Opinion
19226
May 27, 1971.
Vinton D. Lide, Esq., of Hartsville, for the Appellant, cites: As to Rules enacted by this Court, pursuant to legislative authorization, requiring an arresting officer to present a person accused of a criminal act before a properly designated judicial official within a practicable time after arrest: Sec. 17-281, et seq., Code of Laws of South Carolina (1962), as amended; 164 S.C. 487, 162 S.E. 753; 226 Ga. 66, 172 S.E.2d 600; 325 F.2d 1006; 202 S.C. 73, 24 S.E.2d 121; 201 S.C. 50, 21 S.E.2d 393; 145 Ga. 620, 89 S.E. 769. As to the Rules promulgated by this court pursuant to the Defense of Indigents Act being in addition to, and not included in, the mandates set forth in Miranda v. Arizona: 384 U.S. 436; Rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; 342 U.S. 36; 336 F.2d 962; 335 U.S. 410; 326 F.2d 389; Sec. 1911 of Volume 11 of the Delaware Code; 212 A.2d 886; 213 A.2d 298; 359 Mich. 410, 102 N.W.2d 738; 367 Mich. 116, N.W.2d 205; 274 Mich. 571, 132 N.W.2d 669. As to a confession obtained after the passing of a practicable time in which to present the accused before the proper judicial officer, and before such accused is, in fact, taken before such officer, being inadmissible in evidence at the subsequent trial of the accused in South Carolina: 277 U.S. 438; 204 F. Supp. 760; 334 F.2d 517; 313 F.2d 576; 234 F.2d 42; 230 F.2d 494; 250 F.2d 30.
Messrs. Daniel R. McLeod, Atty. Gen., Timothy G. Quinn, Asst. Atty. Gen., of Columbia, and Marion H. Kinon, Esq., Solicitor, J. DuPre Miller, Asst. Sol., of Bennettsville, for Respondent, cite: As to a confession obtained from a person subsequent to his arrest and the passing of a practicable time in which he could have been taken before a properly designated judicial officer to be advised of his rights under the Defense of Indigents Act, and the Rules adopted by this Court by virtue of the authority of the Act, but prior to the accused being taken before such judicial officer, being admissible in evidence at his subsequent trial: 227 S.C. 287, 87 S.E.2d 826; 238 S.C. 140, 119 S.E.2d 671; 235 S.C. 356, 111 S.E.2d 657; 74 S.C. 477, 55 S.E. 117; 211 S.C. 306, 45 S.E.2d 23; 223 S.C. 1, 73 S.E.2d 850; 239 S.C. 449, 123 S.E.2d 835; 239 S.C. 258, 122 S.E.2d 622; 246 S.C. 536, 144 S.E.2d 905; 247 S.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 709; 251 S.C. 556, 164 S.E.2d 439; 220 S.C. 506, 68 S.E.2d 409; 342 U.S. 36, 72 S.Ct. 97; 249 S.C. 541, 155 S.E.2d 607; 276 N.C. 518, 173 S.E.2d 753; 269 N.C. 661, 153 S.E.2d 384; 262 F. Supp. 486; 275 N.C. 141, 166 S.E.2d 53; 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819; The Crime Control Act, Public Law 90-351 ( 18 U.S.C. § 3501); 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726; 367 U.S. 568, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037; 344 U.S. 443, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469; 342 U.S. 55, 72 S.Ct. 141, 96 L.Ed. 86; 352 U.S. 191, 77 S.Ct. 281, 1 L.Ed. 246; 419 F.2d 651; 297 F. Supp. 609; 411 F.2d 131; 415 F.2d 167; 414 F.2d 139.
May 27, 1971.
The defendant appeals from his conviction of larceny of an automobile. The sole question presented is whether the court erred in admitting in evidence the defendant's oral confession, which was made while he was in custody, without the defendant's having been taken before the clerk of the court, or other designated officer, for the purpose of securing his right to counsel, as required by Rule 1 of the rules adopted by this court pursuant to the Defense of Indigents Act, although it would have been practicable to have sooner taken him before such officer.
The Rule relied upon was intended to insure timely appointment of counsel for indigents charged with crime — not to impose a condition upon the right of police officers to interrogate a willing suspect merely because he is in custody and has not been charged nor taken before a designated officer. The product of such interrogation is admissible in evidence, provided the confession or admission was freely and voluntarily made, and the procedural safeguards against involuntary or unwitting self-incrimination required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), were observed. As in the case of an accused interrogated while in custody following an illegal arrest, the test of the admissibility of an indigent's confession, between his arrest and his being taken before an officer designated under the Rule, is its voluntariness. The following excerpt from the opinion in recently decided State v. Funchess, 179 S.E.2d 25 (S.C. 1971), is applicable: "We conclude and hold that every statement or confession made by a person in custody as the result of an illegal arrest, is not involuntary and inadmissible, but the facts and circumstances surrounding such arrest and the in-custody statement should be considered in determining whether the statement is voluntary and admissible. Voluntariness remains as the test of admissibility." 179 S.E.2d at 28. Cf. State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 141, 166 S.E.2d 53 (1969). Since this appeal does not challenge the voluntariness of the defendant's confession, we do not reach the question of whether it should have been excluded on this ground.
Affirmed.
MOSS, C.J., and LEWIS, BUSSEY, and LITTLEJOHN, JJ., concur.