Ibid. (quoting Keppel v. Tiffin Sav. Bank, 197 U.S. 356, 362, 25 S.Ct. 443, 445, 49 L.Ed. 790, 792). “ ‘When choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.’ ” Ibid. (quoting United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221–22, 73 S.Ct. 227, 229, 97 L.Ed. 260, 264 (1952)); see also State v. Bernstein, 189 N.J.Super. 212, 219, 459 A.2d 1185 (App.Div.1983) (“[T]he statute is penal and thus must be strictly construed, so that no act is unlawful under it unless plainly and unmistakably forbidden.”). “The rule of lenity is an important principle of statutory construction; if a statutory ambiguity cannot be resolved by analysis of the relevant text and the use of extrinsic aids, the rule requires that the ambiguity be resolved in favor of the defendant.”
Any other proceedings where jurisdiction is granted by statute. In State v. Bernstein, 189 N.J. Super. 212, 216 (App. Div. 1983), we reversed the defendant's conviction for theft, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a), because "the municipal court did not have jurisdiction to enter the conviction." There, the municipal judge found that the value of the stolen property was $499, a fourth-degree offense over which the municipal court had jurisdiction "only if the defendant waive[d] indictment and trial by jury in writing and the county prosecutor consent[ed] in writing.
Its characterization of the PCAA as a qui tam statute was dicta and overlooked the 1908 legislation that changed how fines, penalties and moneys were paid. In State v. Bernstein, 189 N.J. Super. 212, 459 A.2d 1185 (App. Div. 1983), the defendant was criminally prosecuted in conjunction with a civil claim for animal abuse under N.J.S.A. 4:22–26. The SPCA prosecuted the appeal of the civil claim even though the complaint was filed in the name of the State.