehicles v. McElwain, 80 Wn.2d. 624, 628, 496 P.2d 963 (1972)). Other sources provide or suggest a similar definition of refusal. See, e.g., 32 Linda M. Callahan, Washington Practice: Washington DUI Manual § 27:4, at 586 (2008) ("`Unwillingness to cooperate' in administration of breathalyzer test constitutes refusal to take the test. Unwillingness to comply with the request to take the breath test to determine blood alcohol content is a `refusal' under the implied consent statute."); 11A Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal 92.13, at 98 (2d ed. 2005) ("A person refuses a law enforcement officer's request to submit to a test to determine the person's [[breath] [blood] alcohol concentration] [blood drug content] when the person shows or expresses a positive unwillingness to do the request or to comply with the request."); RCW 46.61.015 ("No person shall willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any . . . police officer."); RCW 46.61.024 ("Any driver of a motor vehicle who willfully fails or refuses to immediately bring his vehicle to a stop and who drives his vehicle in a reckless manner. . . .").
In light of Medcalf, we find the State's position regarding the ordinary meaning of "refuse" persuasive.
Bone asserts that this definition is inadequate under the facts of this case. He argues that a person cannot "refuse" under RCW 46.61.020(1) if that person is "physically incapable of complying." To support this argument, Bone relies on the discussion in Medcalf about "exceptions . . . appl[ying] . . . to physical, not mental, conditions which would render the driver incapable of complying with the officer's request." In particular, Bone quotes RCW 46.20.308(4), which creates an exception for "[a]ny person who is dead, unconscious, or who is otherwise in a condition rendering him incapable of refusal." Bone suggests that he was in a physical "condition rendering him incapable of refusal" because he did not have his driver's license in his possession. This reading of Medcalf is flawed because Bone fails to recognize that the Medcalf court had assigned "refusal" its ordinary meaning as an expression of unwillingness. Thus, "incapable of refusal" in RCW 46.20.308(4) means that the exception applies when the driver is physically unable to "show or express any willingness" to comply with the officer's request. Here, although Bone could not physically produce his driver's license, he was not physically unable to "show or express any willingness" to produce his license upon Davison's request. Therefore, Bone's reliance on Medcalf is misplaced. Other than this misreading of Medcalf, Bone fails to provide any decisional authority to support his position. Significantly, in contrast with the State, Bone does not cite any dictionary definitions, arguing that such definitions "do not illuminate the question of whether one can refuse to do which one is incapable of doing." Bone contends that this inability to assign "refuse" its ordinary meaning reveals that the language of RCW 46.61.020(1) requires judicial interpretation. However, this ignores that the court "`should assume the Legislature means exactly what it says. . . . A statute that is clear on its face is not subject to judicial interpretation.'" This court "`will not add to or subtract from the clear language of a statute even if we believe the legislature intended something else but did not adequately express it.'" Still, this court will "`add or subtract language if doing so is required to make the statute rational. And [the court] will avoid a literal reading of the statute if it would result in an unlikely, absurd, or strained interpretation.'"
Medcalf, 133 Wn.2d at 298 (citing Lax, 125 Wn.2d at 822 and McElwain, 80 Wn.2d. at 628).
State v. Hale, ___ Wn.2d ___, 189 P.3d 829, 832 (2008) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Chapman, 140 Wn.2d 436, 450, 998 P.2d 282 (2000)).
Hale, 189 P.3d at 832 n. 4 (quoting State v. Castillo, 144 Wn. App. 584, 591, 183 P.3d 355 (2008)).
Hale, 189 P.3d at 832 n. 4 (quoting Castillo, 144 Wn. App. at 591).
Here, the language of RCW 46.61.020(1) is clear on its face. Moreover, no language needs to be added or subtracted because the statute is rational when "refuse" is given its ordinary meaning according to standard dictionary definitions. Finally, this reading does not result in an absurd interpretation. Such a reading promotes the collection of identifying information, especially in situations like the present case, where an explanation that one's license is not in one's possession — which does not constitute a refusal — would have allowed the officer to pursue other means of identification. The trial court did not err in finding that Bone could refuse to produce his license under RCW 46.61.020 (1), even if he did not have his license with him.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
RCW 46.61.020(1) requires proof that the defendant "refuse[d] upon demand . . . [by a] police officer to produce his or her . . . vehicle driver's license." According to the plain meaning of these words, the State must prove that the defendant expressed an unwillingness to produce his or her license.
In this case, the State presented evidence that Davison asked Bone for his license, and Bone answered that he would not produce it until he was told why he was pulled over. When Davison explained the reason for the stop was a defective license plate light, Bone stated he would not give his license because Davison was violating his constitutional rights. During this exchange, Bone did not tell Davison that he did not have his license with him and never produced his license. This was sufficient evidence for the trial court to convict Bone for refusing to give information to or cooperate with an officer under RCW 46.61.020(1).
Conclusion
We reject Bone's argument that he could not "refuse" to produce his driver's license under RCW 46.61.020(1) because it was not in his possession. The ordinary meaning of "refuse" presented by the State results in a reading of this provision that is rational and does not lead to an absurd result, as it promotes the information-gathering process. Under this reading, the State presented sufficient evidence to support Bone's conviction under RCW 46.61.020(1).
Affirmed.