Opinion
No. 37959-7-II.
May 12, 2009.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 07-1-01852-4, Frederick W. Fleming, J., entered June 13, 2008.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Quinn-Brintnall, J., concurred in by Houghton and Hunt, JJ.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
A jury found Tarina Ann Berry guilty of first degree robbery. Berry appeals her conviction, arguing that the State failed to prove that the victim sustained a bodily injury as required by RCW 9A.56.200(1)(a)(iii). Because there is sufficient evidence of the victim's bodily injury, we affirm.
FACTS
On April 5, 2007, Verena Coss, who was 81 years old, stopped at a gas station on her way to buy gifts for her grandchildren. As Coss left the gas station, Berry asked her for a ride to a Fred Meyer store. Coss agreed to give her a ride and, on the way to the store, Berry said that her aunt lived nearby and asked Coss to drive into an alley near the house. When Coss pulled in to the alley, Berry demanded that Coss hand over her money. Coss resisted, and Berry punched Coss in the face, arm, and shoulder. Berry took the money out of Coss's purse and fled.
The State charged Berry with one count of first degree robbery. At trial, Coss testified that she felt pain when Berry struck her during the robbery. A jury found Berry guilty as charged. Berry timely appeals her conviction.
ANALYSIS
Berry argues that the State did not provide sufficient evidence of the victim's bodily injury, an essential element of her first degree robbery conviction. We disagree.
Sufficiency of the evidence is a question of constitutional magnitude and can be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Alvarez, 128 Wn.2d 1, 13, 904 P.2d 754 (1995). In determining whether sufficient evidence supports a conviction, we review "whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Rempel, 114 Wn.2d 77, 82, 785 P.2d 1134 (1990) (citing State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 221, 616 P.2d 628 (1980)).
A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State's evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence are equally reliable for purposes of drawing inferences. State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980). A reviewing court defers to the trier of fact for purposes of resolving conflicting testimony and evaluating the persuasiveness of the evidence. State v. Hernandez, 85 Wn. App. 672, 675, 935 P.2d 623 (1997) (citing State v. Walton, 64 Wn. App. 410, 415-16, 824 P.2d 533, review denied, 119 Wn.2d 1011 (1992)). In other words, credibility determinations are for the trier of fact and are not subject to our review. State v. Camarillo, 115 Wn.2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d 850 (1990).
To convict Berry of first degree robbery, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she (1) unlawfully took property of another, (2) intended to do so (3) by use of force (4) in order to obtain the property, and (5) in the commission of the robbery or flight, inflicted a bodily injury. RCW 9A.56.190, .200(1)(a)(iii). "Bodily injury" means "physical pain or injury, illness, or an impairment of physical condition." RCW 9A.04.110(4)(a). Berry only argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove that she inflicted a bodily injury on Coss.
Berry contends that evidence of physical injury is required to satisfy the bodily injury definition of RCW 9A.04.110(4)(a). We look to a statute's plain language in order to fulfill its obligation and give effect to legislative intent. Lacey Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 128 Wn.2d 40, 53, 905 P.2d 338 (1995). When faced with an unambiguous statute, we derive the legislature's intent from the plain language alone. Waste Mgmt. of Seattle, Inc., v. Util. Transp. Comm'n, 123 Wn.2d 621, 629, 869 P.2d 1034 (1994).
Because there is no ambiguity in the definition of "bodily injury" within RCW 9A.04.110(4)(a), we give effect to its plain language meaning. Bodily injury is defined as physical pain or injury, illness, or an impairment of physical condition. Coss testified that she experienced pain when Berry punched her. This testimony was sufficient to satisfy the "physical pain" definition of bodily injury.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, any rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Berry inflicted a bodily injury, as defined by RCW 9A.04.110(4)(a), upon Coss in the course of unlawfully taking her purse, thus proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Berry committed first degree robbery in violation of RCW 9A.56.200(1)(a)(iii) as charged.
Accordingly, we affirm.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
HOUGHTON, P.J. and HUNT, J., concur.