Opinion
NO. 2013-KA-1266
04-16-2014
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. RANEY F. BIBBINS
Leon A. Cannizzaro, Jr. District Attorney J. Bryant Clark, Jr. Assistant District Attorney COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, STATE OF LOUISIANA Sherry Watters LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, RANEY F. BIBBIN
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
APPEAL FROM
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 495-604, SECTION "J"
Honorable Darryl A. Derbigny, Judge
Judge Dennis R. Bagneris, Sr.
(Court composed of Judge Dennis R. Bagneris, Sr., Judge Paul A. Bonin, Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano)
BONIN, J., CONCURS IN THE RESULT.
LOBRANO, J., DISSENTS WITH REASONS
Leon A. Cannizzaro, Jr.
District Attorney
J. Bryant Clark, Jr.
Assistant District Attorney
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, STATE OF LOUISIANA
Sherry Watters
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, RANEY F. BIBBINS
AFFIRMED
The state seeks review of a ruling of the trial court granting the defendant Raney Bibbins's motion to quash the bill of information based on prescription and constitutional grounds. For the following reasons, we hereby affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Mr. Bibbins was charged by bill of information on March 18, 2010 with one count of theft in an amount greater than five hundred dollars, a violation of La. R.S. 14:67(B)(2). Mr. Bibbins filed a motion to quash on July 9, 2013, arguing that the prescription period set forth in La. C.Cr.P. art. 578 had run and that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. The trial court heard and granted Mr. Bibbins's motion to quash on July 17, 2013. The State now appeals this final judgment.
Chronology of the Case
Since the parties dispute whether certain filings suspended prescription, a chronology of the proceedings is included. 03/18/10 The bill of information was filed. Defendant failed to appear, an alias capias was issued and a bond was set for $2,500.00. 03/30/10 Defendant appeared for arraignment, pled guilty and was appointed an attorney. A hearing was set for 4/14/10. Defendant was given notice in open court. 04/09/10 The docket master indicates that the Clerk's Office received defendant's omnibus motion for discovery, motion to suppress statements, evidence, and identification, and a motion for preliminary examination. 04/14/10 Defendant appeared with counsel. The hearing was continued by motion of the state and reset to 4/28/10. Defendant was notified in open court. 04/28/10 Defendant appeared with counsel. The hearing was continued by motion of the state and reset to 5/28/10. Defendant was notified in open court. 05/28/10 Defendant appeared with counsel. The hearing was continued by motion of the state and reset to 7/2/10. Defendant was notified in open court. 07/02/10 Defendant appeared with counsel. The hearing was continued by motion of the defense and reset to 7/28/10. Defendant was notified in open court. 07/28/10 Defendant appeared with counsel. The court denied the motion to suppress and found sufficient probable cause. A pre-trial conference was set for 09/17/10. Trial was set for 9/29/10. Defendant was notified in open court. 09/17/10 Defendant appeared with counsel. The court vacated the trial date of 9/29/10 reset it to 10/26/10. Notice was sent to the defendant. 09/29/10 Defense counsel appeared on behalf of defendant for trial. The matter was set in error. 10/15/10 Defense counsel appeared on behalf of defendant and moved to convert the trial date of 10/26/10 to a pre-trial conference. The court granted that motion and set a pre-trial conference to 10/26/10. Notice was sent to the defendant. 10/26/10 Defendant appeared with counsel. On joint motion by the state and defense, the court granted a continuance. The court set a pre-trial conference for 1/24/11. Defendant was notified in open court. 01/24/11 Defendant appeared with counsel. Trial was set for 5/10/11. Defendant was notified in open court. 05/10/11 Defendant appeared without counsel. The minutes indicate that the defense moved for a continuance, which was granted. The trial was reset for 7/21/11. Defendant was sent notice. 05/19/11 Counsel appeared on behalf of defendant. The case was transferred from Section "D" to Section "J" under court rules 501-505. 06/02/11 Counsel appeared on behalf of defendant. On oral motion of the state and the defense, the court continued the trial to 8/30/11. Notice was sent to defendant. 08/02/11 Counsel appeared on behalf of defendant. A pre-trial conference was set for 8/04/11, where the defendant's presence was not required. 08/04/11 Counsel appeared on behalf of defendant. The court vacated the trial date of 8/30/11. 08/30/11 Counsel appeared on behalf of defendant. A pre-trial conference was set for 9/6/11. 01/30/12 Defendant appeared with counsel. A pre-trial conference was set for 2/13/12, and a trial date was set for 4/2/12. Defendant was notified in open court. 02/13/12 Defendant appeared with counsel. Defendant filed three applications for subpoenas and a motion to appoint a special process server. The court vacated the existing trial date and reset it to 4/17/12. Defendant was notified in open court. 04/17/12 Defendant appeared with counsel. On joint motion of the state and defense, the court granted a continuance and reset the trial date to 6/26/12. Defendant was notified in open court. 06/26/12 Defendant appeared with counsel. On joint motion of the state and defense, the court granted a continuance and set the trial for 8/28/12. It is indicated that defendant chose trial by jury. Defendant was notified in open court. 08/28/12 The docket master indicates that the court was not in session on this date and that a pre-trial conference was set for 9/10/12. 09/10/12 Defendant appeared with counsel for pre-trial conference. The court set a trial date of 11/6/12. Defendant was notified in open court. 01/07/13 As requested by the state, a bond hearing was set for 1/23/13. Notice was sent to defendant and his counsel. 01/23/13 Defendant appeared with counsel. A pre-trial conference was set for 2/6/13. Defendant was notified in open court. 02/06/13 Defendant appeared with counsel. On motion by the state, the court continued the pre-trial conference to 2/20/13. The court noted the defense's objection. Defendant was notified in open court. 02/20/13 Defendant appeared with counsel. On motion by the state, the court continued the pre-trial conference to 3/20/13. The court noted the defense's objection. Defendant was notified in open court. 03/20/13 Defendant appeared with counsel. On motion by the state, the court continued the pre-trial conference to 4/18/13. Defendant was notified in open court. 04/18/13 Defendant appeared with counsel. The court set a trial date for 7/24/13. Defendant was notified in open court. 07/09/13 Counsel appeared on behalf of defendant and waived his presence. Defense filed a motion to quash the bill of information. The court set a hearing on the motion for 7/17/13. 07/17/13 The court granted the defense's motion to quash the bill of information. DISCUSSION
The underlying facts are not relevant for the purposes of the appeal.
The trial court granted Mr. Bibbins's motion to quash based on both statutory and constitutional grounds. The trial court's ruling on a motion to quash should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Tucker, 12-1668, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/30/13), 126 So. 3d 834, 836 (citations omitted). In the state's sole assignment of error, the state argues that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Mr. Bibbins's motion to quash.
The trial court's ruling states in pertinent part:
It has been more than two years since the State instituted this case by filing a bill of information which is beyond the limit permissible for a felony charge under [La. C.Cr.P. art.] 578, thus interfering with the defendant's right to speedy trial under both the Louisiana and United States Constitution.
Statutory Limitations
The state contends that Mr. Bibbins filed certain pleadings and motions which suspended the time limitations, setting the date by which to commence trial past March 18, 2012, two years after the bill of information was filed. As a general rule, La. C.Cr.P. art. 578(A)(2) states: "Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter, no trial shall be commenced nor any bail obligation be enforceable . . . [in] [non-capital] felony cases after two years from the date of institution of the prosecution." An exception to the two year limit is set forth in La. C.Cr.P. art. 580, which states in pertinent part:
A. When a defendant files a motion to quash or other preliminary plea, the running of the periods of limitation established
by Article 578 shall be suspended until the ruling of the court thereon; but in no case shall the state have less than one year after the ruling to commence the trial.
Pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 580, when the time limitations established in La. C.Cr.P. art. 578 have expired, the court, upon the defendant's motion to quash the bill of indictment, must dismiss the charge.
The Louisiana Supreme Court calculates time from one year from the date the court rules on the motion to continue or other preliminary motion. In State v. Brooks, 02-0792 (La. 2/14/03); 838 So.2d 778, the defendant appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to quash. The Court reasoned:
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the continuance of the status hearing on June 20, 2000, on respondent's behalf, for purposes of allowing him to substitute other retained counsel for the inexplicably missing [previous counsel], constituted a preliminary plea within the scope of La.C.Cr.P. art. 580 and gave the state at least until June 20, 2001 to bring the case to trial.Brooks, 02-0792 at p.9, 838 So.2d at 784. See also State v. Fabacher, 362 So.2d 555, 556-57 (La.1978), (whereby the court ruled that "the state could have no less than one year after the court's ruling on defendant's motion for a continuance to commence the trial.") Thus, the State had at least one year from the date of the court's ruling on Mr. Bibbins's motion to continue to initiate trial.
The trial court ruled on Mr. Bibbins's joint motion to continue on June 26, 2012. Therefore, the state had until June 26, 2013 to commence trial. The record reveals that the state failed to commence trial against Mr. Bibbins on or prior to June 26, 2013, and the statutory time limits expired. As such, the trial court properly granted Mr. Bibbins's motion to quash and did not abuse its discretion in doing so. For these reasons, we hereby affirm the judgment of the trial court.
AFFIRMED