Opinion
2 CA-CR 2012-0419-PR
02-21-2013
Amos Beverett In Propria Persona
NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Not for Publication
Rule 111, Rules of
the Supreme Court
PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PIMA COUNTY
Cause No. CR20091782001
Honorable Danelle B. Liwski, Judge
REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED
Amos Beverett San Luis
In Propria Persona
ESPINOSA, Judge. ¶1 Amos Beverett petitions this court for review of the trial court's order summarily denying his petition for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. We will not disturb that ruling unless the court clearly has abused its discretion. See State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, ¶ 4, 166 P.3d 945, 948 (App. 2007). Beverett has not met his burden of establishing such abuse here. ¶2 Beverett was convicted after a jury trial of three counts of sale and/or transfer of a narcotic drug and sentenced to concurrent, presumptive prison terms of 15.75 years. We affirmed his convictions and sentences on appeal. State v. Beverett, No. 2 CA-CR 2010-0397 (memorandum decision filed Dec. 14, 2011). Beverett filed a notice of and pro se petition for post-conviction relief, arguing his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress evidence and object to testimony related to statements made to police officers by a confidential informant that had led police officers to investigate Beverett. The trial court summarily denied relief, concluding there had been no basis to file a motion to suppress or raise a hearsay objection during trial. ¶3 On review, Beverett repeats his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, insisting the fact the police investigation was prompted by information obtained from a confidential informant violated his Fourth Amendment rights, a police officer's testimony about that information constituted inadmissible hearsay in violation of Beverett's right to confrontation, and his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to raise these arguments at trial. We have reviewed the record and conclude the trial court correctly resolved Beverett's claims in a thorough and well-reasoned minute entry, which we adopt. See State v. Whipple, 177 Ariz. 272, 274, 866 P.2d 1358, 1360 (App. 1993) (when trial court correctly rules on issues raised "in a fashion that will allow any court in the future to understand the resolution[, n]o useful purpose would be served by this court rehashing the trial court's correct ruling in a written decision"). ¶4 Beverett additionally asks us to review his case under the "fundamental error doctrine," claiming that the alleged violation of his confrontation rights based on the admission of hearsay evidence warrants a new trial. To the extent he raised this argument below, it could have been raised on appeal and therefore is precluded. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3), (c). ¶5 Although review is granted, relief is denied.
Although the trial court initially appointed counsel to represent Beverett, it relieved counsel based on Beverett's request to proceed pro se.
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PHILIP G. ESPINOSA, Judge
CONCURRING: _______________
GARYE L. VÁSQUEZ, Presiding Judge
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VIRGINIA C. KELLY, Judge