Opinion
A23-0695
10-05-2023
State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Guy Francis Bloomquist, Appellant.
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-19-20347
Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Frisch, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
Jennifer L. Frisch Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. In July 2021, a jury found appellant Guy Francis Bloomquist guilty of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.345, subdivision 1(d) (2018), after receiving evidence that he had engaged in unlawful sexual contact involving a sleeping minor in her bedroom. Bloomquist waived his right to a jury determination of whether the offense occurred within the victim's "zone of privacy," an aggravating factor that may support an upward departure from the presumptive sentence as set forth in the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. See Minn. Sent'g Guidelines 2.D.3.b.14 (Supp. 2019); Minn. Stat. § 244.10, subd. 5a(14) (2018). The district court imposed an upward dispositional sentencing departure, relying on two grounds: that the offense occurred within the victim's zone of privacy-her bedroom-and that Bloomquist was particularly unamenable to probation. The district court sentenced Bloomquist to 24 months' imprisonment.
2. Bloomquist appealed his sentence, arguing that the stated bases for the upward sentencing departure were improper. State v. Bloomquist, No. A21-1516, 2022 WL 4295370 (Minn.App. Sept. 19, 2022), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 28, 2022). Bloomquist argued that the zone-of-privacy aggravating factor could not serve as the basis for an upward sentencing departure because he was convicted of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct against a victim sleeping in her bedroom. Id. at *3. He reasoned that because such offenses frequently occur in a victim's bedroom, his conduct was typical of the offense. Id. We specifically rejected that argument, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the zone-of-privacy aggravating factor supported an upward sentencing departure. But because the upward sentencing departure was also based on an improper finding by the district court that Bloomquist was unamenable to probation, we reversed in part and remanded for resentencing. Id. at *4.
3. On remand, the district court again imposed an upward sentencing departure, this time basing its sentencing decision solely on the zone-of-privacy aggravating factor. Bloomquist now appeals his resentencing, repeating the same argument that he asserted in the first appeal that the victim's zone of privacy cannot form the basis for an upward sentencing departure.
4. The sole issue in this appeal is governed by the law of the case. See Smith v. State, 974 N.W.2d 576, 581 (Minn. 2022). Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, "when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case." State v. Miller, 849 N.W.2d 94, 98 (Minn.App. 2014) (emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted). In the first appeal, we considered and decided the same rule of law at issue in the current appeal, namely whether an upward dispositional sentencing departure is improper because the conduct at issue-sexual contact with a sleeping victim in her bedroom-is typical of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct. We rejected that argument, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing an upward dispositional sentencing departure based on the victim's zone of privacy. Bloomquist, 2022 WL 4295370, at *3. That ruling is now law of the case and so governs the same issue asserted in this subsequent stage of the same case.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.