State v. Boloff

17 Citing cases

  1. State v. De Jonge

    152 Or. 315 (Or. 1936)   Cited 6 times
    Referring to the "salutary mandate" of Art. VII, § 3 of our constitution

    Criminal syndicalism and sabotage are specifically defined by the act, and the crime charged is in the language of the statute. It is not necessary here to discuss the constitutionality of the Oregon act, questioned by defendant, for that matter was thoroughly covered in the cases of State v.Laundy, 103 Or. 443 ( 204 P. 958, 206 P. 290), and State v. Boloff, 138 Or. 568 ( 4 P.2d 326, 7 P.2d 775). See, also, in this connection: Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 ( 71 L.Ed. 1095, 47 S.Ct. 641), and State v. Hennessy, 114 Wn. 351 ( 195 P. 211).

  2. State v. Thorp

    166 Or. App. 564 (Or. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 12 times
    In State v. Thorp, 166 Or App 564, 2 P3d 903 (2000), rev dismissed, 332 Or 559 (2001), a majority of the members of this court agreed that the three-part test articulated in Solem v. Helm, 463 US 277, 284, 103 S Ct 3001, 77 L Ed 2d 637 (1983), provides objective criteria that can aid in determining whether a sentence is proportional to the offense.

    State v. Boloff, 138 Or. 568, 646 4 P.2d 326, 7 P.2d 775 [1932]. The sentence is not one which is 'so proportioned to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable men as to what is right and proper under the circumstances.'

  3. Barber v. Gladden

    220 F. Supp. 308 (D. Or. 1963)   Cited 23 times

    Barber asked the Judge the following question: "In the case of State v. Boloff [ 138 Or. 568, 4 P.2d 326], 7 P.2d 775, Justice Rossman said, `a careful judge apprises himself concerning the defendant's past life, his capacity to comply with the adopted standards, and his former attitude towards law and order.' As the sentencing judge in my case do you think you met the requirements laid down by that?

  4. State v. Murray

    395 P.2d 780 (Or. 1964)   Cited 4 times

    Error, even in a criminal case, in order to demand reversal, must be prejudicial. Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd ed., § 21; State v. Lanegan, 192 Or. 691, 236 P.2d 438; State v. Folkes, 174 Or. 568, 150 P.2d 17; State v. Boloff, 138 Or. 568, 4 P.2d 326, 7 P.2d 775. See also ORS 138.230.

  5. State v. Denny

    53 P.2d 713 (Or. 1936)

    If we should take judicial notice of the transcript of evidence in the case of State v. Dirk De Jonge, supra, then we have already passed upon the constitutionality of the act, and in that case the court said: "It is not necessary here to discuss the constitutionality of the Oregon act, questioned by defendant, for that matter was thoroughly covered in the cases of State v. Laundy, 103 Or. 443 ( 204 P. 958, 206 P. 290), and State v. Boloff, 138 Or. 568 ( 4 P.2d 326, 7 P.2d 775). See also, in this connection: Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 ( 71 L.Ed. 1095, 47 S.Ct. 641), and State v. Hennessy, 114 Wn. 351 ( 195 P. 211).

  6. State v. Pugh

    51 P.2d 827 (Or. 1935)

    It was contended that the act was unconstitutional in that it denies that freedom of speech guaranteed by section 8 of article I of the state constitution, which provides: "No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write or print freely on any subject whatever, but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right." This contention is foreclosed by the decisions of this court in State v. Laundy, 103 Or. 443 ( 204 P. 958, 206 P. 290), and State v. Boloff, 138 Or. 568 ( 4 P.2d 326, 7 P.2d 775), in which cases it was held that the original criminal syndicalism statute, which was more stringent in its provisions than the present statute and of which the present statute is an amendment, was not unconstitutional upon any of the grounds now urged. This question, therefore, is not now an open one.

  7. State v. Goodloe

    24 P.2d 28 (Or. 1933)   Cited 8 times

    The whole affair being a single transaction, the declarations or statements of any one of the defendants, who was a party to it, would be admissible against all. A conspiracy is an agreement or combination by two or more persons to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful or criminal means. People v. Richards, 1 Mich. 216 (51 Am. Dec. 75). There is evidence, and there are circumstances, tending to show that appellant loaned his co-defendants a revolver with which to stage the robbery; that he procured for them the use of the car employed by them; that after the co-defendants returned to his place, the fruits of the robbery were divided with appellant. If this evidence be true, and the jury must have believed it, then the conspiracy did not terminate at the room in the Sandy Court apartments, but continued until the loot was divided, so that any statements by a conspirator during this time would be admissible against all. Oregon Code 1930, § 9-226, Sub-Sec. 6; State v. Boloff, 138 Or. 568 ( 4 P.2d 326, 7 P.2d 775); State v. Milo, 126 Or. 238 ( 269 P. 225); State v. Lewis, 51 Or. 467 ( 94 P. 831). [3.] 2.

  8. State v. Keller

    21 P.2d 807 (Or. 1933)   Cited 11 times
    Involving a different statute in which the court said, "The public must always have access to all public records required to be kept or made by a public official unless the statute specifically provides otherwise."

    When such a conjunction of persons is established by evidence, then the admissions or declarations of one are binding on the others. It is not the name by which such a combination is known that matters, but whether such persons are working together to accomplish a common result. If they are, and are doing the acts prohibited by § 25-1325, supra, and the evidence establishes that fact beyond a reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of a jury, the defendants, or one or more of them may be found guilty. State v. Moore, 32 Or. 65 ( 48 P. 468); State v. Tucker, 36 Or. 291 ( 61 P. 894, 51 A.L.R. 246); State v. Boloff, 138 Or. 568 ( 4 P.2d 326, 7 P.2d 775). The defendant challenges the indictment on the grounds of duplicity, claiming that it also covers the criminal elements defined in § 25-1326, Oregon Code 1930, and is therefore bad because it charges two crimes.

  9. State v. Johnston

    22 P.2d 879 (Or. 1933)   Cited 13 times

    It is, therefore, admitted by appellant and also well settled that the declarations of one of the conspirators which occurs before the actual commission of the alleged crime, and which tends to prove the guilt of that conspirator, is equally admissible in evidence against any one of his confederates in a separate trial of the latter. Oregon Code 1930, § 9-226, Sub. 6; State v. Ryan, 47 Or. 338 ( 82 P. 703, 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 862); State v. Caseday, 58 Or. 429 ( 115 P. 287); State v. Boloff, 138 Or. 568 ( 4 P.2d 326, 7 P.2d 775). In a well-reasoned case, Tuckerman v. United States, 291 Fed. 958, the court said:

  10. De Jonge v. Oregon

    299 U.S. 353 (1937)   Cited 668 times
    Holding that a state may not violate the right to peacefully assemble

    Its wisdom is not for the courts. Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 278; State v. Boloff, 138 Or. 568, 611. The sole purpose of the Act is to prevent the advocacy or use of violence by forbidding anyone to preside at, conduct or assist in conducting a meeting of an organization which teaches it.