Opinion
No. 1-955 / 01-0368.
Filed February 6, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, GARY D. MCKENRICK and MARK D. CLEVE, Judges.
Blouse appeals from a judgment and sentence imposed following his guilty pleas to possession of a controlled substance (second offense) and driving while barred. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan Japuntich, Assistant Appellate Defendant, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by HUITINK, P.J., and ZIMMER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings .
Blouse appeals from a judgment and sentence imposed following his guilty pleas to possession of a controlled substance (second offense) and driving while barred. Blouse's pleas followed a failed motion to suppress incriminating evidence claiming there was no probable cause to support his arrest and subsequent seizure of evidence. At the suppression hearing Blouse disputed the State's claim that he was driving a car immediately prior to his arrest. After entry of judgment in this case, Blouse was subsequently charged and convicted of perjury based on his testimony at the suppression hearing.
On direct appeal Blouse contends he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel. He argues counsel breached an essential duty by failing to advise him that his guilty plea to driving while barred would result in his subsequent prosecution for perjury.
II. The Merits .
We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. State v. Allison, 576 N.W.2d 371, 373 (Iowa 1998). Ordinarily, we preserve claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised on direct appeal for postconviction proceedings to allow full development of the facts surrounding counsel's conduct. State v. Atley, 564 N.W.2d 817, 833 (Iowa 1997). However, we will resolve ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal when the record is adequate to decide the issue. State v. Arne, 579 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Iowa 1998).A defendant receives ineffective assistance of counsel when (1) the defense attorney fails in an essential duty and (2) prejudice results. State v. Bugely, 562 N.W.2d 173, 178 (Iowa 1997). In order to meet the first test, one must overcome the "strong presumption" that his attorney's actions were reasonable under the circumstances and fell within the normal range of competency. State v. Shumpert, 554 N.W.2d 250, 254 (Iowa 1996). To succeed on the second test, he must show that, but for counsel's error, the result of the proceedings would have been different. State v. Buck, 510 N.W.2d 850, 858 (Iowa 1994). An ineffective assistance of counsel claim may be disposed of if the defendant fails to prove either prong. State v. Cook, 565 N.W.2d 611, 614 (Iowa 1997).
Counsel is duty bound to inform a defendant of the direct consequences of the defendant's guilty plea to a criminal offense. Mott v. State, 407 N.W.2d 581, 582-83 (Iowa 1987). Counsel, however, breaches no essential duty by failing to advise a defendant of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea. Saadiq v. State, 387 N.W.2d 315, 325 (Iowa 1986). The distinction between a direct and a collateral consequence is whether the consequence at issue represents a "definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant's punishment." State v. Carney, 584 N.W.2d 907, 908 (Iowa 1998).
A subsequent prosecution based in part on the record of an earlier entered guilty plea to another offense is not considered a direct consequence of the earlier entered guilty plea. See Saadiq, 387 N.W.2d at 324-26 (subsequent prosecution for possession of a firearm by a felon based on prior guilty plea conviction). In the absence of any claim Blouse was misled by counsel concerning the collateral consequences of his plea, we find counsel breached no essential duty by failing to advise Blouse of the prospect of a future perjury prosecution. Blouse's judgment of conviction and his sentence are therefore affirmed.
AFFIRMED.