The controlling significance of the place of observation to our Article 11 jurisprudence is made clear by three other post-Kirchoff decisions. In State v. Blow, 157 Vt. 513, 602 A.2d 552 (1991), the police sent an informant, wired with a transmitter, into the home of defendant to make a drug purchase. We held that "warrantless electronic participant monitoring conducted in a home offends the core values of Article 11" and suppressed the evidence obtained by the transmission.

That said, we have also consistently held that Article 11 protects only those areas or activities that a reasonable person would conclude are intended to be private. See State v. Costin, 168 Vt. 175, 177, 720 A.2d 866, 868 (1998); State v. Kirchoff, 156 Vt. 1, 10, 587 A.2d 988, 994 (1991); State v. Blow, 157 Vt. 513, 517, 602 A.2d 552, 555 (1991). "[A] person cannot rely on Article 11 to protect areas or activities that have been willingly exposed to the public."

Under Article 11, the question of whether an individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy "'hinges on the essence of underlying constitutional values — including respect for both private, subjective expectations and public norms.'" Id. (quoting State v. Blow, 157 Vt. 513, 517-18, 602 A.2d 552, 555 (1991)). Therefore, in order to invoke Article 11 protection, a person must "'exhibit[] an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy . . . that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.'"

The question squarely posed, therefore, is whether participant electronic monitoring in the circumstances presented in this case violates Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution. In State v. Blow, 157 Vt. 513, 602 A.2d 552 (1991), we held that obtaining evidence by electronic monitoring in the defendant's home without his consent and without prior court authorization violates Article 11. The touchstone here, as in Blow and in State v. Kirchoff, 156 Vt. 1, 587 A.2d 988 (1991), is whether a defendant subject to electronic surveillance has a reasonable expectation of privacy.

¶ 13. This Court has previously noted the “significance of the home as a repository of heightened privacy expectations” and deemed heightened expectations in the privacy of one’s home to be legitimate. Geraw, 173 Vt. at 352-53 , 795 A.2d at 1221 ; see also State v. Blow, 157 Vt. 513 , 518, 602 A.2d 552 , 555 (1991). Although there has been some disagreement among the members of the Court in the past as to the extent to which circumstances may alter the general rule, see Geraw, 173 Vt. at 364-68 , 795 A.2d at 1229-33 (Skoglund, J., dissenting) (reasoning that because defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in consensual conversation with known police officer in defendant’s home, officer’s surreptitious recording of conversation was not search), government intrusions into the home are searches for purposes of Article 11 even if an individual fails to take affirmative steps to convey his expectation of privacy. See Blow, 157 Vt. at 519 , 602 A.2d at 556 (holding that police’s warrantless recording of conversation between confidential informant and defendant in defendant’s home violated Article 11).

In State v. Blow, 157 Vt. 513, 602 A.2d 552 (1991), the police used an informant to record a drug transaction in the home of the defendant. During the trial, a police officer was permitted to testify about the contents of the electronically recorded drug transaction.

In determining whether persons have a privacy interest in any given area or activity, we examine both private subjective expectations and general social norms. State v. Blow, 157 Vt. 513, 517-18, 602 A.2d 552, 555 (1991). The manifested privacy interest must be a reasonable one, but as we have cautioned before, constitutional rights are not limited by waning expectations of privacy resulting from increased governmental intrusion into people's lives.

Mot. to Suppress Evid. at 3 (citing United States v. Sotomayor, 592 F.2d 1219, 1224-26 (2d Cir. 1979) In State v. Blow, 157 Vt. 513, 602 A.2d 552 (1991), the Vermont Supreme Court held that warrantless electronic monitoring of a defendant's conversations conducted in a home offends core values of the Vermont Constitution. See id. 519, 602 A.2d at 556. Because the monitoring of the phone calls was unlawful, Rodriguez asserts, all of the evidence obtained in the case, including the heroin found in the car operated by Ortiz, the heroin found in the storage unit, and any statements made by Rodriguez, must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.

When a landowner has taken steps to indicate that strangers are not welcome, such that a reasonable person would conclude that the public is excluded from the land, an expectation of privacy is reasonable. Id. ; State v. Blow, 157 Vt. 513, 517, 602 A.2d 552, 555 (1991). However, absent evidence of intent to exclude the public, and when the police officer can readily observe the object from a lawful vantage point, the plain-view requirement is met.

As a result, warrantless searches of the home are particularly offensive. State v. Blow, 157 Vt. 513, 519, 602 A.2d 552, 556 (1991). By comparison, the GPS monitoring defendant is subject to is neither a physical search of her home and possessions nor a particularly intrusive technological search.