We do not subscribe to the view that a judge is necessarily disqualified because he has formed an opinion as to the legal questions involved in the case. We feel that the controlling principle of law may be found in the case of State ex rel. Sagonias v. Bird, Fla. 1953, 67 So.2d 678. In the Bird case, the complained of public position taken by the respondent judge there pertained to that judge's criticism of certain search and seizure decisions of the Florida Supreme Court.

The statements of the trial Judge attested to by the affiants were that the trial Judge did not like immunity and did not believe in it; also, that he was "philosophically opposed to the granting of immunity to a witness and that he would not rely upon the testimony of a potential defendant who has been immunized." One of the appellate court Judges was of the opinion that the affidavits referred to above were "lacking in the specificity" sufficient to support the writ, and also that the statements of the trial Judge in the instant case were similar to those held to be insufficient in State ex rel. Sagonias v. Bird, Fla. 1953, 67 So.2d 678. In that case, in declining to issue the writ because of the trial judge's criticism of certain search and seizure decisions of this court, we said, "Obviously, the fact that a certain statute or principle of law may run counter to the personal views of the judge does not mean that he is disqualified to try a case involving such law or principle."

We noted in Torres that the distinction between personal and judicial bias referenced by the federal courts is manifested in the Florida opinions on the subject, even if it has not been expressly adopted. SeeTorres , 697 So. 2d at 176 ; State ex rel. Gerstein v. Stedman , 238 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1970) (trial judge's statement that he philosophically opposed granting immunity to testifying witnesses constitutes a disagreement of law amounting to judicial bias not legally sufficient for disqualification); State ex rel. Sagonias v. Bird , 67 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1953) (judge's criticism of a court opinion was judicial bias and legally insufficient to disqualify him). However, a judge's stated judicial policy that personally affects the defendant and places him in fear that he will not receive a fair hearing is legally sufficient grounds for disqualification.

Indeed, the prevalent statement that "the courts are not concerned with the wisdom of legislation but only with the legislative power to enact it," evinces the fact that judges are often called upon to—and do—uphold and enforce laws with which they might not be entirely in accord. State ex rel. Sagonias v. Bird, 67 So. 2d 678, 680 (Fla. 1953). Thus, although perhaps ill-advised to express the same, "the fact that a certain statute or principle of law may run counter to the personal views of a judge does not mean that he [or she] is disqualified to try a case involving such law or principle."

Indeed, the prevalent statement that "the courts are not concerned with the wisdom of legislation but only with the legislative power to enact it," evinces the fact that judges are often called upon to—and do—uphold and enforce laws with which they might not be entirely in accord. State ex rel. Sagonias v. Bird, 67 So. 2d 678, 680 (Fla. 1953). Thus, although perhaps ill-advised to express the same, "the fact that a certain statute or principle of law may run counter to the personal views of a judge does not mean that he [or she] is disqualified to try a case involving such law or principle."

are Southeast Bank, N.A. v. Capua, 584 So.2d 101 (Fla. 3d DCA) (holding bank was entitled to disqualification of judge who was guarantor of another note given to same bank on which maker defaulted, identical to the note at issue in the litigation, such that judge might find himself in same posture if bank filed action on that note), cause dismissed sub nom. Royal Trust Tower, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 592 So.2d 682 (Fla. 1991), and rev. denied 641 So.2d 1344 (Fla. 1994). We disagree with plaintiffs position that the defendant has alleged only disagreement with an adverse ruling, compare Barwick v. State, 660 So.2d 685, 692 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied 516 U.S. 1097, 116 S.Ct. 823, 133 L.Ed.2d 766 (1996), receded from on other grounds by Topps v. State, 865 So.2d 1253 (Fla. 2004), or a judge's expression of a personal view of an issue of law that is at issue in the case, compare State ex rel. Gerstein v. Stedman, 233 So.2d 142 (Fla. 3d DCA), opinion adopted 238 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1970); State ex rel. Sagonias v. Bird 67 So.2d 678 (Fla. 1953); Rodgers v. State, 948 So.2d 655, 672-73 (Fla. 2006), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 59, 169 L.Ed.2d 50 (2007). We find that the defendant has shown "an actual factual foundation for the alleged fear of prejudice."

Likewise, we find the instant case readily distinguishable from the other cases cited by respondent where the courts found that the motions for disqualification were not legally sufficient. See, e.g., Arbelaez v. State, 775 So.2d 909, 916 (Fla. 2000) (finding that judge's "tough-on-crime" stance during her election campaign did not require disqualification); State ex rel. Sagonias v. Bird, 67 So.2d 678 (Fla. 1953) (finding that judge's personal opinion concerning enforcement of the state lottery law did not disqualify the judge from hearing such cases); Jernigan v. State, 608 So.2d 569, 570 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (finding that factually unsupported "theory" that the judge was prejudiced against all child abusers was not sufficient to support disqualification). Respondent also cites Eason v. Colbath, 586 So.2d 78 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), where this court affirmed the denial of the motion for disqualification, finding that the comments in question were legally insufficient because they were merely generalized and not directed to any single defendant appearing before the judge.

Id. That same distinction between personal and judicial bias is manifested in the Florida opinions, although it has not been expressly adopted. For instance, in State ex rel. Sagonias v. Bird, 67 So.2d 678 (Fla. 1953), the court held that a judge's public criticism of a court opinion was legally insufficient to support a motion for disqualification. Such criticism of the law is judicial bias.

The state contends that because the comment was not specifically directed towards appellant, it should be assumed that the trial judge will fairly weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances unique to a defendant in determining an appropriate sentence. However, unlike State ex rel. Sagonias v. Bird, 67 So.2d 678 (Fla. 1953), this is not a case in which the trial judge was merely expressing his personal views on the law. In Sagonias, a judge's public criticism of recent supreme court opinions was held to be legally insufficient to support a motion for disqualification.

State ex rel. Shelton v. Sepe, 254 So.2d 12, 13 (Fla.3d DCA 1971). We also conclude that the trial judge's quoted statements were merely generalized and not directed to any single defendant appearing before him. Compare State ex rel. La Russa v. Himes, 144 Fla. 145, 197 So. 762 (1940), with State ex rel. Sagonias v. Bird, 67 So.2d 678 (Fla. 1953). See also State ex rel. Gerstein v. Stedman, 233 So.2d 142 (Fla.3d DCA 1970), opinion adopted, 238 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1970).