Opinion
No. COA10-1100
Filed 21 June 2011 This case not for publication
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 7 May 2010 by Judge Jay D. Hockenbury in Sampson County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 March 2011.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Derrick C. Mertz, for the State. Sue Genrich Berry for defendant-appellant.
Sampson County Nos. 07 CRS 51282-83.
Where defendant asserts no possessory interest in the item seized, he has no standing to challenge the seizure. Where there was a reasonable and articulable suspicion for the traffic stop of defendant and where the length of the stop was no longer than was necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, there was no error in the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress.
On 7 April 2009, defendant Patrick Jerome Blue was indicted for felony possession of a schedule II controlled substance, no operator's license, possession of a schedule VI controlled substance, resisting, delaying, or obstructing a public officer, and attaining habitual felon status.
On 14 April 2007, an officer with the Clinton Police Department performed a traffic stop of defendant's vehicle. On 5 May 2010, a trial concerning the events occurring during that stop commenced. Upon the early introduction of evidence that defendant did not have a valid driver's license, defendant objected and asked to be heard pursuant to a pre-trial motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the officer's search and seizure of defendant. Out of the presence of the jury, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing.
During the evidentiary hearing, Clinton Police Department Detective Darryl Grady, testified that on 14 April 2007, defendant was under surveillance as part of an undercover investigation regarding the sale of narcotics. The operation supervisor had become aware that defendant was driving without a valid driver's license. Det. Grady testified without objection that this raised concern about the agency's liability in the event defendant caused an injury while driving during the time he was under surveillance and while law enforcement was aware that his driver's license was not valid. Officer Grady was instructed to find defendant and inform him on how to get his license. The day before the stop, Officer Grady searched for the status of defendant's driver's license through a law enforcement database which indicated defendant's license was not valid but was "eligible for reinstatement."
On 14 April 2007, at 9:45 p.m., Officer Grady observed defendant driving on Farrell Street in Sampson County. In an unmarked police car, Officer Grady activated his strobe lights, instructing defendant to pull over. Officer Grady approached defendant's vehicle, requested his driver's license which defendant provided and Officer Grady "ran through DMV[.]" Again, defendant's driver's license status was reflected as "eligible for reinstatement." Officer Grady retuned to defendant's vehicle and asked defendant to step out of the car. Complying, defendant opened his door and stepped out of the vehicle, whereupon a foil package fell to the ground. Officer Grady stated, "You dropped something." "No, I didn't," responded defendant. At this point, Officer Eddie Carter of the Clinton Police Department arrived at the scene. Officer Grady testified that based on his training and experience, the foil packaging was consistent with a way illegal narcotics are packaged. Officer Grady opened the package and observed what he believed to be "crack" cocaine and marijuana. In order to make an arrest, Officer Grady grabbed defendant, but defendant pulled away, "took a swing," and ran. Officers Grady and Carter pursued, but defendant eluded capture. Later that night, defendant surrendered himself to a magistrate.
During arguments on defendant's motion to suppress, defendant's trial counsel "concede[d] that the original and initial stop that Officer Grady did of the defendant was valid, that it was based on his reasonable suspicion." But, defendant argued, the initial reason for the stop was satisfied when defendant handed Officer Grady his license. After hearing the evidence and following the arguments of counsel, the trial court drew the following conclusions:
[A]t the time of the arrest that there was reasonable articulable suspicion that the defendant was driving with a driver's license that had not been reinstated.
[] That there was no search done of the defendant. And the defendant, by his own statements, indicated he did not have any possessory interest in the contraband.
[] That Officer Grady had a constitutional legal basis to open the foil packet and to see what was inside.
[] Based on the totality of the evidence and circumstances, none of the defendant's federal or state constitutional rights were violated either by the stop of his vehicle or the opening of the foil packet and preparing that packet as evidence in the case.
Based upon the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, the defendant's motion to suppress the stop and the admission of evidence in the case is denied.
After the presentation of all evidence, the jury found defendant guilty of possession of cocaine, driving with no operator's license, possession of marijuana, and resisting, delaying, or obstructing a public officer. Defendant entered a guilty plea on the charge of attaining the status of habitual felon. The trial court entered judgment in accordance with the jury verdict. For sentencing, the offenses were consolidated and defendant was sentenced to an active term of 121 to 155 months imprisonment. Defendant appeals.
On appeal, defendant raises three arguments: The trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress on the grounds that (I) defendant did not have standing; (II) there was no reasonable and articulable suspicion for the stop; and (III) defendant's detention on the roadside was unreasonable.
Defendant does not challenge any of the trial court's findings of fact. Therefore, the findings are deemed to be supported and binding on appeal. State v. Baker, 312 N.C. 34, 37, 320 S.E.2d 670, 673 (1984) (appeal from the denial of the defendant's motion to suppress).
I
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop where defendant's person and vehicle were seized and the contents of the foil wrapper searched, when defendant's possessory interest in the foil wrapper found on the street was at best tenuous. We disagree.
"A person's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right[.]" State v. Mlo, 335 N.C. 353, 377, 440 S.E.2d 98, 110, cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1224, 129 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1994). To be entitled to the protections of the Fourth Amendment, defendant "must demonstrate that any rights alleged to have been violated were his rights, not someone else's." Id. Generally, a defendant may not object to the search and seizure of the property of another. Id. at 378, 440 S.E.2d at 110. "The burden of showing this ownership or possessory interest is on the person who claims that his rights have been infringed." Id. at 378, 440 S.E.2d at 111.
State v. Boyd, 169 N.C. App. 204, 206-07, 609 S.E.2d 785, 787 (2005); see also, State v. Johnson, 98 N.C. App. 290, 390 S.E.2d 707 (1990) (concluding that the defendant had no standing to assert a constitutional violation arising from the search of abandoned property (citing Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241, 80 S.Ct. 683, 698, 4 L.Ed.2d 668, 687 (1960) ("There can be nothing unlawful in the Government's appropriation of [] abandoned property."))).
If it is defendant's contention that the foil wrapper was not his property, clearly he lacked standing to contest its seizure and his argument is overruled. Boyd, 169 N.C. App. 206-07, 609 S.E.2d at 787. If it is defendant's contention that the foil wrapper was his property and that the officer's search and seizure of the foil wrapper was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, we note Det. Grady's testimony during the suppression hearing:
A. I asked [defendant] to step out of the car. . . . When [defendant] stepped out of the car, immediately after he stood up, I noticed a foil package fall to the ground and I looked at [defendant] and I said, "You dropped something." He said, "No, I didn't." I picked it up . . . [and] was opening it up and I noticed that it was crack cocaine and marijuana.
Further, defendant did not offer testimony or otherwise assert any possessory interest in the foil package. "The burden of showing this ownership or possessory interest is on the person who claims that his rights have been infringed." Id. at 207, 609 S.E.2d at 787 (citing State v. Mlo, 335 N.C. 353, 378, 440 S.E.2d 98, 111 (1994)). As defendant did not meet his burden of showing his ownership or possessory interest in the foil wrapper, his argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of the wrapper is overruled.
II
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to dismiss on the grounds that there was a lack of justification for the stop. In support of this argument before this Court, though in contradiction to the concession made by defense counsel before the trial court, defendant contends that Officer Grady failed to check the status of defendant's driver's license until after defendant had been stopped. Defendant asserts that the trial court's statement, at the conclusion of the suppression hearing, that the trial court was unable to ascertain whether defendant possessed a valid driver's license at the time of the traffic stop or a license that needed to be reinstated showed that there was a lack of justification for the stop. We disagree.
"[R]easonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops, regardless of whether the traffic violation was readily observed or merely suspected." State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 415, 665 S.E.2d 438, 440 (2008). "[C]ourts have continued to hold that a traffic stop is constitutional if the officer has a `reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.'" State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 246, 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 (2008) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570, 576 (2000)).
Reasonable suspicion is a "less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence." [ Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675-76, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570, 576 (2000)] (citation omitted). The standard is satisfied by "`some minimal level of objective justification.'" United States v. Sokolow,
490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 10 (1989) (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1763, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247, 255 (1984)). This Court requires that "[t]he stop . . . be based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training." State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) (citing Terry [ v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1860, 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906)]. Moreover, "[a] court must consider `the totality of the circumstances — the whole picture' in determining whether a reasonable suspicion" exists. Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 629 (1981)). See generally State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 246, 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 (2008).
Styles, 362 N.C. at 414, 665 S.E.2d at 439-40.
During the suppression hearing, Det. Grady testified that the day before he stopped defendant, he checked the status of defendant's driver's license through a law enforcement database that indicated his license was "eligible for reinstatement." The next day, Officer Grady observed defendant driving on Farrell Street. Det. Grady testified that he was not sure how defendant's license came to be "eligible for reinstatement," but it was possible to have a driver's license suspended by DMV despite a driver's retention of the driver's license card, wherein the license looks valid but is not: a driver could get a citation, not handle it in court, and then DMV would suspend the driver's license, notifying the driver by letter. On appeal, defendant acknowledges that "[i]n other words, a trip to DMV and the payment of a small fee would result in a valid driver's license." We also note that at the conclusion of the suppression hearing, during the arguments of counsel, defendant's trial counsel conceded "the original and initial stop that officer Grady did of the defendant was valid, that it was based on his reasonable suspicion."
Given the totality of the circumstances, these facts indicate "[t]he stop [was] based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer guided by his experience and training." Id. at 414, 665 S.E.2d at 439. Further, notwithstanding the trial court's statement that due to conflicting evidence it could not determine whether defendant possessed a driver's license that was actually valid or eligible for reinstatement on that day, the trial court found, based on competent evidence, that "at the time of the arrest that there was reasonable articulable suspicion that the defendant was driving with a driver's license that had not been reinstated." Accordingly, defendant's argument is overruled.
III
Last, defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to suppress because defendant was detained for an unreasonable length of time. Defendant contends that because the trial court did not determine whether he had a valid license at the time he was stopped, there was no basis for his continued detention after defendant provided his driver's license to Officer Grady. We disagree.
The determination as to whether defendant's detention after being stopped for driving without a valid driver's license was unreasonable, is a question of law reviewed de novo. State v. Castellon, 151 N.C. App. 675, 677, 566 S.E.2d 696, 697 (2002).
"[S]topping an automobile and detaining its occupants implicate[s] the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable seizures. . . ." State v. Sanders, 112 N.C. App. 477, 479, 435 S.E.2d 842, 844 (1993) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)). Where there is reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that a driver does not have a valid license, a detention for the purpose of determining the validity of the driver's license is not unreasonable. See Castellon, 151 N.C. App. 675, 680, 566 S.E.2d 696, 699 (2002); Sanders, 112 N.C. App. 477, 479, 435 S.E.2d 842, 844 (citing Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 59 L.Ed.2d 660). Moreover, "we [have] held [that] the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches is not violated when an officer requires the driver of a lawfully detained vehicle to exit the vehicle." State v. Briggs, 140 N.C. App. 484, 488, 536 S.E.2d 858, 860 (2000) (citing State v. McGirt, 122 N.C. App. 237, 239, 468 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1996), aff'd per curiam, 345 N.C. 624, 481 S.E.2d 288, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 869, 139 L. Ed. 2d 121 (1997)). However, "[i]n order to further detain a person after lawfully stopping him, an officer must have reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that criminal activity is afoot." State v. McClendon, 350 N.C. 630, 636, 517 S.E.2d 128, 132 (1999) (citations omitted). "To ascertain whether an officer has a reasonable suspicion, we examine the totality of the circumstances." State v. Hodges, 195 N.C. App. 390, 397, 672 S.E.2d 724, 729 (2009) (citing McClendon, 350 N.C. at 636, 517 S.E.2d at 132). "In its analysis, the court must view the facts through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training at the time he determined to detain defendant." Castellon, 151 N.C. App. at 680, 566 S.E.2d at 699.
Officer Grady stopped defendant while driving because a law enforcement database reflected that defendant's license was not valid but "eligible for reinstatement." At the time of the stop, Officer Grady requested defendant's driver's license and "ran [it] through DMV[.]" Again, the status was reflected as "eligible for reinstatement." Officer Grady asked defendant to step out of his vehicle, whereupon he observed a foil package fall to the ground. The package contained what Officer Grady believed to be crack cocaine and marijuana.
As discussed in issue II, supra, Officer Grady's initial stop, requesting that defendant pull over to the side of the road, was lawful. And, after having "run [defendant's license] through DMV[,]" and observing the record that defendant's license was not valid but, rather, "eligible for reinstatement," Officer Grady had sufficient grounds to further detain defendant. Moreover, requesting that defendant step out of his vehicle was not a violation of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. See Briggs, 140 N.C. App. at 488, 536 S.E.2d at 860. Because Officer Grady's actions were not in violation of the proscriptions against unreasonable searches and seizures and not otherwise unreasonably intrusive, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress based on the extended duration of the traffic stop. Accordingly, defendant's argument is overruled.
No Error.
Judges ELMORE and GEER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).