The State argues the court erred in holding the first two statements were inadmissible, and thus there is no "taint" of the third statement. [¶ 8] We enunciated our standard of review of a court's disposition of a suppression motion in State v. Bjornson, 531 N.W.2d 315, 317 (N.D. 1995): The trial court's disposition of a motion to suppress will not be reversed if, after conflicts in the testimony are resolved in favor of affirmance, there is sufficient competent evidence fairly capable of supporting the trial court's findings, and the decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
[This standard] recognizes the importance of the trial court’s opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their credibility, and we "accord great deference to its decision in suppression matters." State v. Montgomery , 2018 ND 20, ¶ 4, 905 N.W.2d 754 (quoting State v. Bjornson , 531 N.W.2d 315, 317 (N.D. 1995) ). "Whether findings of fact meet a legal standard is a question of law. While we do not conduct a de novo review of the findings of fact, questions of law are fully reviewable.
"State v. Bjornson , 531 N.W.2d 315, 317 (N.D. 1995) (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Brown , 509 N.W.2d 69, 71 (N.D. 1993) ). "Whether findings of fact meet a legal standard is a question of law. While we do not conduct a de novo review of the findings of fact, questions of law are fully reviewable.
[¶ 22] Nor is there any evidence that Crabtree was specifically told by Weigel that any failure to take the polygraph or to answer a question, or by exercising his privilege against self-incrimination, would result in probation revocation. Cf. Goebel, 2007 ND 4, 725 N.W.2d 578 (holding confession voluntary where defendant drove himself to the police station at law enforcement's request, was interviewed in one-room police department with the door closed, but not locked, was seated next to the door, and was free to leave during the interview); State v. Bjornson, 531 N.W.2d 315 (N.D. 1995) (implied threat of prosecution or promise of leniency by police, without more, is insufficiently coercive to render confession involuntary). According to Crabtree's affidavit, he consulted with an attorney before trying to change the conditions of his probation.
City of Fargo v. Thompson, 520 N.W.2d 578, 581 (N.D. 1994). "That standard of review recognizes the importance of the trial court's opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their credibility, and we `accord great deference to its decision in suppression matters.'" State v. Bjornson, 531 N.W.2d 315, 317 (N.D. 1995) (quoting State v. Brown, 509 N.W.2d 69, 71 (N.D. 1993)). "Questions of law are fully reviewable."
Rather, Syvertson's main claim throughout has been he was tricked into believing Hukee's assurances he was only interested in helping him, and not prosecuting him. While promises implying leniency or threats of prosecution are part of the totality of the circumstances to be weighed by the trial court, without more, they are insufficiently coercive to render a confession involuntary. State v. Bjornson, 531 N.W.2d 315, 319 (N.D. 1995). The First Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Byram, 145 F.3d 405, 408 (1st Cir. 1998), recently explained:
A district court's findings of fact on a motion to suppress will not be reversed if there is sufficient competent evidence fairly capable of supporting the court's findings, and the decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. (citing State v. Sabinash, 1998 ND 32, ¶ 8, 574 N.W.2d 827 (relying on State v. Bjornson, 531 N.W.2d 315, 317 (N.D. 1995))); City of Fargo v. Thompson, 520 N.W.2d 578, 581 (N.D. 1994). Matters of law are fully reviewable by this Court on appeal. E.g., Fahlsing v. Teters, 552 N.W.2d 87, 89 (N.D. 1996).
However, because the trial court transcripts reference orders denying the suppression motions in all three cases, we will treat the suppression orders as though they apply to all three cases. [¶ 11] In State v. Sabinash, 1998 ND 32, ¶ 8, 574 N.W.2d 827, we recalled our standard of review of a trial court's denial of a suppression motion, as enunciated in State v. Bjornson, 531 N.W.2d 315, 317 (N.D. 1995) (internal citations omitted): The trial court's disposition of a motion to suppress will not be reversed if, after conflicts in the testimony are resolved in favor of affirmance, there is sufficient competent evidence fairly capable of supporting the trial court's findings, and the decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
Id. at ¶ 11, 572 N.W.2d 106. The trial court's disposition of a motion to suppress will not be reversed if there is sufficient competent evidence fairly capable of supporting the trial court's findings, and the decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Sabinash, 1998 ND 32, ¶ 8, 574 N.W.2d 827 (relying on State v. Bjornson, 531 N.W.2d 315, 317 (N.D. 1995); City of Fargo v. Thompson, 520 N.W.2d 578, 581 (N.D. 1994). [¶ 8] Individuals are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures in their homes by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and by Article I, section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution. Warrantless searches and seizures inside a home are presumptively unreasonable.
[¶ 14] We explained our standard of reviewing an order denying or granting suppression of evidence in State v. Sabinash, 1998 ND 32, ¶ 8, 574 N.W.2d 827: We enunciated our standard of review of a court's disposition of a suppression motion in State v. Bjornson, 531 N.W.2d 315, 317 (N.D. 1995): The trial court's disposition of a motion to suppress will not be reversed if, after conflicts in the testimony are resolved in favor of affirmance, there is sufficient competent evidence fairly capable of supporting the trial court's findings, and the decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.