Opinion
Def. I.D. No. 9712011730
Date Submitted: April 12, 2001
Date Decided: June 26, 2001
ORDER
1. On December 17, 1997, Joseph F. Blank, III ("Defendant") was arrested for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol in violation of 21 Del. C. § 4177. At the defendant's election, the case was transferred to the Court of Common Pleas for disposition. That Court granted defendant's motion to suppress evidence and, thereafter, dismissed the case by order dated August 28, 2000. Presently before the Court is the State's appeal of that determination, specifically challenging the lower court's ruling on the suppression issue.
2. In his motion to suppress, Defendant sought a ruling that the police officer effectuating the traffic stop did not have sufficient justification to initiate the stop. On this issue, Delaware Courts require that a peace officer develop, prior to stopping a motor vehicle, a "`reasonable and articulable suspicion' that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime." On review of an officer's determination in this regard, courts "must examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the situation `as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, trained police officer in the same or similar circumstances, combining objective facts with such an officer's subjective interpretation of those facts.'"
See Howard v. Voshell, Del. Super., 621 A.2d 804 (1992)("To determine whether the officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion, the Court must focus on the trooper's knowledge before the stop. Information derived from the stop cannot enter into the evaluation of whether the trooper had a reasonable basis to . . ." effectuate the stop.).
State v. Caldwell, Del. Super., ID Nos. 9807006121, 9807006069, Witham, J. (Oct. 22, 1999), Order at 9 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)).
Woody v. State, Del. Supr., 765 A.2d 1257, 1263 (2001) (citing Jones v. State, Del. Supr., 745 A.2d 856, 860 (1999); Quarles v. State, Del. Supr., 696 A.2d 1334, 1336 (1997)).
3. At the suppression hearing, the State presented the testimony of Delaware State Police Trooper Raymond D. Shatley ("Trooper Shatley"), the arresting officer. Trooper Shatley testified that, on December 17, 1997, while performing regular patrol duties, he was following Defendant by a "few car lengths" on northbound Route 13. While directly observing Defendant, Trooper Shatley witnessed Defendant's vehicle: 1) weaving within the center lane (on two occasions); 2) cross the right lane line by approximately one foot and then return (on two occasions); and 3) change lanes unnecessarily. These occurrences led Trooper Shatley to initiate a traffic stop. After conducting a limited field investigation, Trooper Shatley arrested Defendant for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol.
Trooper Shatley testified that, to the best of his knowledge, Defendant probably used his turn signals during these unnecessary lane changes.
See Hr'g Tr. at 10-14, 30-33, 51.
4. The State argues that Trooper Shatley's observations of Defendant's vehicle before the stop provided him with a "reasonable and articulable suspicion" that Defendant was in violation of 21 Del. C. § 4122. Section 4122 provides, in part:
Whenever any roadway has been divided into 2 or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, the following rules in addition to all others consistent herewith shall apply:
(1) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.
5. The lower court rejected the State's argument, ruling that: "The Court is satisfied that the State did not meet its minimal burden to sustain a stop. There was no reasonable articu[l]able suspicion, not explained away, and therefore the Motion is Granted."
State v. Blank, Del. CCP, C. A. No. 98-02-0027, Bradley, J. (Aug. 28, 2000) (Letter Op.).
6. Cases appealed from the Court of Common Pleas to this Court "shall be reviewed on the record and shall not be tried de novo." When considering an appeal, "this Court `must limit its scope of review to correcting errors of law and ascertaining whether the trial judge's factual findings are adequately supported by the record and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive process.'" "[T]he issue on appeal is not whether this Court would have reached the same conclusion or even agrees with the it, but whether the reasoning of that court was logical and the decision is sufficiently supported both legally and factually by the court's findings."
Darst v. State, Del. Super., Cr.A. No. 99-07-3322-1-AP, Toliver, J. (Mar. 26, 2001), Op. and Order at 4-5 (citing Romain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Del. Super., C.A. No. 99A-02-003, Ridgely, P.J. (Dec. 2, 1999), Order at 1 (quoting Wyatt v. Motorola Inc., Del. Super., C.A. No. 93A-01-004, Gebelein, J. (Mar. 11, 1994), (Mem. Op.))).
State v. Maxwell, Del. Super., C.A. No. 95-02-1462, Carpenter, J. (Aug. 30, 1996), Order at 8-9.
7. The State asserts that the lower court erred when it determined that Trooper Shatley could not have formed a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Defendant had committed a violation of 21 Del. C. § 4122. Defendant, of course, endorses the lower court's reasoning. This Court's reading of Section 4122, and specifically Subsection (1), concurs with the notion that changing lanes and crossing lane markings on a highway are only prohibited when the driver has neglected to ascertain whether such movement can be made with safety; the statute does not outright prohibit crossing lane lines (even if for no apparent reason).
See also Becky v. Haley, Del .Supr., 239 A.2d 699, 702 (1968)("[T]he jury should have been called upon to decide whether [the driver] had moved from one lane to the other without first seeing that such movement could be made with safety or without the signal prescribed by the Statutes.").
8. Thus, Trooper Shatley, in order to justify the traffic stop, was required to demonstrate through his testimony (by the articulation of factual circumstances prior to the stop) that he possessed a reasonable suspicion that Defendant crossed the lane lines without first ascertaining whether it was safe to do so. His testimony failed in this regard as it did not even touch upon the issue of Section 4122's safe harbor for a person who first determines that a lane change can be made safely before initiating the maneuver. In fact, the testimony clearly demonstrates that Trooper Shatley considered the lane crossing in and of itself to be prohibited conduct. Consequently, the Court concludes that the lower court's determination that Trooper Shatley's testimony failed to establish that Defendant's driving created a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Defendant had violated Section 4122 was "the product of an orderly and logical deductive process."
See Hr'g Tr. at 10-14, 30-33, 51.
Darst, supra, Op. and Order at 4-5 (citations omitted).
8. In summation, the Court finds that the trial Judge's determination that Trooper Shatley's testimony failed to establish reasonable suspicion (justifying the initiation of the traffic stop) is both supported by the factual record and free from legal error. Accordingly, the lower court's orders granting the motion to suppress and dismissing the case are AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.