State v. Beno

42 Citing cases

  1. State v. Chvala

    2004 WI App. 53 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 6 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In Chvala, 271 Wis. 2d 115, ¶ 52, we construed this argument as follows: May a court interpret an internal legislative rule to determine criminal liability if, when applied to the facts of the specific case, the rule is not ambiguous?

    Whether a statute violates the speech and debate clause presents a question of constitutional interpretation. See generally State v. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d 122, 341 N.W.2d 668 (1984). The framers' objective in enacting WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 16 was "to ensure the independence of the legislature and the integrity of the legislative process by precluding the possibility of intimidation or harassment of members of the legislature."

  2. State v. Burke

    653 N.W.2d 922 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 1 times   2 Legal Analyses

    (3) The earliest interpretation of this section by the legislature as manifested in the first law passed following the adoption of the constitution.State v. Beno, 116 Wis.2d 122, 136-37, 341 N.W.2d 668 (1984) (citations omitted). ¶ 5.

  3. Jacobs v. Major

    132 Wis. 2d 82 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 6 times
    In Jacobs, this court gave "great weight" to the New York court's construction of its free speech constitutional provision in deciding whether the Wisconsin Constitution secures the right to free speech against private infringements.

    State v. Beno, 116 Wis.2d 122, 136, 341 N.W.2d 668, 675 (1984). The analysis requires a court first to examine the plain meaning of the words in the context used.

  4. State v. Williams

    2012 WI 59 (Wis. 2012)   Cited 19 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In Williams, we addressed whether a circuit court commissioner's issuance of a search warrant was an exercise of the judicial power vested in the unified court system by Article VII, Section 2 of the Wisconsin Constitution.

    An obvious source to examine is the United States Constitution, which also explicitly vests “[t]he judicial power” in the Supreme Court, as well as in other inferior courts that Congress may establish. U.S. Const. Art. III, § 1; see State v. Beno, 116 Wis.2d 122, 135–37, 341 N.W.2d 668 (1984) (acknowledging that the framers of the Wisconsin Constitution sought guidance from the federal Constitution). Scholars have noted that there does not appear to be a clear statement as to the meaning of “[t]he judicial power” in the federal Constitution, but that many courts and academics have conceived of the principle as either directly analogous to, or closely related to, subject matter jurisdiction.

  5. Coulee Catholic Schools v. Labor & Industry Review Commission

    2009 WI 88 (Wis. 2009)   Cited 27 times
    Applying ministerial exception

    As with any document, the interpretive task is to "ascertain its true intent and meaning." State v. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d 122, 136-37, 341 N.W.2d 668 (1984). The authoritative, and usually final, indicator of the meaning of a provision is the text — the actual words used.

  6. Custodian of Records v. State

    2004 WI 65 (Wis. 2004)   Cited 25 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Reminding "all who participate in John Doe investigations that the power wielded by the government is considerable. Accordingly, there is a potential for infringing on . . . constitutional rights"

    Wahl also contends that he is excused from complying with the subpoena because Article IV, Section 16 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides that "[n]o member of the legislature shall be liable in any civil action, or criminal prosecution whatever, for words spoken in debate." It is Wahl's position that according to State v. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d 122, 341 N.W.2d 668 (1984), he is entitled to raise Section 16 as a defense to the subpoena, even though the communications are not his, because he is the agent of the legislators who could raise that defense. On the other hand, the State asserts that the John Doe proceeding is an investigation of alleged criminal activity that is not closely related to the purpose for which Section 16 was enacted; therefore, Section 16 is no defense.

  7. Polk County v. State Public Defender

    188 Wis. 2d 665 (Wis. 1994)   Cited 15 times

    We interpret provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution de novo. See State v. Beno, 116 Wis.2d 122, 136-38, 341 N.W.2d 668, 674 (1984). In Beno, this court set forth the appropriate analysis for interpreting provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution: (1) the plain meaning of the words in the context used, (2) the historical analysis of the constitutional debates and of what practices were in existence in 1848; and (3) the earliest interpretation of the provision by the legislature as manifested in the earliest law passed following the adoption of the constitution.

  8. Davenport v. Garcia

    834 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1992)   Cited 214 times
    Holding that the Texas Constitution provides greater protection against prior restraints of speech

    Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293, 102 S.Ct. 1070, 1076, 71 L.Ed.2d 152 (1982) (acknowledging that the Texas Constitution could provide broader protections than federal Constitution); Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 F.2d 1039, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding a restraining order overbroad under the California Constitution). Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1990) (looking to federal law only after finding no inverse condemnation under the state constitution); Mountain States Tel. Tel. Co. v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 160 Ariz. 350, 773 P.2d 455, 461 (1989); In re T.W., 551 So.2d 1186, 1190 (Fla. 1989); O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., 71 N.Y.2d 521, 528 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6, 523 N.E.2d 277, 282 (1988) (Kaye, J., concurring); State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 500 A.2d 233, 238 (1985) (federal law considered but required briefing of the state constitutional issue before the case could be decided); State v. Koppel, 127 N.H. 286, 499 A.2d 977, 979 (1985); State v. Beno, 116 Wis.2d 122, 341 N.W.2d 668 (1984) (following the state constitution even though recognizing the existence of a closely corresponding federal speech and debate clause found in U.S. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 6, cl. 1); People v. Rolfingsmeyer, 101 Ill.2d 137, 77 Ill. Dec. 787, 790-92, 461 N.E.2d 410, 413-15 (1984) (Simon, J., concurring); State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952, 959 (1982) (Pashman, J., concurring); Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 513-15 (Alaska 1975) (Boochever, J., concurring); Burrows v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 13 Cal.3d 238, 118 Cal.Rptr. 166, 529 P.2d 590 (1975); Freedman v. New Jersey State Police, 135 N.J. Super. 297, 343 A.2d 148, 150 (1975); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N YU.L.Rev. 535 (1986) (hereinafter Brennan, Revival of State Constitutions ); Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate and Independent State Grounds as a Means of Balancing the Relationship Between State and Federal Court

  9. Davis v. Grover

    166 Wis. 2d 501 (Wis. 1992)   Cited 24 times
    Holding that the uniformity clause requires the legislature to provide the state's school children with the opportunity to receive a free uniform basic education, and the school choice program “merely reflects a legislative desire to do more than that which is constitutionally mandated”

    To determine the constitutionality of the Parental Choice Program the court must look to the words of art. X, the constitutional debates and educational practices in existence in 1848, and the earliest interpretations by the legislature. State v. Beno, 116 Wis.2d 122, 136-37, 341 N.W.2d 668 (1984). If these sources do not provide an answer, the court will look to "the objectives of the framers in adopting the provision."

  10. Jacobs v. Major

    139 Wis. 2d 492 (Wis. 1987)   Cited 62 times
    Finding no state action and noting that "[i]t is clear that malls . . . [cannot] be said to have an essentially public function. Malls, shopping centers, department stores, and specialty stores exist for primarily one function: profit for their owners. The public nature of their business is a byproduct. . . ."

    Therefore, the defendants argue their freedom of expression is protected in the East Towne and West Towne malls through Art. I, sec. 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution. As we stated in State v. Beno, 116 Wis.2d 122, 136, 341 N.W.2d 668 (1984): "We have previously articulated the analysis which a court should employ in interpreting provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution.