(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Blasko , 202 Conn. 541, 558, 522 A.2d 753 (1987) ; see also Caron v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Commission , 222 Conn. 269, 279, 610 A.2d 584 (1992). In a legislative hearing on the relevant provision, the defendant, in testimony before the legislature, described P.A. 14–155, § 12, as "truly technical. It overturns a drafting error, a really, truly drafting error of last session and restores the intention that [the legislature] had in—in the applicability of the estate tax."

First, it bears emphasizing that the majority essentially declares that a method of statutory construction used by this court in literally hundreds of cases over the past century, including very recent cases, was incorrect. See, e.g., MacDermid, Inc. v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 257 Conn. 128, 154, 778 A.2d 7 (2001); Rizzo Pool Co. v. Del Grosso, 240 Conn. 58, 74, 689 A.2d 1097 (1997); State v. Blasko, 202 Conn. 541, 553, 522 A.2d 753 (1987); State v. Springer, 149 Conn. 244, 248, 178 A.2d 525 (1962); Evans v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 135 Conn. 120, 124, 61 A.2d 684 (1948); Lee Bros. Furniture Co. v. Cram, 63 Conn. 433, 438, 28 A. 541 (1893). We were not alone.

In comparison, the one-man investigatory grand jury is purely a creature of statute, authorized pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) 54-47, as amended. See State v. Blasko, 202 Conn. 541, 545-551, 553-55, 522 A.2d 753 (1987); In re Investigation of the Grand Juror, 4 Conn. App. 544, 549-50, 556, 495 A.2d 1098 (1985), appeal dismissed, 203 Conn. 1, 522 A.2d 1228 (1987). The investigatory grand jury has broad statutory authority to inquire into criminal activity and to report its findings to the court for possible prosecution of those responsible for such activity.

See id. A clarifying act "`"in effect construes and clarifies a prior statute [and, therefore,] must be accepted as the legislative declaration of the meaning of the original act."'" State v. Magnano, 204 Conn. 259, 278, 528 A.2d 760 (1987); State v. Blasko, 202 Conn. 541, 556-57 522 A.2d 753 (1987); Tax Commissioner v. Estate of Bissell, 173 Conn. 232, 246, 377 A.2d 305 (1977). General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) 51-90g (c) provides: "The subcommittee shall conclude any hearing or hearings and shall render its proposed decision not later than ninety days from the date the panel's determination of probable cause or no probable cause was filed with the state-wide grievance committee.

"In our construction of the applicable statutory language, our goal is to `ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.' State v. Blasko, 202 Conn. 541, 553, 522 A.2d 753 (1987). In reaching this goal, we consider first whether the language of the statute yields a plain and unambiguous resolution.

We note that in State v. Lizotte, 200 Conn. 734, 517 A.2d 610 (1986), we skipped directly to the second question without grappling with the first. With respect to the first question, namely, whether an act was intended to clarify existing law, or to change it, our recent case of State v. Blasko, 202 Conn. 541, 522 A.2d 753 (1987), sheds light on the proper analytical approach to follow. In that case, we were faced with the issue of whether Public Acts 1985, No. 85-611, now codified as General Statutes 54-47a through 54-47h, reforming the procedures governing investigatory grand juries, terminated the authority of grand juries that had been dull constituted before the effective date of the public act.

" (Citations omitted.) State v. Blasko, 202 Conn. 541, 553, 522 A.2d 753 (1987). The words used by the legislature in a statute must be given their ordinary meaning and must be construed with common sense.

"[I]f the amendment was enacted soon after controversies arose as to the interpretation of the original act, it is logical to regard the amendment as a legislative interpretation of the original act . . ." State v. Blasko, supra, 202 Conn. At 558, 522 A.2d 753, quoting 1A J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed. Sands 1986) § 22.31, p. 276; see also Shelby Mutual Ins. Co. v. Della Ghelfa, 200 Conn. 630, 640, 513 A.2d 52 (1986). To determine whether or act should be characterized as clarifying legislation, we look to the legislative history to determine the legislative intent.

In determining whether an act should be characterized as clarifying legislation, the court must look to the legislative history to determine legislative intent. Darak v. Darak, 210 Conn. 462, 471, 556 A.2d 145 (1989); State v. Blasko, 202 Conn. 541, CT Page 5163-JJ 558, 522 A.2d 753 (1987). The legislative history of Public Act 93-169 reveals that certain key legislators believed that the amendment was merely a clarification and not a substantive change to § 36-498(a)(2).

, or contrary to common sense that one cannot reasonably assume that they reflect the considered intent of the legislature. See, e.g., Seramonte Associates, LLC v. Hamden, 345 Conn. 76, 91 and nn.10-11, 282 A.3d 1253 (2022); Casey v. Lamont, 338 Conn. 479, 493, 258 A.3d 647 (2021); Planning &Zoning Commission v. Freedom of Information Commission, 316 Conn. 1, 17-18 n.13, 110 A.3d 419 (2015); State v. Courchesne, 296 Conn. 622, 710, 998 A.2d 1 (2010); Wallingford v. Werbiski, 274 Conn. 483, 491, 877 A.2d 749 (2005); see also Cohen v. Rossi, 346 Conn 642, 700, 295 A.3d 75 (2023) (Ecker, J, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (''[t]his court repeatedly has held that the threshold ambiguity analysis under § 1-2z should and must take into account . . . commonsense, practical considerations regarding how the statutory scheme will operate in the real world''); State v. Blasko, 202 Conn. 541, 558-59, 522 A.2d 753 (1987) (court declined to construe legislative silence to bring about ''difficult and possibly bizarre result . . . sub silentio'' (internal quotation marks omitted)).