State v. Blake

14 Citing cases

  1. Commonwealth v. Jones

    472 Mass. 707 (Mass. 2015)   Cited 31 times
    Holding that the trial court must make case-by-case determination under Waller before closing pretrial rape shield hearings under a statute requiring an in camera hearing

    On the other hand, courts in Oregon and North Carolina have rejected public trial challenges to statutes mandating the closure of court rooms during rape shield hearings. See State v. McNeil, 99 N.C.App. 235, 242, 393 S.E.2d 123 (1990) ; State v. Macbale, 353 Or. 789, 813–815, 305 P.3d 107 (2013) ; State v. Blake, 53 Or.App. 906, 909–920, 633 P.2d 831 (1981). The crux of the reasoning in these decisions is that, because a “rape shield” hearing “is a preliminary one and is conducted only to exclude from the trial that which is irrelevant to the proceeding,” and because “[u]nder the rules of evidence, that which is irrelevant should not be heard at all,” the closure of the court room for the hearing does not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.

  2. State v. Romel

    644 P.2d 643 (Or. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 6 times

    "* * * Whenever a child under the age of 10 years is produced as a witness, the court shall, by an examination made by itself, publicly or separate and apart with counsel present, ascertain to its own satisfaction whether the child has sufficient intelligence and sense of obligation to tell the truth to be safely admitted to testify." The guarantee of a public trial embodied in the state and federal constitutions is not absolute. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383, 99 S Ct 2898, 61 L Ed 2d 608 (1979); State ex rel Oregonian Pub. Co. v. Deiz, 289 Or. 277, 284, 613 P.2d 23 (1980); State v. Blake, 53 Or. App. 906, 911, 633 P.2d 831 (1981), appeal dismissed 292 Or. 486, 640 P.2d 605 (1982). In some situations, countervailing policy concerns dictate that the right of the public and the defendant to an openly adjudicated proceeding must give way to other considerations.

  3. Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary

    80 Or. App. 754 (Or. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 1 times

    289 Or at 284. Deiz was followed by our opinion in State v. Blake, 53 Or. App. 906, 633 P.2d 831 (1981), petition dismissed 292 Or. 486, 640 P.2d 605 (1982). The defendant in Blake challenged the constitutionality of former ORS 163.475(4), which provided that a hearing to determine the admissibility at trial of a victim's prior sexual conduct "shall [be] conduct[ed] * * * out of the presence of the jury and the public * * *."

  4. State v. Bowers

    646 P.2d 1354 (Or. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 2 times
    In Bowers, we noted this issue but did not need to resolve it because, in that case, no showing of need to limit the public's attendance at trial was made.

    The state acknowledges "the strong position in favor of a defendant's personal right to a public trial," see In Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S Ct 499, 92 L Ed 682 (1948); State v. Osborne, 54 Or. 289, 103 P. 62 (1909), but asserts that "it is equally true that '[t]he right to a public trial is not absolute,' " citing State v. Lehnherr, 30 Or. App. 1033, 569 P.2d 54 (1977). In State v. Blake, 53 Or. App. 906, 633 P.2d 831, rev allowed 291 Or. 893 (1981), rev dismissed 292 Or. 486, 640 P.2d 605 (1982), which involved the constitutionality of excluding the public from a hearing held to determine the admissibility of evidence regarding a sex crime victim's previous sexual conduct under former ORS 163.475(1), the lead opinion pointed out that "the protection of the privacy of a sex crime victim is a justifiable concern of the legislature." Further, the procedure under that statute involved a "period of public exclusion [that] is narrowly circumscribed and does not exceed the scope necessary to achieve its legitimate legislative purpose.

  5. State ex rel Davey v. Frankel

    312 Or. 286 (Or. 1991)   Cited 6 times
    Defining meaning of phrase "in chambers" within the context of OEC 412 to mean only that the hearing must take place in the judge's office

    At the time that the legislature considered and enacted OEC 412 in 1981, an appellate case was pending that questioned the effect of Deiz on the closed-hearing requirement of ORS 163.475, the predecessor to OEC 412. After the 1981 legislative session ended, a divided Court of Appeals upheld the validity of ORS 163.475, review was allowed by this court, and then review was dismissed by this court because of the limited scope of the issue presented by the ruling under a repealed statute. State v. Blake, 53 Or. App. 906, 633 P.2d 831 (1981), rev dismissed, 292 Or. 486, 640 P.2d 605 (1982). In dismissing that proceeding, this court stated: "When we are required to apply the phrase `in chambers' it will be necessary to judicially construe the phrase."

  6. People v. Arenda

    416 Mich. 1 (Mich. 1982)   Cited 112 times
    Holding evidence of prior sexual abuse of eight-year-old boy had minimal relevance because ability to describe sexual conduct need not be acquired solely through sexual conduct, unlike evidence of pregnancy, semen, or disease, and reasoning that potential prejudice from the admission of such evidence is great, a blanket exception for its admission would "swallow the rule," child victims are among the persons whom the rape shield statute was designed to protect, and there are other means by which one can inquire into the source of knowledge without producing evidence of sexual conduct with others

    pp.3d 685; 128 Cal.Rptr. 864 (1976), People v McKenna, 196 Colo. 367; 585 P.2d 275 (1978), Roberts v State, 268 Ind. 127; 373 N.E.2d 1103 (1978), People v Cornes, 80 Ill. App.3d 166; 399 N.E.2d 1346 (1980), State v Ball, 262 N.W.2d 278 (Iowa, 1978), State v Blue, 225 Kan. 576; 592 P.2d 897 (1979), Smith v Commonwealth, 566 S.W.2d 181 (Ky App, 1978), State v Dawson, 392 So.2d 445 (La, 1980), Cantrell v State, 50 Md. App. 331; 437 A.2d 696 (1981), State v Hamilton, 289 N.W.2d 470 (Minn, 1979), State v Howard, 121 N.H. 53; 426 A.2d 457 (1981), State v Ryan, 157 N.J. Super. 121; 384 A.2d 570 (1978), State v Herrera, 92 N.M. 7; 582 P.2d 384 (Ct App, 1978), People v Mandel, 61 A.D.2d 563; 403 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1978), rev'd on other grounds 48 N.Y.2d 952; 425 N.Y.S.2d 63; 401 N.E.2d 185 (1979), State v Fortney, 301 N.C. 31; 269 S.E.2d 110 (1980), State v Piper, 261 N.W.2d 650 (ND, 1977), State v Gardner, 59 Ohio St.2d 14; 391 N.E.2d 337 (1979), Cameron v State, 561 P.2d 118 (Okla Crim App, 1977), State v Blake, 53 Or. App. 906; 633 P.2d 831 (1981), State v McCoy, 274 S.C. 70; 261 S.E.2d 159 (1979), Washington v Cosden, 18 Wn. App. 213; 568 P.2d 802 (1977), State v Green, 260 S.E.2d 257 (W Va, 1979). III

  7. State v. Blake

    292 Or. 486 (Or. 1982)   Cited 16 times
    Commenting on, but not interpreting, phrase "in chambers"

    Dale Jacobs, Judge. 53 Or. App. 906, 633 P.2d 831 (1981). J. Marvin Kuhn, Chief Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for petitioner on review.

  8. Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary

    736 P.2d 173 (Or. 1987)   Cited 19 times
    In O'Leary, the plaintiff, Oregonian Publishing Company, filed a declaratory judgment action challenging, under Article I, section 10, a statute that required a court to hold a hearing “outside the presence of the jury and the public” in criminal or grand jury proceedings where a witness refused to testify on the ground that the witness may be incriminated by the testimony.

    The Court of Appeals also based its decision on its conclusion that "the public's right to open courts only encompass[es] the right of public access to relevant and admissible evidence." 80 Or App at 758 (citing State v. Blake, 53 Or. App. 906, 919-20, 633 P.2d 831 (1981)). Under this analysis, an ORS 136.617 hearing may be secret because the trier of fact is not entitled to consider testimony and arguments presented at the hearing. The premise of the limitation of public access to the presentation of admissible evidence is that the public has an interest only in the evidence actually considered by the trier of fact in arriving at a decision.

  9. State v. Bashaw

    672 P.2d 48 (Or. 1983)   Cited 5 times
    Considering rape a crime of "degradation as well as violence"

    In three post- Stocker cases, the Court of Appeals has ruled there was no abuse of discretion in failing to give a similar cautionary instruction. See, State v. Romel, 57 Or. App. 372, 377-78, 644 P.2d 643 (1982); State v. Blake, 53 Or. App. 906, 909, 633 P.2d 831 (1981), rev dismissed 292 Or. 486 (1982); State v. Harwood, 45 Or. App. 931, 609 P.2d 1312, rev den 289 Or. 337 (1980). In Harwood, the Court of Appeals held:

  10. State v. Jackson

    36 P.3d 500 (Or. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that defendant's trial in prison violated the defendant's right to a public trial under the State constitution because the prosecution did not make a substantial showing of need when it put on evidence that it would have been more convenient to not transport witness-inmates to the county courthouse

    The court held that actual prejudice would be presumed. See also State v. Blake, 53 Or. App. 906, 913, 633 P.2d 831, appeal dismissed 292 Or. 486 (1982) ("The Osborne court did not require the defendant to demonstrate actual prejudice. Rather, the court found that once the defendant showed his constitutional right to a public trial had been violated, actual injury would be conclusively presumed.").